Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV12391, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

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1. Demurrer to the entire Complaint for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff APS&EE, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Williams-Sonoma, Inc., Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., and Williams-Sonoma Sourcing, Inc. (Defendants) for civil penalties and injunctive relief. According to the Complaint, Defendants’ dinner plates contain lead but Defendants failed to comply with Prop 65 warnings for the products.

On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to Defendants Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. and Williams-Sonoma Sourcing, Inc. only.

On December 6, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 25, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). ¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.) Here, the parties met and conferred via letter and emails. (Maxwell Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) Accordingly, this requirement is met.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿

The court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A, B, and D and Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A.

The court DENIES Defendant’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits C as irrelevant.

The court also DENIES Defendant’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibit E and 1-6 and Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and G. These orders are unpublished and nonprecedential. (See Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”].)

Defendants contend Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a proper 60-day pre-suit notice.[1] Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s claim failed to specifically allege how it violated the Attorney General’s Prop 65 Wedgewood Consent Judgment.

Plaintiff argues that they substantially complied with the notice requirement and strict compliance would not be necessary because they satisfied the statute’s purpose.[2] Plaintiff argues further that the Wedgewood injunctive standards are not codified in law so Plaintiff was not required to include them in their Complaint.[3]

Defendant replies that allowing an outside counsel to field resolution defeats the statute’s dual purpose because that counsel is financially motivated to obtain fee recovery. Additionally, Defendant argues there is no substantial compliance because Plaintiff did not attempt to comply at all.

“Before bringing a Prop. 65 action in the public interest, a private plaintiff must provide a pre-suit notice containing sufficient information about the claim to (1) the Attorney General and other public prosecutors, to allow them to adequately investigate the claim’s basis, and (2) the alleged violator, to allow it an opportunity to cure the violation. . . . Failure to comply with pre-suit notice requirements is grounds for dismissal, and deficiencies cannot be cured after the complaint is filed.” (Council for Education & Research on Toxics v. Starbucks Corp. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 879, 899-900 (Starbucks Corp.).)

One requirement of the pre-suit notice is that it must identify “the name, address, and telephone number of the noticing individual or a responsible individual within the noticing entity and the name of the entity.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 27, § 25903, subd. (b)(2)(A).)

“When a court attempts to discern the meaning of a statute, ‘it is well settled that we must look first to the words of the statute, “because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends. “If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” [Citations.] In reading statutes, we are mindful that words are to be given their plain and commonsense meaning.’ [Citation.]” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 639-640.)

“Although courts sometimes construe statutory mandates liberally to effectuate their remedial purpose [citation], strict compliance with a statute is warranted when our Legislature evinces its intent that the statute’s requirements are to be followed precisely. We may infer such an intent when (1) ‘the Legislature has provided a detailed and specific mandate’ [citations], or (2) ‘the intent of [the] statute can only be served by demanding strict compliance with its terms’ [citation].” (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board No. 2 (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 (Prang).)

It is true that “substantial compliance with statutory directives will suffice if the purpose of the statute is thereby satisfied.” (Downtown Palo Alto Com. for Fair Assessment v. City Council (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 384, 395; see In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 603-604.) However, the Final Statement of Reasons for Section 12903 (“FSOR”) included in Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice does not prove that the purpose of section 25903 is satisfied by identifying the noticing entity’s attorney. The FSOR notes that “many notices do not describe the nature of the alleged violation in an intelligible manner,” which makes it difficult or impossible for the alleged violator to cure any violation prior to litigation, thereby impeding the achievement of the goals of the statute through quick compliance. (Pl. RJN, Ex. A at pp. 7-8.) The notice’s required information is “intended to ensure that notices provide adequate information necessary for the recipients to evaluate the nature and scope of the alleged violation.” (Id. at p. 8.) With respect to identifying the responsible individual within the noticing entity, “Identification of the party giving the notice is needed to give the receiving parties an opportunity to contact the noticing party to resolve the issues raised in the notice and to identify who will be entitled to pursue a civil action.” (Ibid.) Identifying the noticing entity’s attorney, rather than an individual within the entity, is contrary to the goal of curing violations without litigation.

Here, the notice does not comply with all matters of substance. It is undisputed that only Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Novak, is identified. It is also undisputed that Mr. Novak is not “within” Plaintiff’s entity. Thus, the notice identifies a substantively different individual than what is required by the statute. This information is required because the “Legislature evinces its intent that the statute’s requirements are to be followed precisely.” (Prang, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) What is more, the Legislature included the terms “shall” and “all” which indicates that “all” items identified “shall” be satisfied in order to commence a Prop 65 action. This, therefore, requires strict compliance and not substantial compliance. As a result, omission of the responsible individual within the noticing entity is fatal.

Leave to amend should be liberally granted if there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the defect.¿ (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1018,1035.)¿ The Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that leave to amend should be granted, and that the defects can be cured by amendment. (“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349).

These “deficiencies [of the notice] cannot be cured after the complaint is filed.” (Starbucks Corp., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899-900.)

Pursuant to CCP § 581d, this written order of dismissal constitutes a judgment and shall be effective for all purposes. The Clerk shall note this judgment in the register of actions in this case.

[1] Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff filed a pre-suit notice but it failed to properly identify a contact within APS&EE. As the statute states this is a mandatory requirement to facilitate pre-suit settlement between parties, Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirement.

[2] The court declines to analyze the argument comparing the notice requirement here with the certificate of merit requirement because the statute provides that an attorney may sign the certificate of merit. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, subd. (d)(1).)

[3] At any rate, Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated them.