Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 23STCV16616, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

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RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Inancy Chery as an aggrieved employee on behalf of all other aggrieved employees

1. Demurrer to the Complaint because there is another pending action between the same parties on the same cause of action (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(c).);

2. Alternatively, an order staying this matter pending resolution of the duplicative Cristales matter.

On July 17, 2023, Plaintiff Inancy Chery, as an aggrieved employee and on behalf of all other aggrieved employed under the Labor Code Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (Plaintiff) filed a PAGA Complaint against Defendant Sajahtera Inc. dba Beverly Hills Hotel (Defendant) with one cause of action for violating various Labor Code sections.

On November 2, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation to stay proceedings pending mediation.

On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Related Case identifying Ana Cristales v. Sajahtera, Inc. Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 23STCV10210 filed May 8, 2023 (the Cristales Matter).

On February 7, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Related Case identifying the Cristales Matter.

On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer. On April 25, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.

The court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice. The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords¿of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452,¿subds. (c), (d), and (h).)¿

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). ¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.)¿Here, the parties met and conferred on August 28, 2023 via telephone. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 5.) Accordingly, this requirement is met.

“A plea in abatement pursuant to section 430.10, subdivision (c), may be made by demurrer or answer when there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. In determining whether the causes of action are the same for purposes of pleas in abatement, the rule is that such a plea may be maintained only¿where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action.¿Where a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending termination of the first action.”¿ (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 787–788 (internal citations omitted).)¿ “In order to sustain the plea of another action pending it is essential that it shall appear: (1) That both suits are predicated upon the same cause of action; (2) that both suits are pending in the same jurisdiction; and (3) that both suits are contested by the same parties.”¿(Colvig v. RKO General, Inc.¿(1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 56, 70.)

Defendant contends that under the doctrine of concurrent exclusive jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint is duplicative of another PAGA Complaint pending that seeks the same statutory relief, for nearly identical timeframes, on behalf of the State of California. Plaintiff argues that the two cases are not identical, that enforcing the entire Labor Code is not a primary right, and multiple PAGA claims are not uncommon. Plaintiff also argues that, to the extent the other matter is compelled to arbitration, it would not have preclusive effect on this one. Defendant replies that Plaintiff’s argument is speculative and that Plaintiff cannot escape that, as the State’s proxy, her claims are identical to those in the Cristales matter.

Defendant correctly points out that an employee plaintiff pursing a PAGA claim does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies. (Arias v. Superior Court¿(2009) 46 Cal.4th¿969, 986; Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 681-682 (Turrieta); Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255 (Shaw).)¿ Similarly, a PAGA claim “is not a dispute between an employer and an employee…[i]t is a dispute between an employer and the¿state,¿which alleges directly or through its agents – either the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or aggrieved employees – that the employer has violated the Labor Code.” (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC¿(2014) 59 Cal.4th¿348, 386-387.)¿ It is clear the real-party-in-interest in all of the PAGA actions asserted against Defendant is the State of California.

As such, PAGA’s enforcement mechanism permits the state to act through more than one employee with respect to a PAGA claim against a particular employer and “does not foreclose separate but similar actions by different employees against the same employer.” (Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 873 [abrogated on other grounds]; See Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 683.) Absent authority allowing the court to disregard the separate identity of the nominal plaintiffs, the cases lack absolute identity of parties.[1]

Defendant alternatively contends that the court should stay this action pending resolution of the Cristales Action to avoid costly concurrent litigation of two substantially identical PAGA matters. Plaintiff argues a stay is improper because the two claims are so dissimilar, the arbitrator’s ruling in Cristales would have no preclusive effect here, and there is no reason to disallow multiple PAGA actions from proceeding concurrently. Defendant replies any recover in Cristales would encompass any civil penalties recoverable here and if Cristales loses standing then Plaintiff can continue without impact.

¿“Under the rule of¿exclusive¿concurrent¿jurisdiction, ‘when two [California] superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all¿parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.’”¿(People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-70 quoting Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 786-87.)¿“The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy, and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.”¿(Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at 770.) Priority of jurisdiction usually resides in the tribunal where process is first served.¿ (California Union Ins. Co. v. Trinity River Land Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.)

The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar to the plea of abatement codified in Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c) and under the plea of abatement, the pendency of an earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is grounds for abatement of the second action and requires the prior pending action to be between the same parties on the same cause of action.¿(Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 787-88; Leadford v. Leadford (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 571, 574.)¿ But while the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea of abatement, it is interpreted and applied more expansively because, unlike abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of the parties, causes of action, or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.¿ (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at 770.)

“The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar to an affirmative defense and the remedy for its applicability is a stay of the second action.”¿(Id. at 769.) The rule is mandatory and if the conditions are met the issuance of a stay is a matter of right.¿ (Id. at 772.)¿ But “[t]he rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is not ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that failure to comply renders subsequent proceedings void.”¿(Id.)¿ “Since the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and the statutory plea in abatement are mandatory and not discretionary judicial actions, these issues should be raised by demurrer where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where factual issues must be resolved.¿ (Id. at 771.)¿ “Mandatory actions of the trial court should be raised by demurrer or answer; discretionary actions should be raised by appropriate motion.”¿ (Id.) ¿

Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.”¿ (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) Trial judges have inherent powers to manage and fashion procedures to control litigation to insure the orderly administration of justice.¿(Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; see also Code Civ. Proc. §§ 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”] and (a)(5) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.”])¿¿

Here, a stay is warranted. First, the Cristales Action asserts substantially similar Labor Code violations for a time period nearly identical to Plaintiff’s.[2] Indeed, Plaintiff’s own notice of related cases indicates that Cristales “involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims.” (Notice of Related Cases item 1(h).) Second, the court is persuaded that it would waste both the parties’ and the judicial resources to allow both cases to proceed simultaneously.[3] Finally, there is no risk of harm to Plaintiff because the purpose of a PAGA action is for the State’s benefit, not the individual plaintiff. (See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986.) Should Cristales fail, Plaintiff can lift the stay and continue this case.

[1] The court notes that multiple federal authorities have rejected a “first-to-file” bar for PAGA claims. (See Gonzalez v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (E.D.Cal. Aug. 1, 2018, No. 16-cv-01891-DAD-JLT) 2018 WL 3689564, at *4; Tan v. GrubHub, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016) 171 F.Supp.3d 998, 1011-1013 [cited in Julian]; O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 4, 2016, Nos. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 14-cv-5200-EMC, 15-cv-3667-EMC) 2016 WL 11556426, at *1.)¿ Although this authority is not binding, the court finds its reasoning persuasive.

[2] While the Legislature did not intend to foreclose overlapping PAGA litigation, “the judgment in [a PAGA representative] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding.” (Arias v. Superior Court¿(2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 985.) The Court of Appeal in Shaw v. The Superior Court reasoned that there is a circumstance where a court may stay a subsequent PAGA representative action. Specifically, it reasoned that a court has the “power to stay a subsequent PAGA representative suit that is wholly subsumed by a prior PAGA representative suit—i.e., where the second suit alleges the same Labor Code violations based on the same facts and theories as the prior suit. . . .” (Shaw, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at 401.) The Shaw Court further articulated that: “While the Legislature sought to maximize code enforcement and deter future violations, we do not discern an intent in PAGA to waste judicial resources, encourage a multiplicity of duplicative suits, and prohibit courts from staying suits that might otherwise lead to inconsistent results. PAGA and the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule can rationally coexist, and so they must.” (Ibid.)

[3] Indeed, the court is unaware of authority allowing more than one set of PAGA plaintiff attorneys to recover attorneys’ fees.