Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV04208, Date: 2024-11-18 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Izabella Sklar, Access Legal Services and Same Day Marriage in Los Angeles, Inc.

1. An Order Awarding $40,785 in attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendants jointly and severally.

3. Plaintiff to file a proposed amended judgment within 14 days’ notice of this ruling.

On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Izabella Sklar, Access Legal Services and Same Day Marriage in Los Angeles, Inc. (Defendants) with one cause of action for Violation of the Immigration Consultant Act. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

According to the Complaint, Defendants started offering immigration services in 2003 but did not obtain immigration consultant bonds in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 22443.3. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants created an “aura of expertise” and referred to themselves as immigration law experts without taking the immigration specialization exam, obtaining a law degree, or maintaining the required immigration consultant bond.

On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed its acceptance of Defendants’ CCP § 998 Offer to Compromise. The court entered Judgment that same day.

On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Entry of Judgment and Memorandum of Costs.

On September 4, 2024, Defendants filed a CCP § 170.6 peremptory challenge to judicial officer which the court GRANTED.

This court is unaware of any legal authority which requires a court to rule on evidentiary objections on a motion, except as to a motion for summary motion/adjudication [CCP § 437c (q)] or a special motion to strike [CCP § 425.16 (b)(2); see also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-949.] As such, this court respectfully declines to rule on any of these objections. This court is well aware of the rules of evidence, and to how much weight, if any, should be given to any of the proposed evidence.

CCP §§ 1032 and 1033.5(a)(10) provide that a prevailing party may recover its costs as a matter of right, and that those costs may include attorneys’ fees when authorized by statute, law, or contract.

“(b) Any other party who, upon information and belief, claims a violation of this chapter has been committed by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and, upon prevailing, shall recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.”

“[A]bsent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee. We explained that the purpose behind statutory fee authorizations—i.e., encouraging attorneys to act as private attorneys general and to vindicate important rights affecting the public interest—will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133-34 (emphasis in original).) “The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.... The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id. at 1134.) Other factors to consider in fixing the reasonableness of fees to be considered beyond the fee agreement alone include, but are not limited to “(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in this locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the circumstances; and (6) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.” (Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465, 470; EnPalm, LLC v.¿Teitler¿Family Trust¿(2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).)

Plaintiff contends its fees and costs are reasonable and the court should award them in full. The amount constitutes 36.2 hours billed at $750 per hour for $27,150 in attorneys’ fees plus a 1.5 lodestar multiplier. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s fees are outrageously unreasonable because this is a boilerplate complaint and Counsel’s bills are inflated and/or claimed for piggybacked work on hundreds of prior cookie-cutter cases.[1] Plaintiff replies that it is unclear which party is opposing the motion, it is untimely, the lodestar fees requested are reasonable, and Defendants did not provide admissible evidence supporting their position.

Plaintiff argues that the court should exercise its discretion to disregard Defendants’ opposition because it was untimely.

A court may properly consider papers that are not timely filed pursuant to CCP § 1005(b) unless it affects “substantial rights.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d); CCP § 475.) Here, Plaintiff responded to the substantive arguments in the opposition and so the court exercises its discretion to consider those arguments.

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party because the CCP § 998 Offer provides for entry of judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Additionally, the CCP § 998 Offer provides that Plaintiff may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County¿(9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See¿Gates v. Deukmejian¿(9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy¿(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable based on the hourly rate of similarly situated attorneys in the Los Angeles area. Based on the Laffey Matrix, attorneys with similar years of experience as Plaintiff’s counsel as identified above have comparable.[2] However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below.

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) Plaintiff provided a declaration concerning time spent on this case rather than a verified fee bill. (Medvei Decl. ¶ 4.) The court can still determine whether the items billed are reasonable and necessarily incurred. Upon reviewing these charges, Defendants’ contention that the billings are excessive and unreasonable is well taken.

Plaintiff requests 36.2 hours for this matter that settled within two months of filing the Complaint. (Medvei Decl. ¶ 4.) With Plaintiff’s expertise warranting an hourly rate of $750 (or even $1,000 alluded to), the time billed for this matter is unreasonable. First, Plaintiff’s request for 10.5 hours of pre-filing investigation is unreasonable because Plaintiff apparently did not rely on the extensive documentation in its Complaint. Rather, Plaintiff relied on Yelp reviews and Defendants’ website. (Complaint ¶¶ 13, 15.) Second, Plaintiff’s overall billing for “settlement negotiations” and “meet and confer re settlement” is suspiciously high because the supposed negotiations occurred via short emails with Defendants’ counsel and Plaintiff billed for some settlement negotiation calls that did not occur. (Gentino Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 13.) Third, Plaintiff’s billing for templated documents and Judicial Council forms is unreasonable. While templates are useful, if attorneys are still billing significant time to make minor changes, such use of legal resources is unwarranted and any such bill is unreasonable, particularly if the attorney is billing at a high hourly rate. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, at p. 250.) Finally, Plaintiff’s billing for the instant motion, reply, and hearing attendance is unreasonable because this is not such a complicated motion warranting 16 hours of work from a seasoned attorney. The court therefore reduces the hours spent from 36.2 hours to 6.2 hours.[3]

Plaintiff requests $635.66 in costs. Defendants do not challenge the costs. Therefore, the court will award costs as requested.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in part.

3.Plaintiff to file a proposed amended judgment within 14 days’ notice of this ruling.

[1] Defendants do not challenge the memorandum of costs.

[2] The court declines to apply the requested 1.5 lodestar enhancement.

[3]Either Plaintiff’s counsel is a seasoned attorney who billed unreasonably or the hours are reasonable because of counsel’s inexperience and therefore counsel is not worthy of such a high billable rate. It cannot be both.