Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 23STCV15465, Date: 2025-03-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15465 Hearing Date: March 17, 2025 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: March
17, 2025
CASE NAME: Mohamed
Taqieldin v. DCH Torrance Imports Inc., dba DCH Toyota of Torrance
CASE NO.: 23STCV15465
MOTION
TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Lithia Motors, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Mohamed Taqieldin
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
Order striking various portions of the First Amended Complaint pertaining to punitive
damages.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
to Strike is GRANTED with 21 days’ leave to amend.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On July 3, 2023, Plaintiff Mohamed Taqieldin (Plaintiff)
filed a Complaint against Defendant DCH Torrance Imports Inc., dba DCH Toyota
of Torrance (DCH) with thirteen causes of action for: (1) race discrimination
in violation of FEHA; (2) religious creed discrimination in violation of FEHA;
(3) gender discrimination in violation of FEHA; (4) harassment in violation of
FEHA; (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to prevent
discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (7) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy; (8) violation of California Labor
Code § 510 (unpaid overtime); (9) violation of California Labor Code §§ 226(A)
and 1174 (non-compliant wage statements); (10) violation of California Labor
Code §§ 201-203 (failure to pay all wages and on a timely basis); (11)
violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(A) (unpaid meal period
premiums); (12) violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.;
and (13) violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 (rest break violations).
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff worked for DCH’s auto
dealership as sales representative from April 2022 until his wrongful
termination in July 2022. Plaintiff contends that DCH discriminated against him
as an Egyptian Muslim man. Plaintiff further contends various other labor code
violations.
On October 13, 2023, DCH filed a demurrer to the Fifth Cause
of Action with motion to strike which the court SUSTAINED with leave to amend
and DENIED.
On December 21, 2023,
Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC).
On January 23, 2024, DCH filed a demurrer to the FAC which
the court SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a fictitious name
amendment changing substituting DOE 1 for Lithia Motors, Inc. (Lithia).
On March 15, 2024, DCH filed an Answer to the FAC.
On November 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice and
Acknowledgement of Receipt concerning Lithia.
On December 16, 2024, Lithia filed the instant Motion to
Strike portions of the FAC (MTS). On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed an
opposition. On March 10, 2025, Lithia filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Meet
and Confer
“Before filing a motion to strike …, the moving party shall
meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading
that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an
agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the
motion to strike.” (CCP § 435.5, subd. (a).) Here, the parties met and
conferred on December 13, 2024 and were unable to reach an agreement. (Noel
Decl. ¶ 10.) Accordingly, this requirement is met.
Motion
to Strike
The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its
discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., (CCP) §
436, subds. (a)-(b).)¿¿
ANALYSIS:
Evidentiary
Objections
The court is unaware of any legal authority which requires a
court to rule on evidentiary objections on a motion, except as to a motion for
summary motion/adjudication [CCP §¿437c (q)] or a special motion to strike [CCP
§ 425.16 (b)(2); see also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane
Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-949.] Accordingly, this court
respectfully declines to rule on any of these objections.
Motion to Strike
Lithia seeks an order striking the following portions of the
FAC:
1. FAC,
Paragraph 34, page 7, lines 2-6: The portion of this paragraph, which reads:
“In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted maliciously, fraudulently,
and oppressively, in an intentional and deliberate manner, in violation of
Plaintiffs civil rights, and with a conscious disregard of Plaintiffs civil
rights and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount to
be determined at trial according to proof.”
2. FAC,
Paragraph 51, page 9, lines 3-6: The portion of this paragraph, which reads:
“In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted maliciously, fraudulently,
and oppressively, in an intentional and deliberate manner, in violation of
Plaintiff's civil rights, and with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff s civil
rights and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount to
be determined at trial according to proof.”
3. FAC,
Paragraph 70, page 11, lines 20-23: The portion of this paragraph, which reads:
“In doing the acts herein alleged,
Defendants acted maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, in an intentional
and deliberate manner, in violation of Plaintiff's civil rights, and with a
conscious disregard of Plaintiff s civil rights and Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial according
to proof.”
4. FAC,
Paragraph 79, page 12, lines 23-26: The portion of this paragraph, which reads:
“In doing the acts herein alleged,
Defendants acted maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, in an intentional
and deliberate manner, in violation of Plaintiff's civil rights, and with a
conscious disregard of Plaintiff s civil rights and Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial according
to proof.”
5. FAC,
Paragraph 82, page 13, lines 9-13: The portion of this paragraph, which reads: “Defendant through its officers, directors,
managing agents, and/or supervisory employees, intentionally created or
knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a
reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have had no reasonable
alternative except to resign.”
6. FAC,
Prayer for Damages, Paragraph 8, page 21, lines 9-10: which reads: “For punitive damages;”
Lithia contends Plaintiff insufficiently alleged facts warranting
punitive damages. Plaintiff argues they did. Lithia replies there are no
specific facts that Lithia was Plaintiff’s employer.
“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages,
a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive
damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman,
supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery
of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising
from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code
§ 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to
plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code
§ 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”
(Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on
the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal
rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere
allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an
award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v.
Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there by
circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the
pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.;
see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)
In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the
defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages . . . . Punitive
damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme
indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should
not have to tolerate.” (Flyer’s Body Shop
Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149,
1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051
[“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are reprehensible,
fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)
Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) provides:
An employer shall not be liable for
damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the
employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the
employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the
damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.
With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious
disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice
must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.
(Civ. Code § 3294(b).)
Upon reviewing the FAC, Plaintiff insufficiently alleged a
claim for punitive damages. First, Plaintiff alleges he was terminated as part
of a campaign of discrimination directed at Muslim employees, resulting in
Plaintiff’s and five other Muslim employees, less than an hour after Plaintiff
acknowledged to the General Manager that he had been praying. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 22,
23, 24.) The court also notes that since the specific identifies of the
officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Lithia that authorized and/or
ratified the alleged harassment and discrimination are still to be determined
through discovery, these allegations are sufficient to constitute the punitive
damages claim for purposes of the instant motion. (See Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [less specificity required when it appears from the
nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full
information concerning the facts of the controversy.]) However, Plaintiff
failed to allege that Lithia was his employer. This is a curable deficiency.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion to strike with
leave to amend.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Motion
to Strike is GRANTED with 21 days’ leave to amend.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 17, 2025 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court