Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV10216, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling

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CASE NAME: Andres Alatorre Medina, et al. v. Antolini Luidi & C. S.P.A., et al.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Andres Alatorre Medina and Maria Rita Ramos Abundiz

2. An Order striking allegations and claim for punitive damages and the generalized product identification language.

a. The court ORDERS the following portion of the Complaint stricken: ¶ 84, page 46:17: “and other silica-containing stone products to be identified during the course of discovery”

On April 22, 2024, Plaintiffs Andres Alatorre Medina and Maria Rita Ramos Abundiz (Plaintiffs) filed a toxic tort Complaint against Defendants Antolini Luigi & C. S.P.A.; Architectural Surfaces Group, LLC; Arizona Tile, LLC; Arriaga USA, Inc. (dba Stoneland USA); Best Cheer Stone Inc.; C & C North America, Inc.; CAB620, Inc. (fka Parsoda U.S.A., Inc., dba Pacifica Wholesale Tile & Stone); Caesarstone LTD (fka Caesarstone SDOT-YAM LTD.); Caesarstone USA, Inc.; Cambria Company LLC; Color Marble Inc.; Colorquartz USA Inc.; Compac Atlanta, LLC; Compac Corporate Sociedad Limitada; COmpac Quartz, Inc.; Compac USA Inc.; Cosentino Global Sociedad Limitada; Cosentino Industrial SA; Cosentino SA (formerly known as Cosentino Group, SA); Costco Wholesale Corporation; Dal-Tile Distribution, LLC; Dal-Tile International Inc; Dal-Tile, LLC; Diresco NV; Diresco USA LLC; EIDP, Inc. (fka E. I. Du Poont De Nemours and Company); Elite Quartz MFG LLC; Empire Marble and Granite, Inc.; Francini, Inc.; Gem International, Inc.; Hirsch Glass Corp; Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.; Hyndai L&C USA, Inc.; Hyundai L&C USA LLC; Icestone, LLC; IKEA US Retail LLC; Jacobe Enterprises, Inc.; Lotte Chemical California, Inc.; Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC; LX Building Material Inc.; LX Hausys America, Inc.; M S International, Inc.; Marmol Export Corporation; Mohawk Industries, Inc.; Pacific Shore Stones, LLC; Pacifica Tile & Stone, Inc.; Paragon Industries, Inc. (dba Bedrosians Tile & Stone); Planet Stone, Inc.; The Planet Stone Global Corporation; S. & E. Stone, Inc.; San Fernando Marble & Granite Inc.; Spectrum Quartz LLC; Stone Italiana; Stone Supplies, Inc. (dba Royal Stone & Tile); Stoneville USA, Inc.; Stylenquaza, LLC (dba Vicostone USA); Surface Warehouse, L.P.; Verona Marble Company, Inc.; Verona Quartz Inc.; Verona Quartz Surfaces LLC; Vicostone JSC (aka Vicostone Joint Stock Company); Walker & Zanger, LLC dba Walker Zanger; West Coast Marble and Granite, Inc.; and Wilsonart LLC (Defendants) with six causes of action for: (1) Negligence, (2) Products Liability – Failure to Warn, (3) Products Liability – Design Defect, (4) Fraudulent Concealment, (5) Breach of Implied Warranties, and (6) Loss of Consortium.[1]

According to the Complaint, Defendants are manufactures, suppliers, distributors, importers, brokers, and/or contractors of stone products that contain silica. Plaintiff Medina worked with the silica stone products from 1998 to 2024 and alleges that as a result of inhaling the silica dust, developed silicosis. Plaintiff Abundiz, his wife, claims loss of consortium.

On June 11, 2024, Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc. (Caesarstone) filed a Motion to Strike which the court DENIED.

On June 11, 2024, Defendant Stylenquaza LLC filed a Motion to Quash Service of Summons.

On June 20, 2024, Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike.

On June 25, 2024, Defendants DAL-Tile Distribution, LLC, DAL-Tile International Inc., DAL-Tile, LLC and Plaintiffs filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order Striking Specific Language from Plaintiffs’ Complaint which the court GRANTED.[2]

On July 31, 2024, Defendant S. & E. Stone, Inc. filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike.

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed untimely oppositions to the Demurrers and Motions to Strike.

On January 17, 2025, the court CONTINUED the hearing on S. & E. Stone, Inc.’s Demurrer with Motion to Strike to allow time to file replies. As of February 24, 2025, the court has not received replies.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. (CCP) §430.41 and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to CCP §430.41(a)(2) & (3).¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.) Here, the meet and confer requirement is met. (Moana Decl. ¶ 3.)

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context—any defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)¿

Any party “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (CCP § 435(b)(1).)

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id.¿§¿437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”].)¿“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿

S. & E. Stone, Inc. (S&E) contends Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts supporting a claim for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs argue that they sufficiently alleges facts pursuant to Jones v. ConocoPhillips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187 (Jones).[3] S&E did not file a reply.

To state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage. (Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-13.)

Causes of action sounding in fraud are subject to strict pleading requirements. “Every element of a cause of action for fraud must be alleged both factually and specifically, and the policy of liberal construction of pleadings will not be invoked to sustain a defective complaint.” (Cooper v. Equity Gen. Ins. Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) This is true whether the fraud is based on a theory of false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure; however, the familiar who-what-where-when-how requirement for fraud claims is relaxed somewhat when the claim is based on an allegedly fraudulent omission. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Imp. System & Planning Ass’n, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 [who-what-where-when-how rule “is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations . . . . [I]t is harder to apply this rule to a case of simple nondisclosure. How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?”].)

S&E contends the Complaint contains general allegations against them and fails to specifically allege how S&E participated in the alleged fraud.

However, under Jones v. ConocoPhillips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent concealment with the requisite particularity. In Jones, an employee had used the defendant’s toxic chemicals in the course of his employment throughout his career and the suit was against several manufacturers and distributors of the chemicals for serious health conditions that eventually developed. (Ibid.) In reaching its conclusion that fraudulent concealment had been sufficiently pled, the Court of Appeal reasoned:

“Here, the amended complaint alleges defendants were ‘aware of the toxic nature of their products’ and ‘owed a duty to disclose the toxic properties of¿their¿products to [Carlos] because [they] alone had knowledge of material facts, to wit the toxic properties of their products, which were not available to [Carlos].’ It also alleges defendants owed a duty to disclose because they ‘made representations regarding their products, but failed to disclose additional facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, and/or which rendered the disclosures made likely to mislead [Carlos].’ These conclusory allegations are supplemented with respect to the single compound, DMF. The Joneses cite studies published as early as 1969 attesting to DMF’s toxicity, several years before Carlos began working at Goodyear where he was exposed to the Dow product containing DMF.

At a minimum, the amended complaint states a viable claim for fraudulent concealment against Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of the product Polymide 2080–D/DHV, which allegedly contained DMF. The Joneses have alleged DMF was known to be hazardous as early as 1969, and Dow Chemical concealed the toxic properties of their product, which Carlos would not have used had he been fully advised of its toxicity.”

Here, Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claims are sufficient under Jones. First, Plaintiff identifies the S&E products, describes how his work brought him in contact with the products, the health hazards of the products, allegations providing a detailed historical timeline of the scientific literature documenting the hazards of the products, and allegations describing Plaintiff’s resulting silicosis and its alleged causal connection to S&E’s products. At the pleading stage, this sufficiently states, or reasonably implies, the elements of fraudulent concealment. As for knowledge and intent, for the Court of Appeal in Jones, the specific allegations of studies and other publications showing that the scientific community had been aware of the toxicity of the product for some time were sufficient to provide allegations of the defendant’s knowledge and intent. (Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.)

Next, S&E’s argument requiring even greater specificity for a corporate entity also fail since Plaintiffs’ case is premised on omissions. It is hard to imagine how an individual can be identified who made omissions. (See Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1199 [requiring a relaxed pleading standard for fraudulent concealment causes of action].)¿¿

Case law outlines four scenarios in the context of fraudulent concealment in which a duty to disclose exists: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose by S&E. First, S&E had exclusive knowledge of facts not known to Plaintiffs. This arises from a reasonable consequence that S&E manufactured a product with known health risks. Second, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that S&E failed to warn Plaintiff and his employer about the dangers of their products. This qualifies as a partial representation coupled with a suppression of a material fact.[4]

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES S&E’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action.

1. ¶ 84, page 46:17: “and other silica-containing stone products to be identified during the course of discovery”

2. ¶ 1114, pages 404:24-405:12: “1114. In their negligent conduct in exposing Plaintiff to their toxic and fibrogenic stone products, Defendants consciously disregarded Plaintiff's safety despite knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences of their products, and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid said dangerous consequences befalling Plaintiff. Defendants were either aware of, or culpably indifferent to, unnecessary risks of injury to Plaintiff and failed and refused to take steps to eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of said dangerous consequences to Plaintiff. Defendants concealed known toxic hazards of their stone products from Plaintiff, specifically by failing to warn Plaintiff of adverse toxic effects of their stone products, and such hazards were known by and such concealment was ratified by the corporate officers and managers of each of the defendants. Defendants consciously decided to market their stone products with knowledge of their harmful effects and without remedying the toxic effects of their stone products, and such marketing despite knowledge of the foregoing toxic hazards of Defendants' products was ratified by the corporate officers and managers of each of the defendants. Defendants also misrepresented the nature of their stone products, by withholding information from Plaintiff regarding toxic and fibrogenic chemicals, including silica and metals, released from their products during their anticipated or reasonably foreseeable uses, and such misrepresentation and withholding of information was ratified by the corporate officers and managers of each of the Defendants."

3. ¶1115, page 405:13-15: "1115. Defendants' conduct in exposing Plaintiff to said toxic and fibrogenic stone products was despicable, malicious, oppressive, and perpetrated in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff to punitive and exemplary damages."

4. ¶1133, page 406:6-10: "1133. Defendants' conduct in exposing Plaintiff to said toxic and fibrogenic stone products without adequate warnings of their toxic hazards and without adequate instructions for safe handling and use of their toxic and lethal products was despicable, malicious, oppressive, and perpetrated in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff to punitive and exemplary damages."

5. ¶1155, page 411:19-22: "1155. Defendants' conduct in exposing Plaintiff to said toxic and fibrogenic stone products without adequate warnings of their toxic hazards and without adequate instructions for safe handling and use to prevent disabling lung disease was despicable, malicious, oppressive, and perpetrated in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages."

6. ¶1188, page 419:7-10: "1188. Defendants' conduct in exposing Plaintiff to said toxic and fibrogenic stone products without adequate warnings of their toxic hazards and without adequate instructions for safe handling and use necessary to prevent disabling lung disease was despicable, malicious, oppressive, and perpetrated in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff."

7. Prayer for Relief, ¶4, page 446:5: "For punitive damages according to proof."

S&E contends that Plaintiffs’ inclusion of “other silica containing products to be identified during the course of discovery” violates the specificity requirements articulated in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Company, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71 (Bockrath). Plaintiffs argue additional products will be discovered during discovery.

“The law cannot tolerate lawsuits by prospecting plaintiffs who sue multiple defendants on speculation that their products may have caused harm over time through exposure to toxins in them, and who thereafter try to learn through discovery whether their speculation was well-founded.” (Bockrath, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 81.) As such, Plaintiffs’ allegation of “other products to be determined in discovery” is improper. Consistent with Bockrath, Plaintiffs must allege the specific products Plaintiff Medina was exposed to that allegedly caused his injuries. If Plaintiffs later discover or presently know that S&E manufactured other products that caused Decedent’s injuries, Plaintiffs may allege the specific products.[5]

Accordingly, the court GRANTS S&E’s Motion to Strike allegations of “other silica-containing stone products to be identified during the course of discovery.”

S&E contends that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts of S&E’s knowledge and Plaintiffs do not allege ratification by S&E via its managing agent, officer, or director. Plaintiffs argue that they sufficiently alleged conduct warranting punitive damages via their claim for fraudulent concealment.

“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there by circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)

In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages . . . . Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)

Similarly, punitive damages are, in general, available in claims for negligence, but “[i]n order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) Further, for nonintentional torts, an award of punitive damages is authorized “where defendant’s conduct which causes injury is of such severity or shocking character that it warrants the same treatment as that accorded to willful misconduct-conduct in which the defendant intends to cause harm.” (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286-287.) Moreover, “[i]t has long been the rule that conduct classified only as unintentional carelessness, while it may constitute negligence or even gross negligence, will not support an award of punitive damages. (Id. at 285-286.)

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim for punitive damages. The Complaint alleges that Defendants, including S&E, were aware of the toxic and fibrogenic nature of their products, knew of the probable dangerous consequences of their products, but nonetheless marketed their products, despite having knowledge of their harmful effects and probable dangerous consequences from exposure to them, without providing any warnings or taking steps to reduce the risk of dangerous consequences to their products in conscious disregard for Plaintiff Medina’s safety. The court also notes that since the specific identifies of the officers, directors, and/or managing agents of S&E that authorized and/or ratified the alleged concealment, and failure to warn of the hazards are still to be determined through discovery, these allegations are sufficient to constitute the punitive damages claim for purposes of the instant motion. (See Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [less specificity required when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.])

Accordingly, the court DENIES S&E’s Motion to Strike the punitive damages claims.

1.Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is OVERRULED and Defendant is to ANSWER only within 20 days of this order;

a. The court ORDERS the following portion of the Complaint stricken: ¶ 84, page 46:17: “and other silica-containing stone products to be identified during the course of discovery”

[1] The court notes there are several Answers and other pleadings on file. The court is purposefully shortening the pleadings identified here.

[2] Those parties struck: page 36, line 26 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, paragraph 583, and paragraph 584.

[3] S&E did not address Jones in their demurrer.

[4] What is more, Plaintiff’s employers relied on S&E to provide proper warnings and disclosures about the risks of their products so that the employees would not use toxic chemicals in a way that would eventually cause them injury. Therefore, S&E’s alleged failure to disclose to the employers extends to Plaintiff as an employee which satisfies the “special relationship” or “transactional relationship” requirement. (Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199 [observing that the principles underlying the sufficiency of the fraudulent concealment claim “are equally pertinent to the scope of defendants’ duty to disclose” and proceeding to find a properly pled duty despite the absence of a fiduciary relationship]).

[5] Indeed, Plaintiffs have identified several products already. (Complaint, p. 34:1-9.)