Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV04763, Date: 2024-07-03 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 24STCV04763 Hearing Date: July 3, 2024 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: July
3, 2024
CASE NAME: Albin
Pracki v. Edge Property Management, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV04763
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DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE![]()
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Edge Property Management, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Albin Pracki
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. Demurrer
to the Sixth Cause of Action;
2. Motion
to Strike Punitive Damages.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Defendant
Edge Property’s Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is OVERRULED;
2. Defendant
Edge Property’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff Albin Pracki (Plaintiff)
filed a Complaint against Defendants Edge Property Management, Inc. and Weerts
Real Estate, Inc. (Defendants) with ten causes of action for: (1) Breach of
Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability / Tenantability
(H&S Code 17920.3 et seq.), (3)
Breach of Implied Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment (CCC Sec. 1927), (4) Negligence,
(5) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (6) Private Nuisance,
(7) Premises Liability, (8) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (9)
Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et
seq., and (10) Violation of Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff resided at 13630
Wyandotte St., Unit 310, Van Nuys, California 91405 (the Premises) which Defendants
owned and operated. Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew Plaintiff resided at the
Premises and was a contemplated tenant under the October 1, 2003 lease
agreement with Plaintiff’s sister (the Lease). Plaintiff alleges Defendants
failed to remediate poor conditions on the Premises that they knew about. Defendants
allegedly refuse to recognize Plaintiff as a tenant under the Lease.
On April 26, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Weerts Real Estate,
Inc. only.
On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Amendment to Complaint
to correct DOE 1 as Robert R. Mallicoat Charitable Trust.
On May 14, 2024, Defendant Edge Property Management, Inc. (Edge
Property) filed the instant Demurrer with Motion to Strike.
On June 4, 2024, Defendant Robert R. Mallicoat Charitable
Trust filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike.[1]
On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed untimely oppositions. On
June 26, 2024, Edge Property filed timely replies.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿¿
¿¿
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to
the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)¿¿
Motion to Strike¿
¿
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also
strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with
the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Id.¿§¿437.)¿“When the defect which
justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave
to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿
Meet and Confer¿
¿
Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required
to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc.
(CCP) §430.41 and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer
obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to CCP §430.41(a)(2) &
(3).¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP §
435.5.)¿Here, Edge Property attempted to meet and confer twice via email but
did not receive a response. (Declaration of Stephanie S. Poli ¶ 2.) Still, inadequacy of the meet and confer
process is not a sufficient ground to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (CCP §
430.41(a)(4).)
ANALYSIS:
Demurrer
Defendant Edge Property Management, Inc. (Edge Property)
contends that their demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiff’s Sixth
Cause of Action for Private Nuisance is duplicative of his Fourth Cause of
Action for Negligence. Edge Property relies on El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1337 (El Escorial) for
the proposition that Plaintiff cannot plead both negligence and private
nuisance if the claims rely on the same facts and request the same monetary
damages.[2]
Plaintiff argues that there are separate facts alleged that support a claim for
nuisance, but not negligence.[3]
A nuisance is defined as follows: “[a]nything which is injurious
to health,¿including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled
substances,¿or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any
public park,¿square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, §
3479.)
Private “[n]uisance liability arises from violation of a
duty to another that interferes with the free use and enjoyment of his or her
property.” (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property
Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1373.) The elements of a private
nuisance are: (1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and
enjoyment of his property”; (2) “ ‘the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in
the use and enjoyment of the land [must be] substantial,
i.e., that it cause[s] the plaintiff to suffer “substantial actual damage” ’ ”;
and (3) “ ‘ “[t]he interference with the protected interest must not only be
substantial, but it must also be unreasonable” [citation], i.e., it must be “of
such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference
with the use and enjoyment of the land.” ’ [Citation.]” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
248, 262-63.) Tenants may sue their landlords for a nuisance. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 903, 919.)
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts supporting a
claim for nuisance. Notably, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants harassed him as
he “continued to report the habitability defects in the Premises” by issuing “over
fifty (50) 24-hour notices to enter over a two-year period for inspections and
maintenance where none is required or requested” and that these notices are
“vague or overbroad times of entry, including some that state entry will occur
over a week period or sometimes longer.” (FAC ¶ 23.) Defendant did not address
this allegation in its demurrer. These actions support a claim for nuisance
because it shows an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property, it
is a substantial interference (over fifty intrusions over a two year period),
and is unreasonable interference with Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the
Premises because he did not request the inspections or maintenance and none was
required. This alleged conduct is more than failing to timely remedy property
damage or maintain the Premises in a habitable condition.
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Edge Property’s demurrer
to the sixth cause of action.
Motion to Strike
Edge Property moves to strike the following portions of the
Complaint:
1. Paragraph
29, Page 6:17-18: “Defendant’s conduct in furtherance of this neglectful and
retaliatory scheme warrants the imposition of punitive damages;” and
2. Prayer
for Relief, Paragraph H, Page 15: “For punitive and exemplary damages according
to statute and according to proof, and to be determined at trial.”
Edge Property contends that Plaintiff alleged negligence in
maintaining the property which does not warrant punitive damages. Plaintiff
argues they sufficiently alleged facts supporting punitive damages.
To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts in support of punitive damages.¿ (See¿Hilliard
v. A.H. Robins Co.¿(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)¿ In
addition,¿punitive damages are allowed only where “it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.”¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).)¿ Courts have viewed despicable conduct as
conduct “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it
would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Further, Civil Code § 3294(c) provides the
definition of malice, oppression, and fraud. Malice is “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Ibid.) Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Ibid.) Fraud is “an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”¿(Ibid.)¿
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts supporting a claim
for punitive damages. First, Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5(h)(2) provides for
punitive damages. This supports the Second and Third Causes of Action. Second,
Plaintiff may seek punitive damages for his nuisance claim. In Stoiber v. Honeychuck, the premises was
so dilapidated that it needed to be torn down. ((1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 912
[describing the following defects identified by the Kern County health
Department: “heavy cockroach infestation, broken interior walls broken
deteriorated flooring on front porch, falling ceiling, deteriorated, overfused
electrical wiring, lack of proper plumbing connection to sewage system in
bathroom, sewage under bathroom floor, leaking roof, broken, windows, and fire
hazard.”]) The Court there found that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to
support her prayer for punitive damages because the defendant had actual
knowledge of defective conditions in the premises, acted with full knowledge of
the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their
conduct was willful, oppressive, and malicious. (Id. at p. 920.) Unlike in Stoiber,
the nuisance claim here concerns Defendant’s alleged harassment of Plaintiff
via excessive 24-hour notices to enter. (FAC ¶ 23.) Ordinary decent people
would likely look down on a landlord posting unwarranted inspection and
maintenance notices to harass a tenant for reporting habitability defects that
impact his health. Such conduct is despicable and carried with a willful and
conscious disregard of the Plaintiff’s rights.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Edge Property’s motion to
strike.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
3. Defendant
Edge Property’s Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is OVERRULED;
4. Defendant
Edge Property’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 3, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
These motions are substantively identical to the motions filed by Defendant
Edge Property Management, Inc.
[2]
El Escorial was determined at the
trial stage, not the pleading stage.
[3]
Plaintiff does not help the court by identifying those allegations.