Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV12080, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

CASE NAME: Manuel Pineda v. Judith Fisher as Trustee of the Fischer Family Trust, et al.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Judith Fisher, as Trustee of The Fischer Family Trust, North Oak Real Estate INV, Inc., Sinahi G. Barrios, and Joel B. Rodstein

1. Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action for failure to state sufficient facts and uncertainty;

On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff Manuel Pineda (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Judith Fischer as Trustee of the Fischer Family Trust, North Oak Real Estate INV, Inc., Sinahi G. Barrios, and Joel B. Rodstein (Defendants) with causes of action for: (1) Breach of Agreement, (2) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (3) Violation of Civ. Code §§ 1941, 1941.1, and 1942.4, (4) Willful Interruption of Services – Violation of Civ. Code § 789.3, (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (6) Private Nuisance, (7) Negligence, (8) Constructive Eviction, (9) Violation of Unfair Competition Laws (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.), and (10) Unlawful Entry (Civ. Code § 1954 et seq.).

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is a tenant at 6336 Orange St., Unit #3, Los Angeles, California 90048, owned and operated by Defendants, which allegedly contain substantial substandard conditions.

On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint substituting Comex Holdings, LLC for DOE 1.

On August 21, 2024, Defendants Judith Discher, as Trustee of the Fischer Family Trust, North Oak Real Estate INV. Inc., Sinahi G. Barrios, and Joel B. Rodstein (Defendants) filed the instant Demurrer with Motion to Strike. On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions. On December 30, 2024, Defendants filed replies.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). ¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.) Here, the parties met and conferred telephonically. (Larsen Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id.¿§¿437.)¿“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿¿¿

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege outrageous conduct, no allegations of intent to cause emotional distress to Plaintiff, and no allegations of severe emotional distress. Defendants also contend this claim is uncertain because the factual allegations contradict themselves concerning repairs made or not made. Plaintiff argues the outrageous conduct was Defendants knowingly displaced Plaintiff and failed to remediate the problems to his home before he returned. Plaintiff further argues this conduct shows a reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress and did cause Plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional distress.[1] Defendants reply that Plaintiff still failed to specifically allege outrageous conduct by each defendant and the actions pled show nuisance and negligence.

The necessary elements for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) which was intentional or reckless in nature; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259 (Huntingdon).) For purposes of pleading IIED, conduct is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (Davidson).)

Although emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry [citation], to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was severe and not trivial or transient.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376.)¿ Such distress must be “of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.”¿ (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.)¿A tenant may sue their landlord for IIED “if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922 [noting a factual question in that case.]) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (a) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (b) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (c) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Id. at p. 921.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, although Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts supporting a claim for IIED, Plaintff failed to articulate which defendant had knowledge and how they had such knowledge. First, Plaintiff alleges that the outrageous conduct was “intentionally ignoring and failing to keep the Property clean, sanitary, and free from accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, and garbage, and by violating health and safety codes, ordinances, regulations, and other laws” coupled with knowing the Property was “untenable” and “refused to remediate.” (Complaint ¶¶ 137-138.) While these allegations in isolation are conclusory, the fifth cause of action incorporates the prior factual allegations in the preceding paragraphs. (Complaint ¶ 136.) Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff pleads facts recounting significant habitability issues that Defendants had knowledge of and yet failed to correct including a collapsed bedroom ceiling (Complaint ¶¶ 40-42), flea infestation ((Complaint ¶¶ 48-51), inoperable heater ((Complaint ¶¶ 53-55), lack of running water (Complaint ¶¶ 56-60), and being removed from the unit in January 2023 without being offered relocation benefits. (Complaint ¶¶ 75-77).) These incorporated facts sufficient to state a claim. However, Plaintiffs lump all defendants together and fail to specifically alleges which defendants they provided notice or how knowledge was imputed to each defendant.

1. Paragraph 118: “This constitutes malice . . . and justifies an award of punitive damages.”

2. Paragraph 119: “This constitutes oppression . . . and justifies an award of punitive damages”

3. Paragraph 114: “Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages against Defendants”

4. Paragraph 151: “Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages against Defendants”

6. Paragraph 183: “Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages against Defendants”

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to allege facts that Defendants acted with malice, oppression, or fraud warranting punitive damages because the alleged failure to timely or properly maintain the Premises alone is not despicable conduct. Plaintiff argues he alleged sufficient facts demonstrating malice and punitive damages are warranted for Defendants’ repeated failure to remediate the Property despite Plaintiff’s and government citations. Defendants reply that gross negligence is insufficient to justify a punitive damages award.[2]

To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in support of punitive damages.¿ (See¿Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co.¿(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)¿ In addition,¿punitive damages are allowed only where “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).)¿ Courts have viewed despicable conduct as conduct “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Further, Civil Code § 3294(c) provides the definition of malice, oppression, and fraud. Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Ibid.) Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Ibid.) Fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”¿(Ibid.)¿

Upon reviewing the Complaint, again, while Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts warranting punitive damages, Plaintiff filed to enumerate how each defendant had actual or imputed knowledge. In Stoiber v. Honeychuck, the premises was so dilapidated that it needed to be torn down. ((1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 912 [describing the following defects identified by the Kern County health Department: “heavy cockroach infestation, broken interior walls broken deteriorated flooring on front porch, falling ceiling, deteriorated, overfused electrical wiring, lack of proper plumbing connection to sewage system in bathroom, sewage under bathroom floor, leaking roof, broken, windows, and fire hazard.”]) The Court there found that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support her prayer for punitive damages because the defendant had actual knowledge of defective conditions in the premises, acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive, and malicious. (Id. at p. 920.) Here, as in Stoiber, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had actual knowledge of the defects, that the defects were causing Plaintiff damages, and that Defendants’ conduct was willful, oppressive, and malicious. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 22, 23, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 54, 55, 56, 58, 75, 76, 82, 83, 84, 85.) However, there are insufficient allegations to determine which defendants committed the various allegedly malicious acts.

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

[1] Plaintiff cited no authority supporting his position.

[2] Defendants additionally request that the court consider granting the motion as to the individual defendants at minimum.