Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV08540, Date: 2024-08-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV08540 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: August
28, 2024
CASE NAME: Rafael
Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV08540
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SPECIAL
MOTION TO STRIKE (0671)![]()
MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendants
Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf; Joinder by Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Cross-Complainant Beith David
Education Center
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
Order Striking the following portions of the First Amended Cross-Complaint:
a. Paragraph
48, 12:14-15 and Exhibit 21 (“At that point, Mr. Raz with the support of some
of his allies began to propagate a baseless claim of ‘election fraud.’”)
b. Paragraph
51, 12:26-13:2 (“Despite what Mr. Raz falsely claims, on January 29, 2024 Mr.
Raz along with the other board members, signed the board minutes agreeing to
events that occurred during the board meeting on January 3, 2024.”)
c. Paragraph
63, Page 15:16-22 (striking of the entire paragraph)
d. Paragraph
74, Page 17:23-18:5 (striking of the entire paragraph)
e. Paragraph
75, Page 18:6-11 (striking of the entire paragraph)
f.
Paragraph 76, Page 18:12-17 (striking of
the entire paragraph)
g. Paragraph
78, Page 18-19 (striking of the entire paragraph)
h. Paragraph
79, Page 19:2-4(striking of the entire paragraph)
i.
Paragraph 80, Page 19:5-7 (striking of the
entire paragraph)
j.
Paragraph 84, Page 20:1-2 (striking of the
entire paragraph)
k. Paragraph
87, Page 20:25-21:2 (striking of the entire paragraph)
l.
Paragraph 89, Page 21-22, lines 20-206
[sic] in their entirety, sub paragraph (I) lines 27-3 in their entirety, and
sub paragraph (iii) lines 6-7 in their entirety
m. Paragraph
90, Page 22:19-24 (striking of the entire paragraph)
n. Second
Cause of Action in its entirety
o. Seventh
Cause of Action in its entirety
p. Paragraph
144, Page 32:27-33:5 (striking of the entire paragraph)
q. Tenth
Cause of Action in its entirety
r.
Paragraph 161, Page 36:6-7 (“and are
attempting to overturn a lawful and legitimate election in contravention to the
BDEC bylaws in an attempt to damage BDEC.”)
s. Fourteenth
Cause of Action in its entirety
t.
Paragraph 187, Page 40:12-13 (“and
attempting to overturn a fair and legitimate election, crippling BDEC’s ability
to function and advance its interests.”)
u. Fifteenth
Cause of Action in its entirety
v. Paragraph
194, Page 41:18-19 (“and attempting to overturn a fair and legitimate election,
crippling BDEC’s ability to function and advance its interests.”)
w. Seventeenth
Cause of Action in its entirety
x. Paragraph
203, Page 42:26-43:3 (striking of the entire paragraph)
y. Paragraph
209, Page 44:1-3 (“Cross-Complainants have suffered and continue to suffer,
substantial damages as a result of Cross-Defendants’ interference with the
Election results and continuing operation of BDEC, in an amount to be proven at
trial.”)
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. The
Motion is Denied.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini,
Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken Pezeshki,
David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified Petition for
an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and Ordering a
New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief
against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David) and Fahrim
Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).
Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp.
Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that
the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and
corrupt.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.
On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a
Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a
Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with
twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4)
Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director
from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code §
7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting;
(11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14)
Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional
Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel;
(20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.
According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was
legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted
against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a
significant amount of money.
On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary
Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.
On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal
of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the
Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended
Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing
Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against Individuals
Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the Extent
Necessary.
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a
General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of
the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.
On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.
On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz
and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order
Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any
Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.
On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.
On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that
they subsequently withdrew.
On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.
On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.
On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed
a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.
On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case
which the court GRANTED.
On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the
Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Request for
Judicial Notice
The court grants Beith David’s
Request for Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing
Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes
judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content
and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not
take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those
documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022)
87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿
Special Motion to
Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a
defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from
the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from
any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿¿¿¿
¿
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from
activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described
this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima
facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts
the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿
‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations
omitted].)¿¿
ANALYSIS:
Special Motion to
Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
Cross-Defendants contend that the portions of the FACC identified
above are subject
to Special Motion to Strike under CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2) because they are
wholly based on protected speech – namely, Cross-Defendants’ underlying
Petition. Beith David argues the FACC is not based on the Petition.
Prong 1: Protected Speech
CCP § 425.16(e) provides that an “act in furtherance of a
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or
oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; and (2) any
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body or other official
proceeding authorized by law. (CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2).)
The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires
the defendant to make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action
is one arising from protected activity.”¿ (Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29¿Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)¿ “[T]he
statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . .
arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance
of the right of petition or free speech.
[Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP
context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself
was based on an act in furtherance of
the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” (City
of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati).)
Even if the
complained of conduct qualified under one of the four protected categories,
Defendants must still demonstrate that the claim arises from a protected activity. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Here, Cross-Defendants
fail to make a threshold showing that the challenged claims arise from protected activity.
The court has reviewed the portions of the FACC
Cross-Defendants seek to strike. The Court agrees that Cross-complainants’
specifically describe Cross-Defendant’s lawsuit—which is protected activity—in
their complaint. (SEE paragraphs 75, 76, 77 am 91.) Participating in a judicial
proceeding is the very thing most strongly and essentially protected by the
litigation privilege. (Rubin v. Green (1992)
4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195-1196) Defendants contend that since all the
causes of action incorporate by reference all the allegations in the complaint,
they have sufficiently shown that Plaintiffs are relying on the speech to
establish liability.
Not so because identifying
protected activity in a cross-complaint alone does not satisfy
Cross-Defendant’s Prong 1 burden. “[A]
claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of
liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is
asserted.” (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) As
such, it is incumbent on Cross-Defendants to demonstrate to the trial court how
the protected activity provides the basis of Cross-Defendants’ liability, which
requires Cross Defendant to analyze the elements of each cause of action and
indicate how the protected activity is being utilized to satisfy an element of
a claim. (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) Moreover, Cross-Defendants fail
to appreciate that there is a difference between
allegations that supply
the elements of a claim and allegations of incidental background. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1012.) Allegations of protected activity that are “
‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” or that “merely provide context, without
supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Baral, supra,1 Cal.5th at
p. 394.) “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court
considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (City
of Cotati, at p. 79, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)
Cross-Defendants failed to articulate how the protected
activity—filing a lawsuit—is being used by Cross-Complainants to satisfy any of
the elements for the twenty-one causes of action.
“If a
defendant wants the trial court to take a surgical approach, whether in the
alternative or not, the defendant must propose where to make the incisions.
This is done by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered paragraph or
sentence in the complaint that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the
claim's elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and wh[y]
those actions are protected.’ “ (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 1099, 1109.)
Cross-Defendants failure to even
attempt to make this showing is startling.[1]
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. The
court DENIES Cross-Defendants Special Motion to Strike. Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 22, 2024[2] __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]As
such, Court need not rule on Cross-Defendants’ objections to
support its ruling.
[2]This
motion was originally calendared for July 22, 2024. Due to Court wide network
issues, the matter was rescheduled for August 28, 2024.
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: August
28, 2024
CASE NAME: Rafael
Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV08540
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MOTIONS
TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL ![]()
MOVING PARTY:
First Motion: Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro
Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor, and David
Dardashti.
Second Motion: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Beith David
Education Center
RESPONDING PARTY(S):
First Motion: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Beith David
Education Center
Second Motion: Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini,
Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor, and David
Dardashti.
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
Order Disqualifying Mr. Farivar and Farivar Law as counsel for Beith David;
2. An
Order Disqualifying Edwin Schreiber and Schreiber & Schreiber as counsel
for Plaintiffs.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Each
Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini,
Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken
Pezeshki, David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified
Petition for an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and
Ordering a New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for
Injunctive Relief against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David)
and Fahrim Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).
Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp.
Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that
the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and
corrupt.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.
On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a
Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a
Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with
twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4)
Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director
from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code §
7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting;
(11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14)
Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional
Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel;
(20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.
According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was
legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted
against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a
significant amount of money.
On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary
Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.
On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal
of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the
Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended
Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing
Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against
Individuals Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the
Extent Necessary.
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a
General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of
the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.
On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.
On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz
and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order
Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any
Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.
On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.
On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that
they subsequently withdrew.
On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.
On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.
On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed
a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.
On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case
which the court GRANTED.
On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the
Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.
On August 2, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On August 12, 2024, Beith David filed supplemental briefing
concerning Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel.
On August 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Beith David’s motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On August 21, 2024, Beith David filed replies.
On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Beith
David’s motion for bond.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Motion to
Disqualify Counsel
“A judge’s authority to disqualify an attorney has its
origins in the inherent power of every court in the furtherance of justice to
control the conduct of ministerial officers and other persons in pending
judicial proceedings.”¿(Neal v. Health
Net, Inc.¿(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 840;¿see also¿Code Civ. Proc., §
128,¿subd. (a)(5) [“Every court shall have the power to . . .¿control in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all
other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in
every matter pertaining thereto”].)¿“The power is frequently exercised on a
showing that disqualification is required under professional standards
governing avoidance of conflicts of interest or potential adverse use of confidential
information.”¿(Responsible Citizens v.
Superior Court¿(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1724.)¿¿
¿¿
“Motions to disqualify counsel present competing policy
considerations. On the one hand, a court must not hesitate to¿disqualify an
attorney when it is satisfactorily established that he or she wrongfully
acquired an unfair advantage that undermines the integrity of the judicial
process and will have a¿continuing effect on the proceedings before the court.
[Citations.] On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that disqualification
usually imposes a substantial hardship on the disqualified attorney’s innocent
client, who must bear the monetary and other costs of finding a replacement. A
client deprived of the attorney of his [or her] choice suffers a particularly
heavy penalty where ... his [or her] attorney is highly skilled in the relevant
area of the law.”¿(Gregori¿v. Bank of
America¿(1989)¿207 Cal.App.3d¿291,¿300.)¿“The paramount concern must be to
preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the
integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one’s choice must yield
to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our
judicial process.”¿(People ex rel. Dept.
of Corporations v.¿SpeeDee¿Oil¿Change Systems, Inc.¿(1999)¿20 Cal.4th
1135,¿1145.)¿
Generally, the disqualification of an attorney vicariously
disqualifies his or her firm.¿(William
H.¿Raley¿Co. v. Superior Court¿(1983)¿149 Cal.App.3d¿1042, 1048–1049.)¿¿
Request for Judicial
Notice
The court GRANTS each party’s request for judicial notice.
Evidentiary
Objections
First, this court is unaware of any
legal authority which requires a court to rule on evidentiary objections on a
motion, except as to a motion for summary motion/adjudication or a special
motion to strike. (CCP § 437c (q); CCP § 425.16 (b)(2); see also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v.
Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-949.) As such, this court
respectfully declines to rule on any of these objections. This court is
well aware of the rules of evidence, and to how much weight, if any, should be
given to any of the proposed evidence.
ANALYSIS:
Advocate Witness
Rule
Rule 3.7 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from acting as an “advocate in
a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness” unless: “(1) the
lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; (2) the lawyer’s
testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or (3) the lawyer obtained informed written consent from the client.”
(Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(1)-(3); Lopez
v. Lopez (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412, 423 (Lopez).) Even with informed written consent, the court still has
discretion to disqualify counsel “to protect the trier of fact from being
misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 423.)
“In exercising
its discretion to disqualify counsel under the advocate-witness rule, a court
must consider: (1) “ ‘ “whether counsel's testimony is, in fact, genuinely
needed” ’ ”; (2) “the possibility [opposing] counsel is using the motion to
disqualify for purely tactical reasons”; and (3) “the combined effects of the
strong interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice, and
in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved in
replacing counsel already familiar with the case.” (Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 583). “A trial court is
empowered to disqualify counsel through its inherent power “[t]o control in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all
other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in
every matter pertaining thereto.” (M'Guinness
v. Johnson (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 602, 613).¿
Here,
disqualification of Mr. Farivar is unwarranted. First, Beith David, through its
Board of Directors, executed an informed written consent as to the potential
dual nature of Mr. Farivar’s role in the instant matter. (Supplemental
Declaration of Payman Kakoli (Kakoli Decl.) ¶ 4, Exhibits 1 and 2.) Second, the
risk of confusing the trier of fact is low. Plaintiffs seek an order for a
judicial election – not a jury trial. Beith David does not request a jury trial
in the FACC and did not post jury fees concerning its First Amended
Cross-Complaint. As such, should the FACC proceed to trial it will be a bench
trial. (CCP § 632(f)(5).) The court is not concerned that it will confuse Mr.
Farivar’s arguments as evidence. Third, Beith David has a strong interest in
counsel of its choice coupled with avoiding duplicate expense and
time-consuming efforts in proceeding with Ross LLP as the main advocate. Fourth,
Plaintiffs filed this motion despite arguing in virtually every other filing
that the court lacks jurisdiction to make rulings without setting a hearing
pursuant to Corps. Code §§ 7616(b) and 9418(b).[1]
Accordingly,
the court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Mr. Farivar and Farivar Law
as counsel for Beith David.
Conflict of
Interest – Prior Client
The next issue is Schreiber & Schreiber’s supposed prior
representation of Beith David. Plaintiffs argue there is no conflict because
the legal services occurred more than three years ago, concerned interpreting
the By-Laws for the Board of Trustees (not for the Board of Directors),
drafting proposed new By-Laws that were never presented to the Board of Directors,
and that Counsel did not receive confidential information from Beith David or
any information related to the instant election dispute from Beith David. Beith
David argues that Mr. Schreiber downplays the scope of the prior representation
as well as a supposed concurrent representation of Mr. Gideon and did not
provide informed written consent from Beith David.
Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “A
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interest of the former
client unless the former client gives informed written consent.” (Prof. Rules,
Rule 1.9(a); H. F. Ahmanson & Co. v.
Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1451.) “Where such a
conflict of interest exists, and the former client has not consented to the
current representation, disqualification follows as a matter of course. The
court does not engage in a ‘balancing of equities’ between the former and
current clients. The rights and interests of the former client will prevail.” (H. F. Ahmanson & Co., supra, at p. 1451.) “If the former client can
establish the existence of a substantial relationship between representations
the courts will conclusively presume the attorney possesses confidential
information adverse to the former client.” (Id.
at p. 1452.) “[A] substantial relationship has been shown to exist between
the former representation and the current representation, and when it appears
by virtue of the nature of the former representation or the relationship of the
attorney to his former client confidential information material to the current
dispute would normally have been imparted to the attorney.” (Id. at p. 1454.) “The courts ask whether
confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have
been imparted to the attorney by virtue of the nature of the former
representation.” (Id.) “Mere prior
professional association with the former client is not enough.” (Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co.
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 785, 813.) There is also a tactical risk with these
motions, too. (H. F. Ahmanson & Co.,
supra, at p. 1454.)
Here, disqualification of Schreiber & Schreiber is also
unwarranted. Notably, Beith David has not shown that the supposed prior
representation concerns a substantial relationship between the former
representation and the current representation versus a mere prior professional
association. In Kirk Corp., the Court
found that the Plaintiffs had not shown a conflict due to counsel’s prior work
drafting CC & R’s for another entity.[2]
(Kirk Corp., supra, at p. 812-813.) The
issue here concerns a recent Board of Directors election (on Plaintiff’s side)
and a host of ethical breaches by board members and an independent contractor
(on Beith David’s side). Schreiber & Schreiber’s prior involvement with
Beith David occurred over three years ago, concerned consulting with the Board
of Trustees on the By-Laws, and drafting a revised set of By-Laws that were not
proposed to the Board of Directors or voted on. (Declaration of Edwin Schreiber
to Opposition to Motion to Disqualify, p. 8:5-19.) Like in Kirk Corp., Beith David’s evidence does not show that Schreiber
& Schreiber did more that consultant work.[3]
Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion to
disqualify Schreiber & Schreiber as counsel for Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Each
Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.
Plaintiffs to provide notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 28, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The court notes that Plaintiffs assert this
without substantive argument or authority to assist the court to determine if
it is indeed so constrained. Moreover, the court cannot help but notice that
Plaintiffs’ seek court rulings while simultaneously blocking the same relief
requested by Beith David. As such, the court wonders whether Plaintiffs are
genuinely seeking relief or whether they are prosecuting this motion as a tactical endeavor.
[2]
The trial court noted that the plaintiffs “utterly failed” to show “even [a]
remote connection with the legal or factual issues of the present litigation of
that [the] firm acquired any confidential information related to the issues . .
. .” (Kirk Corp., supra, at p. 804.)
[3]
Beith David’s arguments concerning spoliation issues are not appropriate for
this motion. The court therefore declines to develop those arguments.
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: August
28, 2024
CASE NAME: Rafael
Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV08540
![]()
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (0889)![]()
MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Beith David Education Center
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba
Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor,
and David Dardashti.
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
Order for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs for failure to state a
claim;
2. Alternatively,
an Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice due to protection under CCP §
425.16 Anti-SLAPP statute.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED;
2. Special
Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini,
Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken
Pezeshki, David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified
Petition for an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and
Ordering a New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for
Injunctive Relief against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David)
and Fahrim Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).
Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp.
Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that
the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and
corrupt.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.
On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a
Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a
Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with
twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4)
Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director
from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code §
7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting;
(11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14)
Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional
Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel;
(20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.
According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was
legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted
against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a
significant amount of money.
On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary
Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.
On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal
of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the
Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended
Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.
On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing
Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against
Individuals Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the
Extent Necessary.
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a
General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of
the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.
On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.
On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo
Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz
and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.
On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order
Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any
Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.
On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as
to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.
On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that
they subsequently withdrew.
On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.
On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.
On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed
a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.
On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case
which the court GRANTED.
On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the
Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.
On August 2, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On August 12, 2024, Beith David filed supplemental briefing
concerning Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel.
On August 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Beith David’s motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On August 21, 2024, Beith David filed replies.
On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Beith
David’s motion for bond.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the
grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action alleged
in the complaint, or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Pro. §
438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The grounds for a motion for judgment on the
pleadings shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any
matter which the court has judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438,
subd. (d).) A motion may be made even though the movant has already demurred
to the complaint or answer, on the same ground as is the basis for the motion
for judgment on the pleadings, and the demurrer has been overruled, “provided
that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since
the ruling on the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd.
(g)(1).)
In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded,” but “does not
consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB
Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215,
1219-1220.)
Meet
and Confer
Prior to filing a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person, via telephone, or
by video conference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) Insufficient
meet and confer is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) Here,
the parties did not meet and confer at all. The court is not aware of authority
allowing it to deny the motion on these grounds.
Request for
Judicial Notice
The court grants Beith David’s
Request for Judicial Notice only as to judicial filings. (Evid. Code § 452(d),
(h); See Kalnoki v. First American
Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the
court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the
existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified
documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual
matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez
v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿In all other respects, the request
for judicial notice is DENIED.
Special Motion to
Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a
defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from
the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from
any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿¿¿¿
¿
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from
activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described
this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima
facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts
the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿
‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations
omitted].)¿¿
ANALYSIS:
Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings
Beith David contends that Plaintiffs failed to comply with
Cal. Corps. Code § 7616 by failing to include all parties with an interest in
the action, failed to comply with Cal. Corps Code § 9418, failed to comply with
Cal. Corps. Code § 5710, and lack standing. Beith David also contends it is
protected by CCP § 425.15. Plaintiffs argue that the court lacks jurisdiction
under Corps. Code §§ 7616(b) and 9418(b) because there is not yet a hearing
date for the election challenge. Plaintiffs also argue that Beith David relies
on improper evidence, that CCP § 425.15 and Corps. Code § 5710 are
inapplicable, and that the court does have jurisdiction to resolve this
corporate election case. Plaintiffs also argue that Beith David’s arguments are
mostly factual in nature which is not proper at the pleading stage.
Corporations Code §
7616
Beith David’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to comply
with Corporations Code § 7616 is not well taken. Notably, subsection (c)
provides for service of notice of the hearing
date in the same method as service of the summons. As Plaintiffs point out,
there is not yet a hearing set.
As such, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings on this ground.
Corporations Code §
9418
Corporations Code § 9418 provides:
“Upon the filing of an action therefor
by any director or member, or by any person who had the right to vote in the
election at issue after such director, member, or person has exhausted any
remedies provided in the articles or bylaws, the superior court of the proper
county shall determine the validity of any election or appointment of any
director of any corporation.”
(Corps. Code § 9418(a).)
This section also provides for a hearing date. (Corps. Code
§ 9418(b).)
For the same reasons articulated above, the court DENIES Beith
David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground.
Corporations Code §
5710
Corporations Code § 5710 provides:
“(b) No action may be instituted or
maintained in the right of any corporation by any member of such corporation
unless both of the following conditions exist:
(1) The plaintiff alleges in the
complaint that plaintiff was a member at the time of the transaction or any
part thereof of which plaintiff complains; and
(2) The plaintiff alleges in the
complaint with particularity plaintiff's efforts to secure from the board such
action as plaintiff desires, or the reasons for not making such effort, and
alleges further that plaintiff has either informed the corporation or the board
in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of action against each defendant
or delivered to the corporation or the board a true copy of the complaint which
plaintiff proposes to file.”
(Corps. Code § 5710(b)(1)-(2).)
Here, the Petition does not comply with Corps. Code § 5710(b)(1) and (b)(2). It complies with
(b)(1) because the Petition alleges that the Plaintiffs were/are members of
Beith David. (¶¶ 2-3, Exhibit C.) It does not comply with (b)(2) however
because there are no allegations as to seeking the requested relief from the
board or reasons why Plaintiffs did not make such efforts.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Beith David’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. However, the court will hear argument on whether or
not to grant leave to amend.
CCP § 425.15
CCP § 425.15(a) provides in pertinent part:
“No cause of action against a person
serving without compensation as a director or officer of a nonprofit
corporation . . . on account of any
negligent act or omission by that person within the scope of that person's
duties . . . shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the
court enters an order allowing the pleading that includes that claim to be
filed after the court determines that the party seeking to file the pleading
has established evidence that substantiates the claim.”
The court agrees that this section does not apply because
the individual defendant, Mr. Farivar, was dismissed as a defendant on May 23,
2024.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings on this ground.
Standing
Upon reviewing the Petition, Plaintiffs have stated
standing. Unlike Beith David’s contention, the Petition alleges that Mr. Javed
S. Rad, Mike Noor, Mr. Sherf, Mr. Dardashti, and Mrs. Orit Nazarian are members
in good standing. (Petition ¶ 3, Exhibit C.) According to the Bylaws, “[e]ach
member shall have one vote on matters calling for a vote of membership.”
(Petition, Exhibit A, Article I, Section 2.) To the extent that Beith David
provided conflicting evidence concerning membership, that is appropriate for
summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings on this ground.
Special Motion
to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
Beith David contends it is protected under CCP § 425.16 because
the communications during the election process are protected speech.[1]
Plaintiffs argue there is no alleged speech subject to the Petition or
Complaint, rather, it is an authorized action seeking a new election.
As a threshold matter, Beith David did not comply with Gov.
Code §§ 70677(a)(1) and 70617(a). Instead, Beith David improperly combined its
Special Motion to Strike with a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s Special
Motion to Strike.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED;
2. Special
Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 28, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
Beith David relies on Lee v. Silveira
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 543-544 and Schwarzburd
v. Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354-1355.