Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV11016, Date: 2024-11-04 Tentative Ruling

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MOVING PARTY: Defendants Dennis P. Block, APC (erroneously sued as Dennis P. Block & Associates) and Dennis P. Block; Defendants Carol Becker, William F. Burke aka Billy Burke, The Auctionarium, LLC, Mid Century Apartments, LLC, and Terry Becker

1. An Order striking various allegations in the Complaint as well as the Fourth Cause of Action;

1. The Block Defendants’ and Becker Defendants’ Special Motions to Strike are GRANTED in their entirety;

2. The Block Defendants and Becker Defendants to file a RESPONSIVE PLEADING to the Complaint within 14 days of this ruling;

On May 2, 2024, Plaintiffs Salma Agha and Ali Khan (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants Carol Becker, Dennis P. Block & Associates, Dennis P. Block, Christine T., Roxane, William F. Burke aka Billy Burke, The Auctionarium, LLC, Midcentury Apartments, Midcentury Apartments LLC, and Terry Becker with six causes of action for: (1) Violation of California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act / Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (Civil RICO – 18 U.S.C. § 1964(C); (2) Mail/Wire Fraud; (3) Fraud – Concealment; (4) Abuse of Process and Civil Conspiracy; (5) Conversion; and (6) Defamation.

According to the Complaint, Defendants fraudulently filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiffs despite scheming to fraudulently collect rent payments from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that the unlawful detainer action was fraught with procedural defects. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that some defendants broke into their home and stole their personal belongings.

On June 27, 2024, Defendants Dennis P. Block APC (erroneously sued as Dennis P. Block & Associates) and Dennis P. Block (Block Defendants) filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP).

On July 3, 2024, Defendants Carol Becker, William F. Burke aka Billy Burke, The Auctionarium, LLC, Mid Century Apartments, LLC, and Terry Becker (Becker Defendants) filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP). On October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed oppositions. As of October 30, 2024, the court has not received reply briefs.

The court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in its entirety. (Evid. Code § 452(d); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿

“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿¿¿¿

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿ First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿ ‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations omitted].)¿¿

The Block and Becker Defendants seek to strike the following from the Complaint:

1. Paragraph 8: “Defendants conspired to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity to unlawfully seek judicial enforcement of their fraudulent private action of eviction and thereafter embezzled and converted Plaintiff’s personal properties without just cause. Because Defendants sought judicial enforcement of their fraudulent private action, Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan have been deprived of their Constitutionally protected liberty interests in their properties without notice and without due process in violation of Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khans’ Constitutional rights that are secured under the Fifth Amendment which is made applicable to the County of Los Angeles, California and the City of Pasadena, California by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

2. Paragraph 38: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan alleges that on or about 08/14/2023, Defendants, CAROL BECKER, and possible owner of 144 Carr Drive; DENNIS P. BLOCK & ASSOCIATES, a law firm; DENNIS P. BLOCK, an individual and Principal of Dennis P. Block & Associates; CHRISTINE T, an individual and Associate of Dennis P. Block and each of them and does 1 through 25, participated in an enterprise with income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt and orchestrated unconscionable plan and scheme to defraud Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan by claiming that Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan owed Defendants rent for Plaintiffs’ rental unit commonly described as 144 Carr Drive Unit 4, Glendale, CA 91205 wen Defendants and each of them knew that to be false.

3. Paragraph 40: “On or about 08/14/2023 Defendants conspiring and colluding deliberately keeping Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan uninformed commenced a UD action in Pasadena Court, Case No. 23PDUD02847 employing Defendant Dennis P. Block et al. lacking a rental agreement which was not attached – a legal requirement to commencing a UD action under Code Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (d)(1).”

4. Paragraph 42: “Defendant Unlawful Detainer action for non-payment of rents being demanded by non-existing Defendant Midcentury Apartments without serving Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan with the summons and complaint of the unlawful detainer action.”

5. Paragraph 43: “On or about 08/14/2023 Defendants commenced the UD action in Pasadena Court, Case No. 23PDUD02847 under Defendant Carol Becker’s name and not under Defendant Midcentury Apartments who had been demanding “rent” money from Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan. Defendant Carol Becker was unknown to the Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and her status as to building ownership was unknown. Also unknown was her role in Defendant Midcentury Apartments. Furthermore, no Ren[t]al Agreement existed between Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and Defendant Carol Becker on which the UD lawsuit could be based on.”

6. Paragraph 44: “Defendants’ UD action was fraudulent, filed by Defendant Dennis P. Block et. Al. knowingly and deliberately with intent to defraud. Despite knowing the law they failed to attach a rental agreement as required by law in UD action under Code Civ. Proc. § 1166, subd. (d)(1). Defendant Dennis P. Block et. al. also knew that Midcentury Apartments was not a legal entity or registered to do business in California hence in UD the demanding person was switched to Defendant Carol Becker.”

7. Paragraph 45: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan were not served by Defendants and no statutory notice was given as required by California law in the event that Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan was unable to serve Defendant summons and complaint personally. Also no order was sought from the Court regarding posting of statutory notice.”

8. Paragraph 46: “On 10/05/2023, Defendant CAROL BECKER er. al. (Plaintiff in UD) not a known Landlord of the Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan, and whom Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan, were never in privity of any rental agreement with, filed Verification by Landlord Regarding Rental Assistance. (while engaged in fraudulent UD action since 8/14/202023 [sic]).”

9. Paragraph 48: “On 10/05/2023, Defendant CAROL BECKER et.al. (Plaintiff in UD), who was not a known Landlord of the Plaintiffs and SALMA AGHA was never in privity of any rental agreement, unlawfully caused a Default Judgment to be entered against, Defendant Salma Agha. No Default judgment was entered against the remaining occupants.”

10. Paragraph 49: “On 10/05/2023 Defendant CAROL BECKER et. al., who is not a known Landlord of the Defendant, and whom Defendant, SALMA AGHA was never in privity of any rental agreement with, caused an Application for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Possession or Sale to be filed.”

11. Paragraph 50: “On 10/05/2023, Defendant CAROL BECKER et. al., who is not a known Landlord of the Defendant, and whom Defendant, SALMA AGHA was never in privity of any rental agreement with, caused a Writ of Execution to be issued not withstanding that on the same day on 10/05/2023, Defendants had stated that possession was no longer an issue. To the extent that possession was no longer an issue, the Unlawful Detainer court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to preside over issue relating to possession of Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan’s apartment and the Unlawful detainer court cannot by law issue a writ of possession which formed the basis of the lock-out that was posted on Defendant’s door on December 07, 2023, if possession was not an issue as Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan indicated on 10/05/2023.”

12. Paragraph 51: “On 10/05/2023, Defendant CAROL BECKER, who is not a known Landlord of the Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and whom Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan were never in privity of any rental agreement with, falsely claimed that there was a Proof of Service by Posting against Plaintiffs, Salma Agha (Defendant in UD) knowing it to be false.”

13. Paragraph 52: “On 10/05/2023 Default judgment was entered by Clerk for Defendant, Carol Becker (Plaintiff in UD), against Plaintiff Salma Agha (Defendant in UD) on the frivolous unlawful detainer Complaint filed by Carol Becker on 08/14/2023 for a total of $0.00.”

14. Paragraph 54: “Plaintiffs Salma Agha and Ali Khan allege that Judgment for possession was not granted against all unnamed occupants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.46 however, Restitution and possession of the premises located at 144 CARR DR., APT. 4, GLENDALE, CA 91205 is granted for the Defendants in the instant case.”

15. Paragraph 55: “On 10/05/2023 the case was placed in special status of: UD Case Possession No Longer At Issue when UD Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and its/her/his Lawyers knew that to be false.”

16. Paragraph 61, pg. 16:6: “After pursuing all the above legal actions to further execute their racketeering schemes”

18. Paragraph 65: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan alleges that Defendants unlawfully employed judicial proceeding and knowingly, purposefully and intentionally concealed the true and material facts with the intent to defraud and induce the court to render judgment in their favor so that Defendants can illegally exercise dominion and control over Plaintiffs, Salm Agha and Ali Khan’s personal property worth in excess of $5,000,000.00.”

22. Paragraph 74, pg. 20:15: “conspiracy to file fraudulent rental agreement to secure eviction of Plaintiffs,”

24. Paragraph 81: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan are informed and belief and thereon allege that on 10/05/2023, t. al. Defendants, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), committed predicate acts when they proffered fraudulent Affidavit pursuant to CCP 1169 to induce the Superior Court of California to issue judgment of eviction in their favor.”

25. Paragraph 82: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan are informed and belief and thereon allege, that on 10/05/2023, Defendants, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), committed predicate acts when they obtained Default Judgment 0 Unlawful Detainer; Filed by: Carol Becker; without Notice to Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan concerning the Unlawful detainer action, to induce the Superior Court of California to issue judgment of eviction in their favor.”

26. Paragraph 83: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan are informed and belief and thereon allege, that on 10/05/2023, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), committed predicate acts when they obtained Application for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Possession or Sale; Filed by: Carol Becker, to induce the Superior Court of California to issue judgment of eviction in their favor.”

27. Paragraph 84: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan are informed and belief and thereon allege, that on 10/05/2023, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), committed predicate acts when they Request for Entry of Default / Judgment; Filed by: Carol Becker; As to: Salma Agha to induce the Superior Court of California to issue judgment of eviction in their favor.”

28. Paragraph 85: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan are informed and belief and thereon allege, that on 10/05/2023, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), committed predicate acts when they conspired to fraudulently employed judicial proceedings to obtain Default judgment by Clerk and fraudulently induced the clerk of the court to enter default judgment for Carol Becker against Salma Agha on the Complaint filed by Carol Becker on 08/14/2023 for a total of $0.00 and Judgment for possession of the premises located at 144 CARR DR., APT. 4, GLENDALE, CA 91205, when Carol Becker is neither the Landlord nor agent of the Landlord.”

29. Paragraph 94: “On or about 10/05/2023, CAROL BECKER, et. al., and does 1 through 25 (“RICO Defendants”), participated in an enterprise with income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt and conspired to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity unlawfully when they sought judicial enforcement of private action with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and California Superior Court in the City of Pasadena California.”

30. Paragraph 95, pg. 25:23: “employ judicial proceeding to effectuate their racketeering and criminal enterprise.”

31. Paragraph 99: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan alleges Defendants had a duty to no defraud the Court and had a duty to disclose to the Court that Defendant Carol Becker was not the Landlord or it agent and that no rental agreement existed between the Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan and Carol Becker or any other Defendant in the instant case, including but not limited to their respective agents or assigns or anyone or entity and agent working on their behalf.”

33. Paragraph 101: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan alleges that Defendants unlawfully employed judicial proceeding and knowingly, purposefully intentionally concealed the true and material facts with the intent to induce the court to render judgment in their favor.”

34. Paragraph 102: “Plaintiffs, Salma Agha and Ali Khan alleges that the court was so induced and rendered judgment in favor of the Defendants because of the Defendants concealed the true and material facts.”

35. The Fourth Cause of Action for Abuse of Process and Civil Conspiracy in its entirety.

The Block and Becker Defendants contend that the allegations identified above as well as the Fourth Cause of Action for Abuse of Process are based on protected speech because they are based on a judicial proceeding – the Unlawful Detainer Complaint. Plaintiffs argue that their claims are based on Defendants’ fraudulent termination of their tenancy or otherwise fall within the illegal conduct exception because Defendants’ conduct, theft of their personal property, is not protected activity.[1]

The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the defendant to make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.”¿ (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29¿Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)¿ “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . .¿ arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.¿ [Citation.]¿ In¿the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.”¿ (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati); Park, supra, at p. 1060; Old Republic Const. Program Group v. Boccardo Law Firm, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 859, 862.) As such, a trial court must examine the elements of a claim and determine what actions supply those elements and consequently form the basis for the defendant’s alleged liability.¿ (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) Allegations of protected activity that are “ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” or that “merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”¿ (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394 (Baral).)¿ “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”¿ (City of Cotati, at p. 79, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)¿¿¿

CCP § 425.16(e)(1) provides that an “act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. “There is no question that the prosecution of an unlawful detainer action is indisputably protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16.” (Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286; see also Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 45.) However, “[t]erminating a tenancy or removing property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech.” (Clark, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286-1287.) “The pivotal question is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 1287 [italics in original; internal quotations omitted].)

Here, the subject allegations and Fourth Cause of Action are clearly “based on” Defendants’ right to petition. First, Plaintiffs allege throughout the Complaint that Defendants “employ[ed] judicial proceeding[s] to effectuate their racketeering and criminal enterprise.” (Complaint at p. 25:23.) Plaintiffs separately identify several pleadings filed in the Unlawful Detainer matter that they contend are “predicate acts.” (Complaint at ¶¶ 81-85.) Unlike in Clark, supra, where the plaintiffs were challenging the landlord’s termination of their tenancy, here, Plaintiffs are alleging that the filing and pursuit of the Unlawful Detainer action is a critical component of the wrongdoing.[2]

Plaintiffs’ argument that the conduct is illegal and therefore unprotected is not well taken. To qualify as unprotected illegal conduct, it must be illegal as a matter of law – meaning Defendants either conceded that point or Plaintiffs provided evidence that conclusively demonstrated illegal conduct. (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424; Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Neither happened here. Plaintiffs’ single declaration in support concludes that “Defendants and their Attorneys filed fabricated documents as evidence to obtain judgment of eviction against [Plaintiffs].” (Agha Decl. ¶ 5.) This is not conclusively demonstrating illegal conduct.

Accordingly, the Block and Becker Defendants have made a threshold showing that the identified allegations and Fourth Cause of Action arise from protected activity.

When defendants carry their initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the claims are subject to CCP § 425.16, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that they will prevail at trial on that claim by making a prima facie showing on that claim.¿ (Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc.¿(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 613.)¿ “Put another way, the plaintiffs ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]”¿ (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477-78).¿ “Thus, plaintiffs' burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment.”¿ (Id.)¿ While the Court does not weigh the evidence, “the trial court must consider facts so as to make a determination whether [Cross-Complainants] can establish a prima facie probability of prevailing on [their] claims.”¿ (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc.¿(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 921.)¿¿ “If there is a conflict in the evidence (the existence of a disputed material fact), the anti-SLAPP motion should be denied. (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 598.)

Abuse of Process requires: (1) an ulterior motive by the person using the process, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056-1057.)

The litigation privilege is codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), and provides that “a privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [¶] [i]n any . . . judicial proceeding . . . .”¿¿

“’The principal purpose of [Civil Code] section [47, subdivision (b)] is to afford litigants and witnesses . . .¿ the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.’ [Citation.] Additionally, the privilege promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging ‘“open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence”’¿without the external threat of liability [citation]¿and ‘by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients' interests.’ [Citation.]” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 321-322.)¿

The litigation privilege is “absolute,” and “it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.) It applies not only to statements made before a court but broadly “to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) Simply put, “communications in connection with matters related to a lawsuit are privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).” (Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058.)¿

Although the scope of protected activity under anti-SLAPP and the scope of the litigation privilege are not exactly coterminous, they are symmetrical for the purposes of this motion. (See Flatley, supra, at p. 323 [“The litigation privilege is also relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing”]; accord Action Apartment Association, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1248 [litigation privilege applies to communications and communicative conduct, but not to noncommunicative conduct].)

Here, Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. Notably, Plaintiffs’ claim for abuse of process is barred due to the litigation privilege. First, participating in a judicial proceeding is the very thing most strongly and essentially protected by the litigation privilege.(Rubin v. Green (1992) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195-1196.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants wrongfully pursued an Unlawful Detainer Action. (See generally, Complaint.) Second, the privilege applies “in the context of abuse of process claims alleging the filing of false or perjurious testimony or declarations.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.) In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants fraudulently filed various pleadings in the Unlawful Detainer Action. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 82.) Because Plaintiffs will be barred from presenting evidence to substantiate their claim, Plaintiffs do not have a probability of success. ¿

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Block Defendants’ and Becker Defendants’ Special Motions to Strike in their entirety.[3]

The Block and Becker Defendants each seek $3,660.00 in attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiffs argue that the anti-SLAPP is frivolous and so they should receive attorney’s fees and costs.

The “prevailing defendant” on the special motion to strike “shall be entitled” to recover the defendant's attorney fees and costs. (CCP § 425.16(c); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

Here, the Block and Becker Defendants are entitled to an attorney’s fees and costs award. They provided evidence supporting the request for $3,660.00. (H.G. Long Decl. ¶ 3 [attached to each motion].) However, the court exercises its discretion to modify the award because, as requested, it is unreasonable. First, the motions are identical so the second request for 8 hours of work is unreasonable. Second, there was no opposition filed or need to prepare a reply which renders the requested 3 hours also unreasonable. As such, the court reduces the total award to 5 hours at counsel’s rate of $450.00 per hour plus $120 motion filing fees for a total of $2,370.00.

1. The Block Defendants’ and Becker Defendants’ Special Motions to Strike are GRANTED in their entirety;

2. The Block Defendants and Becker Defendants to file their RESPONSIVE PLEADING to the Complaint within 14 days of this ruling;

[1] Plaintiffs also advance arguments pertaining to the causes of action that Defendants did not move to strike (e.g., Conversion). The court declines to develop those arguments since they are not at issue via this motion.

[2] Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “had a duty not to defraud the Court and had a duty to disclose to the Court that Defendant Carol Becker was not the Landlord . . . .” (Complaint ¶ 99.) The entire Third Cause of Action for Fraud is purportedly due to Defendants’ misleading the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Complaint ¶¶ 98-103.) The court notes that while Defendants seek to strike most of the allegations comprising the Third Cause of Action they did not seek an order striking it entirely.

[3] The court notes, however, that the Block and Becker Defendants did not move to strike the First, Second, Third, Fifth, or Sixth Causes of Action. As such, those remain. Whether they will survive further attack is beyond the scope of this motion.