Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV04763, Date: 2025-02-21 Tentative Ruling

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RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Edge Property Management, Inc. and Robert R. Mallicoat Charitable Trust

b. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to provide and maintain a habitable premises under the implied warranty of habitability;

c. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to uphold the covenant of quiet enjoyment; and

d. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to act in conformance with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff Albin Pracki (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Edge Property Management, Inc. and Weerts Real Estate, Inc. (Defendants) with ten causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability / Tenantability (H&S Code 17920.3 et seq.), (3) Breach of Implied Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment (CCC Sec. 1927), (4) Negligence, (5) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (6) Private Nuisance, (7) Premises Liability, (8) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (9) Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., and (10) Violation of Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff resided at 13630 Wyandotte St., Unit 310, Van Nuys, California 91405 (the Premises) which Defendants owned and operated. Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew Plaintiff resided at the Premises and was a contemplated tenant under the October 1, 2003 lease agreement with Plaintiff’s sister (the Lease). Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to remediate poor conditions on the Premises that they knew about. Defendants allegedly refuse to recognize Plaintiff as a tenant under the Lease.

On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Weerts Real Estate, Inc. only.

On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Amendment to Complaint to correct DOE 1 as Robert R. Mallicoat Charitable Trust.

On May 14, 2024, Defendant Edge Property Management, Inc. (Edge Property) filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike which the court OVERRULED and DENIED.

On June 4, 2024, Defendant Robert R. Mallicoat Charitable Trust (Mallicoat) filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike which the court OVERRULED and DENIED.

On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Adjudication (MSA).

On November 26, 2024, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing on the MSA which the court GRANTED.

On February 7, 2025, Defendants filed an opposition. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply and an updated reply.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843). In analyzing such motions, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley¿v.¿Oakshade¿Town Center¿(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294).¿ Thus, summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP § 437c(c);¿Villa v.¿McFarren¿(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741).¿¿¿

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party¿moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element.¿(Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520). Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389). A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition or where the opposition is weak.¿(See¿Leyva v. Superior Court¿(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475;¿Salesguevara¿v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.¿¿¿¿¿

Once the¿moving¿party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party¿to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(2)).¿ When¿a¿party¿cannot¿establish an essential element or defense, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(1)-(2)).¿¿¿

The court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice in full. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿

Plaintiff contends that, as a matter of law, Defendants owe duties to him as a tenant because his sister, Denise, assigned leasehold rights to him over two years ago.[1] In other words, Plaintiff seeks a determination that he is a lawful tenant.

Defendants argue there are material factual disputes that Plaintiff is even a proper tenant and party to the lease – especially concerning landlord consent.

Plaintiff replies there is an uncontested modification to the lease that removes landlord consent for assignment.[2]

The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “A written contract may be pleaded by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) To plead a contract by its legal effect, a plaintiff must “allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.” (Ibid.)¿

The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability “are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891 review denied (July 14, 2021)). A violation of a statutory housing standard that affects health and safety is a strong indication of a materially defective condition. (Ibid.)¿¿

The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when there is an eviction, actual or constructive, of the tenant.[3] (Marchese v. Standard Realty & Development Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148.) Actual eviction occurs when there is an expulsion or ouster of the tenant by the landlord. (Giraud v. Milovich (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 543.) Constructive eviction occurs when there is a substantial and material interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises, causing the tenant to vacate. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903.) An interference by the landlord amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and surrenders possession, and the tenant will not be liable for rentals following his eviction. Upon surrendering possession of the premises, the tenant is relieved of the obligation to pay rent and may sue for damages, or may plead damages by way of offset in an action brought by the landlord to recover any unpaid rent that accrued prior to surrender. (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 590.) Alternatively, a tenant may elect to stand upon the lease, remain in possession and sue for breach of contract damages as well as for injunctive relief. (Ibid.) Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable. (Id., at pp. 589-590.)

“ ‘The [implied] covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract.’ [Citation.] The covenant is read into contracts and functions ‘as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.’ [Citation.] The covenant also requires each party to do everything the contract presupposes the party will do to accomplish the agreement’s purposes. [Citation.] A breach of the implied covenant of good faith is a breach of the contract [citation], and ‘breach of a specific provision of the contract is not…necessary’ to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [citation].” (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.) (Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff’s allegations must show “that the conduct of the defendant, whether or not it also constitutes a breach of a consensual contract term, demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement. Just what conduct will meet this criteria will depend on the contractual purposes and reasonably justified expectations of the parties.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.)¿

“The prerequisite for any action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied term in the contract.” (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 225 Cal.App.3d 48-49.)¿

Here, Plaintiff met his initial prima facie burden that he is a lawful tenant.[4] First, Plaintiff provided evidence that Denise had a lease with Defendants. (Ackerman Decl., Exhibit C.) Second, Plaintiff provides evidence he had at least a sublease with Denise because he declares that he paid rent to Denise and, when Denise moved to assisted living, Defendants did not indicate that his continued occupancy was unapproved or problematic. (Pracki Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 7,9, 10.) The burden shifts.

Defendants met their burden demonstrating triable material facts as to whether Plaintiff is a lawful tenant. First, Defendants provided emails between Plaintiff and Defendants’ agent whereby the agent repeatedly tell Plaintiff he is not on the lease and that they need requests from Denise (who is). (Poli Decl., Exhibit B.) Second, Defendants rebut Plaintiff’s declaration that he paid rent by providing rent checks during Plaintiff’s supposed co-tenancy that are not from Plaintiff. (Poli Decl., Exhibit A.)

Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication.

[1] Plaintiff’s ten causes of action are rooted in Defendants’ obligations to him as lawfully occupying the premises.

[2] The purported updated reply is substantively identical to the reply.

[3] Plaintiff admitted he has not vacated the premises. (Pracki Decl. ¶ 11.)

[4] Plaintiff’s reliance on Little v. Guadron (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 (Little) is misplaced. The original lease there was oral. (Little, supra, at p. 4.) Here, there is a written lease that at one point prohibited assignment or subleasing without the landlord’s permission. (Ackerman Decl., Exhibit C.) One lease provides: “Renter’s right to possession shall not be assigned nor sublet.” (Id. at p. 52, item 5.) Another version of the lease is subsequently attached with annotations. (Id. at p. 56.) This copy also has Item 5 intact. (Id. at p. 57.) A subsequent lease strikes through Item 5. (Id. at p. 64.) That lease deletes the express term restricting assignment or subleasing. (Ibid.)