Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV08540, Date: 2024-08-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08540    Hearing Date: August 28, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   August 28, 2024                                             

 

CASE NAME:           Rafael Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                24STCV08540

 

SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE (0671)

 

MOVING PARTY:  Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf; Joinder by Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Cross-Complainant Beith David Education Center

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An Order Striking the following portions of the First Amended Cross-Complaint:

a.       Paragraph 48, 12:14-15 and Exhibit 21 (“At that point, Mr. Raz with the support of some of his allies began to propagate a baseless claim of ‘election fraud.’”)

b.      Paragraph 51, 12:26-13:2 (“Despite what Mr. Raz falsely claims, on January 29, 2024 Mr. Raz along with the other board members, signed the board minutes agreeing to events that occurred during the board meeting on January 3, 2024.”)

c.       Paragraph 63, Page 15:16-22 (striking of the entire paragraph)

d.      Paragraph 74, Page 17:23-18:5 (striking of the entire paragraph)

e.       Paragraph 75, Page 18:6-11 (striking of the entire paragraph)

f.        Paragraph 76, Page 18:12-17 (striking of the entire paragraph)

g.      Paragraph 78, Page 18-19 (striking of the entire paragraph)

h.      Paragraph 79, Page 19:2-4(striking of the entire paragraph)

i.        Paragraph 80, Page 19:5-7 (striking of the entire paragraph)

j.        Paragraph 84, Page 20:1-2 (striking of the entire paragraph)

k.      Paragraph 87, Page 20:25-21:2 (striking of the entire paragraph)

l.        Paragraph 89, Page 21-22, lines 20-206 [sic] in their entirety, sub paragraph (I) lines 27-3 in their entirety, and sub paragraph (iii) lines 6-7 in their entirety

m.    Paragraph 90, Page 22:19-24 (striking of the entire paragraph)

n.      Second Cause of Action in its entirety

o.      Seventh Cause of Action in its entirety

p.      Paragraph 144, Page 32:27-33:5 (striking of the entire paragraph)

q.      Tenth Cause of Action in its entirety

r.        Paragraph 161, Page 36:6-7 (“and are attempting to overturn a lawful and legitimate election in contravention to the BDEC bylaws in an attempt to damage BDEC.”)

s.       Fourteenth Cause of Action in its entirety

t.        Paragraph 187, Page 40:12-13 (“and attempting to overturn a fair and legitimate election, crippling BDEC’s ability to function and advance its interests.”)

u.      Fifteenth Cause of Action in its entirety

v.      Paragraph 194, Page 41:18-19 (“and attempting to overturn a fair and legitimate election, crippling BDEC’s ability to function and advance its interests.”)

w.    Seventeenth Cause of Action in its entirety

x.      Paragraph 203, Page 42:26-43:3 (striking of the entire paragraph)

y.      Paragraph 209, Page 44:1-3 (“Cross-Complainants have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial damages as a result of Cross-Defendants’ interference with the Election results and continuing operation of BDEC, in an amount to be proven at trial.”)

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      The Motion is Denied.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken Pezeshki, David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified Petition for an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and Ordering a New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David) and Fahrim Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).

 

Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp. Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and corrupt.

 

On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.

 

On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code § 7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting; (11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel; (20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.

 

According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a significant amount of money.

 

On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.

 

On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against Individuals Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the Extent Necessary.

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.

 

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.

 

On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.

 

On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.

 

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.

 

On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.

 

On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.

 

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case which the court GRANTED.

 

On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

The court grants Beith David’s Request for Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿ 

 

 

Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

 

“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿¿¿¿ 

¿ 

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿ First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿ ‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations omitted].)¿¿ 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

 

Cross-Defendants contend that the portions of the FACC identified above are subject to Special Motion to Strike under CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2) because they are wholly based on protected speech – namely, Cross-Defendants’ underlying Petition. Beith David argues the FACC is not based on the Petition.

 

Prong 1: Protected Speech

 

CCP § 425.16(e) provides that an “act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; and (2) any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body or other official proceeding authorized by law. (CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2).)

 

The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the defendant to make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.”¿ (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29¿Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)¿ “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . .  arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.  [Citation.]  In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.”  (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati).)

Even if the complained of conduct qualified under one of the four protected categories, Defendants must still demonstrate that the claim arises from a protected activity. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).)  Here, Cross-Defendants fail to make a threshold showing that the challenged claims arise from protected activity.

 

The court has reviewed the portions of the FACC Cross-Defendants seek to strike. The Court agrees that Cross-complainants’ specifically describe Cross-Defendant’s lawsuit—which is protected activity—in their complaint. (SEE paragraphs 75, 76, 77 am 91.) Participating in a judicial proceeding is the very thing most strongly and essentially protected by the litigation privilege. (Rubin v. Green (1992) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195-1196) Defendants contend that since all the causes of action incorporate by reference all the allegations in the complaint, they have sufficiently shown that Plaintiffs are relying on the speech to establish liability.

 

Not so because identifying protected activity in a cross-complaint alone does not satisfy Cross-Defendant’s Prong 1 burden. “[A] claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) As such, it is incumbent on Cross-Defendants to demonstrate to the trial court how the protected activity provides the basis of Cross-Defendants’ liability, which requires Cross Defendant to analyze the elements of each cause of action and indicate how the protected activity is being utilized to satisfy an element of a claim. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) Moreover, Cross-Defendants fail to appreciate that there is a difference between allegations that supply the elements of a claim and allegations of incidental background. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1012.) Allegations of protected activity that are “ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” or that “merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra,1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”  (City of Cotati, at p. 79, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).) 

 

Cross-Defendants failed to articulate how the protected activity—filing a lawsuit—is being used by Cross-Complainants to satisfy any of the elements for the twenty-one causes of action.

“If a defendant wants the trial court to take a surgical approach, whether in the alternative or not, the defendant must propose where to make the incisions. This is done by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered paragraph or sentence in the complaint that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the claim's elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and wh[y] those actions are protected.’ “ (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 1099, 1109.)

 

Cross-Defendants failure to even attempt to make this showing is startling.[1]

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

1.      The court DENIES Cross-Defendants Special Motion to Strike.  Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             July 22, 2024[2]                         __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1]As such, Court need not rule on Cross-Defendants’ objections to support its ruling.

[2]This motion was originally calendared for July 22, 2024. Due to Court wide network issues, the matter was rescheduled for August 28, 2024.

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   August 28, 2024                                             

 

CASE NAME:           Rafael Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                24STCV08540

 

MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

 

MOVING PARTY:  

 

First Motion: Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor, and David Dardashti.

 

Second Motion: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Beith David Education Center

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S):

 

First Motion: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Beith David Education Center

 

Second Motion: Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor, and David Dardashti.

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An Order Disqualifying Mr. Farivar and Farivar Law as counsel for Beith David;

2.      An Order Disqualifying Edwin Schreiber and Schreiber & Schreiber as counsel for Plaintiffs.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Each Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken Pezeshki, David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified Petition for an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and Ordering a New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David) and Fahrim Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).

 

Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp. Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and corrupt.

 

On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.

 

On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code § 7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting; (11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel; (20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.

 

According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a significant amount of money.

 

On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.

 

On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against Individuals Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the Extent Necessary.

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.

 

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.

 

On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.

 

On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.

 

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.

 

On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.

 

On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.

 

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case which the court GRANTED.

 

On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.

 

On August 2, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel.

 

On August 12, 2024, Beith David filed supplemental briefing concerning Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel.

 

On August 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Beith David’s motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel.


On August 21, 2024, Beith David filed replies.

 

On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Beith David’s motion for bond.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Motion to Disqualify Counsel 

 

“A judge’s authority to disqualify an attorney has its origins in the inherent power of every court in the furtherance of justice to control the conduct of ministerial officers and other persons in pending judicial proceedings.”¿(Neal v. Health Net, Inc.¿(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 840;¿see also¿Code Civ. Proc., § 128,¿subd. (a)(5) [“Every court shall have the power to . . .¿control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto”].)¿“The power is frequently exercised on a showing that disqualification is required under professional standards governing avoidance of conflicts of interest or potential adverse use of confidential information.”¿(Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court¿(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1724.)¿¿ 

¿¿ 

“Motions to disqualify counsel present competing policy considerations. On the one hand, a court must not hesitate to¿disqualify an attorney when it is satisfactorily established that he or she wrongfully acquired an unfair advantage that undermines the integrity of the judicial process and will have a¿continuing effect on the proceedings before the court. [Citations.] On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that disqualification usually imposes a substantial hardship on the disqualified attorney’s innocent client, who must bear the monetary and other costs of finding a replacement. A client deprived of the attorney of his [or her] choice suffers a particularly heavy penalty where ... his [or her] attorney is highly skilled in the relevant area of the law.”¿(Gregori¿v. Bank of America¿(1989)¿207 Cal.App.3d¿291,¿300.)¿“The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one’s choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.”¿(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v.¿SpeeDee¿Oil¿Change Systems, Inc.¿(1999)¿20 Cal.4th 1135,¿1145.)¿ 

 

Generally, the disqualification of an attorney vicariously disqualifies his or her firm.¿(William H.¿Raley¿Co. v. Superior Court¿(1983)¿149 Cal.App.3d¿1042, 1048–1049.)¿¿ 

 

Request for Judicial Notice 

 

The court GRANTS each party’s request for judicial notice. 

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

First, this court is unaware of any legal authority which requires a court to rule on evidentiary objections on a motion, except as to a motion for summary motion/adjudication or a special motion to strike. (CCP § 437c (q); CCP § 425.16 (b)(2); see also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-949.) As such, this court respectfully declines to rule on any of these objections.  This court is well aware of the rules of evidence, and to how much weight, if any, should be given to any of the proposed evidence.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Advocate Witness Rule 

 

Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from acting as an “advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness” unless: “(1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) the lawyer obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(1)-(3); Lopez v. Lopez (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412, 423 (Lopez).) Even with informed written consent, the court still has discretion to disqualify counsel “to protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 423.)

 

“In exercising its discretion to disqualify counsel under the advocate-witness rule, a court must consider: (1) “ ‘ “whether counsel's testimony is, in fact, genuinely needed” ’ ”; (2) “the possibility [opposing] counsel is using the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons”; and (3) “the combined effects of the strong interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case.” (Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 583). “A trial court is empowered to disqualify counsel through its inherent power “[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.” (M'Guinness v. Johnson (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 602, 613).¿

 

Here, disqualification of Mr. Farivar is unwarranted. First, Beith David, through its Board of Directors, executed an informed written consent as to the potential dual nature of Mr. Farivar’s role in the instant matter. (Supplemental Declaration of Payman Kakoli (Kakoli Decl.) ¶ 4, Exhibits 1 and 2.) Second, the risk of confusing the trier of fact is low. Plaintiffs seek an order for a judicial election – not a jury trial. Beith David does not request a jury trial in the FACC and did not post jury fees concerning its First Amended Cross-Complaint. As such, should the FACC proceed to trial it will be a bench trial. (CCP § 632(f)(5).) The court is not concerned that it will confuse Mr. Farivar’s arguments as evidence. Third, Beith David has a strong interest in counsel of its choice coupled with avoiding duplicate expense and time-consuming efforts in proceeding with Ross LLP as the main advocate. Fourth, Plaintiffs filed this motion despite arguing in virtually every other filing that the court lacks jurisdiction to make rulings without setting a hearing pursuant to Corps. Code §§ 7616(b) and 9418(b).[1]

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Mr. Farivar and Farivar Law as counsel for Beith David.

 

Conflict of Interest – Prior Client

 

The next issue is Schreiber & Schreiber’s supposed prior representation of Beith David. Plaintiffs argue there is no conflict because the legal services occurred more than three years ago, concerned interpreting the By-Laws for the Board of Trustees (not for the Board of Directors), drafting proposed new By-Laws that were never presented to the Board of Directors, and that Counsel did not receive confidential information from Beith David or any information related to the instant election dispute from Beith David. Beith David argues that Mr. Schreiber downplays the scope of the prior representation as well as a supposed concurrent representation of Mr. Gideon and did not provide informed written consent from Beith David.

 

Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interest of the former client unless the former client gives informed written consent.” (Prof. Rules, Rule 1.9(a); H. F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1451.) “Where such a conflict of interest exists, and the former client has not consented to the current representation, disqualification follows as a matter of course. The court does not engage in a ‘balancing of equities’ between the former and current clients. The rights and interests of the former client will prevail.” (H. F. Ahmanson & Co., supra, at p. 1451.) “If the former client can establish the existence of a substantial relationship between representations the courts will conclusively presume the attorney possesses confidential information adverse to the former client.” (Id. at p. 1452.) “[A] substantial relationship has been shown to exist between the former representation and the current representation, and when it appears by virtue of the nature of the former representation or the relationship of the attorney to his former client confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have been imparted to the attorney.” (Id. at p. 1454.) “The courts ask whether confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have been imparted to the attorney by virtue of the nature of the former representation.” (Id.) “Mere prior professional association with the former client is not enough.” (Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 785, 813.) There is also a tactical risk with these motions, too. (H. F. Ahmanson & Co., supra, at p. 1454.)

 

Here, disqualification of Schreiber & Schreiber is also unwarranted. Notably, Beith David has not shown that the supposed prior representation concerns a substantial relationship between the former representation and the current representation versus a mere prior professional association. In Kirk Corp., the Court found that the Plaintiffs had not shown a conflict due to counsel’s prior work drafting CC & R’s for another entity.[2] (Kirk Corp., supra, at p. 812-813.) The issue here concerns a recent Board of Directors election (on Plaintiff’s side) and a host of ethical breaches by board members and an independent contractor (on Beith David’s side). Schreiber & Schreiber’s prior involvement with Beith David occurred over three years ago, concerned consulting with the Board of Trustees on the By-Laws, and drafting a revised set of By-Laws that were not proposed to the Board of Directors or voted on. (Declaration of Edwin Schreiber to Opposition to Motion to Disqualify, p. 8:5-19.) Like in Kirk Corp., Beith David’s evidence does not show that Schreiber & Schreiber did more that consultant work.[3]

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion to disqualify Schreiber & Schreiber as counsel for Plaintiffs.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

1.      Each Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.

Plaintiffs to provide notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: August 28, 2024                                  __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1] The court notes that Plaintiffs assert this without substantive argument or authority to assist the court to determine if it is indeed so constrained. Moreover, the court cannot help but notice that Plaintiffs’ seek court rulings while simultaneously blocking the same relief requested by Beith David. As such, the court wonders whether Plaintiffs are genuinely seeking relief or whether they are prosecuting this motion  as a tactical endeavor.

 

[2] The trial court noted that the plaintiffs “utterly failed” to show “even [a] remote connection with the legal or factual issues of the present litigation of that [the] firm acquired any confidential information related to the issues . . . .” (Kirk Corp., supra, at p. 804.)

[3] Beith David’s arguments concerning spoliation issues are not appropriate for this motion. The court therefore declines to develop those arguments.

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   August 28, 2024                                             

 

CASE NAME:           Rafael Raz, et al. v. Beith David Education Center, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                24STCV08540

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (0889)

 

MOVING PARTY:  Defendant/Cross-Complainant Beith David Education Center

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rab, Mike Noor, and David Dardashti.

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An Order for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs for failure to state a claim;

2.      Alternatively, an Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice due to protection under CCP § 425.16 Anti-SLAPP statute.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED;

2.      Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Rafael Raz, Fariba Yamini, Khosro Yamini, Orit Nazarian, Shlomo Sherf, Javid S. Rad, Mike Noor, Ken Pezeshki, David Dardashti, and Mitra Pezeshki (Plaintiffs) filed a Verified Petition for an Order Voiding Purported Election of Non-Profit Corporation and Ordering a New Properly Supervised Election and Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Defendants Beith David Education Center (Beith David) and Fahrim Farivar (Farivar) (collectively, Defendants).

 

Plaintiffs allege that Beith David is governed by Cal. Corp. Code § 7510 et seq., not Cal. Corp. Code § 9130. Plaintiffs further allege that the purported Election of Directors on December 3, 2023 was invalid and corrupt.

 

On April 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which the court DENIED.

 

On April 22, 2024, Beith David and Farivar filed a Cross-Complaint (Cross-Complaint) against Rafael Raz, Hooman Moshe Gideon a/k/a Moshe Hooman Gideon, Shlomo Sherf, and Ken Pezeshki (Cross-Defendants) with twenty-one (21) causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraud; (5) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (6) Conversion; (7) Removal of Director from Non-Profit Corporation for Malfeasance Pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code § 7223(a); (8) Open Book Account; (9) Books and Records; (10) Aiding Abetting; (11) Express Indemnity; (12) Implied Indemnity; (13) Specific Performance; (14) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Interests; (15) Intentional Interference with Current Business Advantage; (16) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (17) Civil Harassment; (18) Defamation; (19) Trade Libel; (20) Ejectment; and (21) Declaratory Relief.

 

According to the Cross-Complaint, the election was legitimate. The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendants acted against Beith David’s interests, bullied members, and owed Beith David a significant amount of money.

 

On May 13, 2024, Beith David filed an ex parte application for Writ of Possession and Temporary Restraining Order which the court GRANTED in part.

 

On May 15, 2024, Beith David filed a request for dismissal of Farivar as a Cross-Complainant which was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the Farivar Law Firm, APC and Farivar as counsel.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint that was rejected by the Clerk.

 

On May 16, 2024, Beith David filed a Notice of Hearing Pursuant to CCP § 425.15 for Permission to file a Cross-Complaint against Individuals Purportedly Acting as Directors of a Non-Profit Organization to the Extent Necessary.

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a General Denial to the Cross-Complaint.

 

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the second cause of action and as to Plaintiff Ken Pezeshki.

 

On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Defendant Fahim Farivar as to all causes of action.

 

On May 24, 2024, Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

 

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rafael Raz and Shlomo Sherf filed an Opposition to Petition Pursuant to CCP § 425.15.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed an Answer.

 

On May 29, 2024, Beith David filed a Motion for Order Requiring Undertaking Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5710 and Request for Any Necessary Relief Regarding the Filing Timeline.

 

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal as to Plaintiff Mitra Pezeshki only.

 

On June 5, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to dismiss that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 6, 2024, Beith David filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that they subsequently withdrew.

 

On June 7, 2024, the court signed a Preliminary Injunction.

 

On June 18, 2024, Cross-Defendant Hooman Moshe Gideon filed a joinder to the Special Motion to Strike.

 

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case which the court GRANTED.

 

On July 9, 2024, Beith David filed an opposition to the Special Motion to Strike. On July 5, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a reply.

 

On August 2, 2024, Beith David filed a motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel.

 

On August 12, 2024, Beith David filed supplemental briefing concerning Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel.

 

On August 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Beith David’s motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel.


On August 21, 2024, Beith David filed replies.

 

On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Beith David’s motion for bond.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

 

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action alleged in the complaint, or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.  (Code Civ. Pro. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)  The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter which the court has judicially noticed.  (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd. (d).)  A motion may be made even though the movant has already demurred to the complaint or answer, on the same ground as is the basis for the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the demurrer has been overruled, “provided that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (g)(1).)   

 

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded,” but “does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.”  (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220.)  

 

Meet and Confer

 

Prior to filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person, via telephone, or by video conference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) Insufficient meet and confer is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) Here, the parties did not meet and confer at all. The court is not aware of authority allowing it to deny the motion on these grounds.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

The court grants Beith David’s Request for Judicial Notice only as to judicial filings. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿In all other respects, the request for judicial notice is DENIED.

 

Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

 

“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿¿¿¿ 

¿ 

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿ First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿ ‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations omitted].)¿¿ 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

 

Beith David contends that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Cal. Corps. Code § 7616 by failing to include all parties with an interest in the action, failed to comply with Cal. Corps Code § 9418, failed to comply with Cal. Corps. Code § 5710, and lack standing. Beith David also contends it is protected by CCP § 425.15. Plaintiffs argue that the court lacks jurisdiction under Corps. Code §§ 7616(b) and 9418(b) because there is not yet a hearing date for the election challenge. Plaintiffs also argue that Beith David relies on improper evidence, that CCP § 425.15 and Corps. Code § 5710 are inapplicable, and that the court does have jurisdiction to resolve this corporate election case. Plaintiffs also argue that Beith David’s arguments are mostly factual in nature which is not proper at the pleading stage.

 

Corporations Code § 7616

 

Beith David’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Corporations Code § 7616 is not well taken. Notably, subsection (c) provides for service of notice of the hearing date in the same method as service of the summons. As Plaintiffs point out, there is not yet a hearing set.

 

As such, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground.

 

Corporations Code § 9418

 

Corporations Code § 9418 provides:

“Upon the filing of an action therefor by any director or member, or by any person who had the right to vote in the election at issue after such director, member, or person has exhausted any remedies provided in the articles or bylaws, the superior court of the proper county shall determine the validity of any election or appointment of any director of any corporation.”

(Corps. Code § 9418(a).)

 

This section also provides for a hearing date. (Corps. Code § 9418(b).)

 

For the same reasons articulated above, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground.

 

Corporations Code § 5710

 

Corporations Code § 5710 provides:

“(b) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any corporation by any member of such corporation unless both of the following conditions exist:

(1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that plaintiff was a member at the time of the transaction or any part thereof of which plaintiff complains; and

(2) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity plaintiff's efforts to secure from the board such action as plaintiff desires, or the reasons for not making such effort, and alleges further that plaintiff has either informed the corporation or the board in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of action against each defendant or delivered to the corporation or the board a true copy of the complaint which plaintiff proposes to file.”

(Corps. Code § 5710(b)(1)-(2).)

 

Here, the Petition does not comply with Corps. Code  § 5710(b)(1) and (b)(2). It complies with (b)(1) because the Petition alleges that the Plaintiffs were/are members of Beith David. (¶¶ 2-3, Exhibit C.) It does not comply with (b)(2) however because there are no allegations as to seeking the requested relief from the board or reasons why Plaintiffs did not make such efforts.

 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Beith David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, the court will hear argument on whether or not to grant  leave to amend.

 

CCP § 425.15

 

CCP § 425.15(a) provides in pertinent part:

“No cause of action against a person serving without compensation as a director or officer of a nonprofit corporation . . .  on account of any negligent act or omission by that person within the scope of that person's duties . . . shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the pleading that includes that claim to be filed after the court determines that the party seeking to file the pleading has established evidence that substantiates the claim.”

 

The court agrees that this section does not apply because the individual defendant, Mr. Farivar, was dismissed as a defendant on May 23, 2024.

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground.

 

Standing

 

Upon reviewing the Petition, Plaintiffs have stated standing. Unlike Beith David’s contention, the Petition alleges that Mr. Javed S. Rad, Mike Noor, Mr. Sherf, Mr. Dardashti, and Mrs. Orit Nazarian are members in good standing. (Petition ¶ 3, Exhibit C.) According to the Bylaws, “[e]ach member shall have one vote on matters calling for a vote of membership.” (Petition, Exhibit A, Article I, Section 2.) To the extent that Beith David provided conflicting evidence concerning membership, that is appropriate for summary judgment.

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground.

 

Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

 

Beith David contends it is protected under CCP § 425.16 because the communications during the election process are protected speech.[1] Plaintiffs argue there is no alleged speech subject to the Petition or Complaint, rather, it is an authorized action seeking a new election.

 

As a threshold matter, Beith David did not comply with Gov. Code §§ 70677(a)(1) and 70617(a). Instead, Beith David improperly combined its Special Motion to Strike with a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Beith David’s Special Motion to Strike.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

1.      Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED;

2.      Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: August 28, 2024                                  __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1] Beith David relies on Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 543-544 and Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354-1355.