Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV12954, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

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1. An Order striking the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action from the Cross-Complaint in full;

2. Alternatively, an Order striking paragraphs 36 and 38 from the Cross-Complaint.

On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff Adam Sigal (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Danielle Druz p/k/a Dani Druz, and Anthony W. Trujillo, Esq. (Defendants) with six causes of action for: (1) Defamation, (2) Invasion of Privacy – False Light, (3) Civil Harassment (CCP § 527.6), (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (5) Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, and (6) Civil Extortion.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff and Defendant Druz worked together and separately maintained a consensual romantic relationship. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants defamed Plaintiff by publishing a false sexual harassment complaint to SAG-AFTRA, posting false defamatory statements to social media, and by sending a false letter to Plaintiff indicating litigation on the alleged sexual harassment commenced and demanded settlement payment.

On July 26, 2024, Defendant Druz filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) and a Cross-Complaint. The Cross-Complaint has eleven causes of action for: (1) Sexual Assault; (2) Sexual Battery in Violation of Civ. Code § 1708.5; (3) Sexual Harassment in Violation of Civ. Code § 51.9; (4) Violation of Civ. Code § 51.7; (5) Violation of Civ. Code § 52.1; (6) Gender Violence in Violation of Civ. Code § 52.4; (7) Invasion of Privacy – False Light; (8) Defamation; (9) Intentional Interference with Economic Relations; (10) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations; and (11) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On September 4, 2024, Cross-Defendant Maren Altman filed an Answer to Druz’s Cross-Complaint.

On September 5, 2024, Defendant Trujillo filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

On October 1, 2024, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sigal filed a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) to Druz’s Cross-Complaint.

On October 10, 2024, Cross-Defendant Carol Gene Lewis filed a General Denial to Druz’s Cross-Complaint.

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Trujillo.

On February 11, 2025, Druz filed an opposition to Sigal’s Anti-SLAPP motion. On February 19, 2025, Sigal filed a reply.

“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected¿conduct¿from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.”¿ (Baral v.¿Schnitt¿(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).)¿ “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 384.)¿

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.¿ First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by¿section 425.16.¿ If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”¿ (Baral,¿supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 [citation omitted].)¿ The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’¿ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.¿ Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made¿a prima facie¿factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.¿ It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as¿true, and¿evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.¿ ‘[C]laims¿with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’”¿ (Id.¿at pp. 384-385 [citations omitted].)¿

The court need not rule Druz’s and Sigal’s evidentiary objections for purposes of ruling on this motion.

The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the defendant to make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.”¿ (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29¿Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)¿ “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . .¿ arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.¿ [Citation.]¿ In¿the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.”¿ (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati).)

There are four categories of protected speech set forth in subdivision (e) of California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. “The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [‘arising from’] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....” (Equilon, supra, 29¿Cal.4th at p. 66.) As such, a trial court must examine “the elements of a claim and determine what actions supply those elements and consequently form the basis for the defendant’s alleged liability.”(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063.) “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”¿ (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 at p. 79, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)

Sigal moves under (e)(1) and (e)(2) because the two claims arise out of his Complaint. Druz argues that the litigation privilege does not protect Sigal’s disclosure of the Complaint to unrelated parties. Sigal replies that his filing and alleged circulation of the Complaint is the basis of liability for both interference claims and is therefore protected activity.[1]

Here, Sigal’s disseminating the Complaint to non-party entertainment professionals is not protected activity. Undoubtedly, Sigal’s filing of the Complaint is protected activity under CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (2). (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.App.4th 82, 90.) But, on reading the Cross-Complaint, that is not the basis for Druz’s claims against him. Druz alleges:

“Upon information and belief, Sigal has sent around the Sigal Lawsuit in an attempt to discredit Druz and to cause entertainment industry professionals to avoid doing business with her and entering into business relationships with her.”

Thus, the “conduct by which [Druz] claims to have been injured” was not Sigal’s filing and prosecuting the Complaint but for allegedly taking the Complaint and sending it to unrelated entertainment industry professionals.[2] A “claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Druz’s allegation identifying the Complaint is not a basis for liability but merely background. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 36.)

[1] Sigal also attacks the merits of Druz’s evidence submitted with her opposition. The court reminds all parties of the rules of civility.

[2] While more appropriately discussed under Prong 2, Sigal’s alleged distribution of the Complaint is akin to “litigation in the press” which is not protected activity. (GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 152.) Parenthetically, the court notes it is not persuaded the litigation privilege would apply to Sigal’s sending the Complaint to unrelated industry professionals. Indeed, Sigal argues on reply that the entertainment professionals “would have a substantial interest in the lawsuit in deciding whether they would want to work with Druz in the future given her unstable temperament and wild defamatory accusations of Sigal.” (Reply 10:3-7 [bolding added].) This is outside the scope of the litigation privilege. (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 1268 [noting that the letter there was protected because it was sent to “persons whom Maxsecurity reasonably could believe had an interest in the dispute as potential witnesses to, or unwitting participants in, Neville’s alleged misconduct.”] [emphasis added.])