Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV01880, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV01880    Hearing Date: June 13, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   June 13, 2024                                     

CASE NAME:            Jose C Leanos Velazquez v. Gregg Drilling, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                24STCV01880

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Gregg Drilling, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Jose C Leanos Velazquez

TENTATIVE RULING:

Motion to Strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff Jose C Leanos Velazquez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Gregg Drilling, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging cause of action for (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of FEHA; and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

The Complaint alleges that Defendant was Plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his back and foot while working, was diagnosed with Lumbosacral Radiculopathy, and was given work restrictions. His injuries constituted a disability. Defendant failed to provide modified work and forced him off work. His work restrictions were then extended, and while he was still on leave, he was terminated. Plaintiff alleges that based on these events, he believes Defendant discriminated, harassed, and retaliated against and terminated Plaintiff based upon his age, disability, real or perceived, medical condition, real or perceived, request for accommodations for his disability, engagement in protected activities, and denied Plaintiff accommodations, denied Plaintiff an interactive process, and actually or constructively and wrongfully terminated Plaintiff. Defendant failed and refused to stop and prevent discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was actually or constructively wrongfully terminated.

On April 15, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes.

      LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

ANALYSIS:

Defendant argues that the Court should strike punitive damages from the Complaint because the Complaint (1) is bereft of factual allegations supporting Plaintiff’s claims of malice, oppression, or fraud, and (2) contains no factual allegations identifying any corporate officer, director, or managing agent whom Plaintiff claims committed said punitive acts or conduct against him. Thus, Defendant contends the Complaint lacks the required specificity for punitive damages.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he alleges intentional wrongs, not merely non-deliberate wrongs, which are supported by pleading that the wrongs were committed willfully or with a design to injure. (Complaint, ¶¶17-41.)

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Ibid.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)¿

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)¿¿“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”¿ (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.]¿ In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)¿

¿“An employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294(b).) The California Supreme Court interpreted the “latter statement as requiring the officer, director, or managing agent to be someone who¿‘exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (White v. Ultramar, Inc.¿(1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.)¿

Punitive damages are available in actions based on FEHA or violations of public policy.¿ (Commodore Home Systems v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220; Cloud v. Casey¿(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 911-912.) California law long has recognized that discharges in violation of public policy may be actionable torts for which punitive damages can be recovered under Civil Code section 3294. (E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176-177 [discharge for refusal to commit antitrust violation; availability of punitive damages no bar to recognition of action]; see also Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 77 [discharge for exercise of right to self-organization]; Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard (1949) 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 325 [discharge for acting as poll watcher; punitive damages available].) However, wrongful termination, without more, will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression.¿ (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc.¿ (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717.)¿  

Further, “[c]orporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.¿ But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.”¿ (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, internal quotations and citation omitted.)¿

Here, the Court finds the allegations are insufficient to state a claim for punitive damages. The allegations are conclusory and do not meet the specificity requirement. In sum, the allegations state that Plaintiff became disabled and needed accommodation, was placed off work, and was terminated while off work because of his disability. Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that “[b]ecause the acts taken toward Plaintiff were carried out by officers, directors and/or managing agents acting in a deliberate, cold, callous, cruel and intentional manner, in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and in order to injure and damage Plaintiff, Plaintiff requests [] punitive damages.” (Complaint, ¶30.) There are conclusory allegations of the same nature throughout the Complaint. However, there are no specific facts alleged indicating the deliberate nature of the failure to accommodate and terminate Plaintiff. Further, there is no identification of an officer, director, or managing agent who perpetrated the acts or ratified them, let alone any identification or specific facts alleged as to acts of any employee of Defendant or anyone acting on behalf of Defendant.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

Motion to Strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Moving party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             June 13, 2024                          ___________________________________

                                                                                    Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court