Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 23STCV16264, Date: 2025-01-29 Tentative Ruling

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1. Demurrer to the First Cause of Action and Third Cause of Action for failing to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action;

4. Plaintiff to file a Third Amended Complaint within 30 days’ notice of this ruling.

On July 12, 2023, Plaintiff MCJ Petro Tanklines, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a Verified Complaint against Defendant City of Bellflower (Defendant) requesting declaratory relief, temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions.

On August 6, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant filed a Stipulation with Proposed Order to allow Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint which the court GRANTED.

On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) with causes of action for (1) Trespass to Land; (2) Declaratory Relief; and (3) Injunctive Relief. According to the SAC, Plaintiff owns land located at 10015 Artesia Place, Bellflower, California 90706 (the Property). Plaintiff alleges they obtained zoning approval to park semi tractor trailers trucks and empty fuel tankers on the Property but that Defendant trespassed on the Property and demanded Plaintiff remove the empty fuel tanker trucks from the Property. In order to keep Defendant from impounding its trucks, Plaintiff removed the vehicles and stored them in a different location.

On December 18, 2024, the court advanced the hearing date on the demurrer with motion to strike to January 29, 2025.

Replies were due on or before January 22, 2025. As of January 24, 2025, the court has not received any replies.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). ¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.)¿Here, the parties met and conferred on October 2, 2024 but were unable to resolve the issues concerning the SAC. (Campen Decl. ¶ 3.) Accordingly, the meet and confer requirement is met.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)¿

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id.¿§¿437.)¿“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿¿

The court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h).)

Defendant contends this claim fails because Plaintiff insufficiently alleged facts it was harmed or that a trespass was a substantial factor in causing such harm. Plaintiff argues that they sufficiently alleged damages resulting from the trespasses.

The elements for trespass are: 1) plaintiff's ownership, or control, of the property; 2) defendant's intentional, reckless, or negligent, entry onto property; 3) lack of permission for entry, or actions in excess of permission; 4) harm; and 5) the actions were a substantial factor in causing harm. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal. App. 5th 245, 262 (citing CACI 2000).

Upon reviewing the SAC, Plaintiff insufficiently alleged a claim for trespass. Notably, Plaintiff did not allege facts that Defendant did not have permission to enter the Property.[1] (Civic Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16-17 [“Where there is a consensual entry, there is no tort, because lack of consent is an element of the wrong.”]) Rather, Plaintiff alleges that: “On or about March 22, 2023, by Defendant’s own admission, Defendant trespassed.” (SAC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendant, along with the Los Angeles County Fire Department against Plaintiff’s wishes conducted an inspection of the PROPERTY.” (Ibid.) However, conducting an inspection against Plaintiff’s wishes is not the same as entering the Property against Plaintiff’s wishes. And, concluding that Defendant trespassed is not a fact.

Defendant contends this claim fails because it is not a standalone cause of action but a remedy. Plaintiff argues that they sufficiently alleged irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief due to Defendant’s repeated threats to enter the Property without Plaintiff’s permission and impound Plaintiff’s trucks coupled with Plaintiff’s accrual of off-site parking fees out of fear from Defendant impounding the trucks.

“Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 65.) “A cause of action must exist before a court may grant a request for injunctive relief.” (Ibid.) A plaintiff “may still obtain injunctive relief if they prevail on a cause of action.” (Id. at p. 65-66.)

Here, the court agrees that injunctive relief is not a standalone cause of action. Rather, it is a remedy. Plaintiff’s reliance on Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499 is misplaced. There, the underlying claim was for unfair business practices and the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. (Hewlett, supra, at p. 539-541.) Plaintiff’s reliance on Styrene Information & Research Center v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1082 is similarly flawed. The opinion does state that the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. (Styrene, supra, at p. 1092.) What it does not do is state that the injunctive relief was a standalone cause of action. In the SAC, Plaintiff at a minimum has a claim for declaratory relief. (SAC ¶¶ 67-102.) This is therefore, at minimum, the underlying claim on which Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Still, to the extent injunctive relief is proper, it belongs in the prayer for relief. (See Allen, supra, at p. 65-66.)

Defendant moves to strike the Third Cause of Action from the SAC. However, in light of the above ruling, this is duplicative of the demurrer request.

Leave to amend should be liberally granted if there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the defect.¿ (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1018,1035.)¿ The Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that leave to amend should be granted, and that the defects can be cured by amendment. (“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Here, leave to amend is warranted as to the First Cause of Action but not as to the Third Cause of action. First, Plaintiff requested leave to amend. Second, the deficiencies identified in the First Cause of Action are reasonably possible to cure. However, Plaintiff cannot reasonably cure the deficiencies of the Third Cause of Action because injunctive relief is a remedy, not a standalone cause of action.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff one final time to amend the First Cause of Action Only.

4. Plaintiff to file a Third Amended Complaint within 30 days’ notice of this ruling.

[1] The court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument concerning harm because physical trespass allows for nominal damages. (Staples v. Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1406; See CACI 2000; Armitage v. Decker (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 887, 905 [“The general rule is simply that damages may be recovered for annoyance and distress, including mental anguish, proximately caused by a trespass.”].)