Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV13717, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

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MOVING PARTY: Defendants Pacific Healthworks, LLC; Emergent Medical Associates; Irv Edwards M.D., Inc.; and Mark R. Bell Medical Corporation

1. Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a claim.

On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff Tamar Sauer (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant Pacific Healthworks, LLC, Emergent Medical Associates, Irv Edwards, M.D., Inc., and Mark R. Bell Medical Corporation (Defendants) with five causes of action for: (1) Labor Code § 3706; (2) Failure to Pay All Wages Owed Each Pay Period; (3) Failure to Provide Compliant Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Provide Compliant Rest Breaks; and (5) Unfair Business Practices.

On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) with the same five causes of action.

According to the FAC, Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a doctor. She alleges that she was stabbed by a patient while working as an Emergency Room Physician for Defendants who misclassified her as an independent contractor. Plaintiff alleges that because of the misclassification, she could not receive worker’s compensation benefits or other California employee protections.

On December 18, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer. On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 13, 2025, Defendants filed a reply.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). Here, the parties met and conferred telephonically on November 26, 2024, with emails on November 21, 2024 and December 12, 2024. (Sawicki Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Accordingly, this requirement is met.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿¿

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)¿¿

Defendants contain that Plaintiff insufficiently alleged facts that Defendants owned, possessed, or controlled Encino Hospital, that the third-party criminal act (stabbing) was unforeseeable, that Plaintiff did not allege what further actions Defendants could have taken to prevent the stabbing, and that helping to establish security policies and procedures is insufficient. Specifically, Defendants challenge the duty element of Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Plaintiffs argue that they did sufficiently state a claim at this stage.[1] Defendants reply that they have a complete defense.[2]

As a threshold matter, the court addresses the underlying cause of action Plaintiff pursues. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges violation of Labor Code § 3706. It provides: “If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his dependents may bring an action at law against such employer for damages, as if this division did not apply.” (Lab. Code § 3706.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “did not offer workers’ compensation benefits to Plaintiff after the subject incident. Therefore, Defendants are subject to tort action by Plaintiff for her injuries sustained while in the scope of employment . . . .” (FAC ¶ 38.) As such, Plaintiff uses Lab. Code § 3706 to bring her workplace injury claim against Defendants in this court. And, when read in conjunction with the rest of the FAC’s allegations, Plaintiff pursues a negligence claim against Defendants.[3]

The basic elements of a negligence claim are: a duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff; defendant’s breach of that duty; causation; and harm to plaintiff. (Kesner v. Sup. Ct. (Pneumo Abex, LLC) (2016 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)[4]

Pursuant to Lab. Code § 3708 once a Plaintiff alleges that an employment relationship and that an injury occurred while in the scope of work, a presumption of negligence applies.

Upon reviewing the FAC, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a negligence claim. First, Plaintiff alleges she was an employee of Defendants. (See FAC ¶ 1; see also ¶¶ 20-21 [describing physician requirements provided by Defendants.]) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff was injured during the scope of employment. (FAC ¶ 19.) Third, Plaintiff alleges resulting damages. (FAC ¶ 19.)

Defendants rely heavily on Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487, 591, for the proposition that they do not owe a duty as a matter of law because they did not actually own, possess or control the location where the injury was sustained. In other words, they did not owe Plaintiff a duty and, therefore, there can be no negligence. It is true that Defendants are entitled to offer evidence to rebut the presumption of Labor Code § 3708 and . duty is an element of negligence. Nonetheless, we are currently at the pleading stage, not the evidentiary stage. As such, it is for another day for the court to resolve that impending issue.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendants’ demurrer to the First Cause of Action with leave to amend.

Demurrer to the First Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Defendants are to file an ANSWER only within 21 days.

[1] Plaintiff also argues that Defendants misconstrue various authorities.

[2] The court notes that both parties argue Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487. However, that case is a summary judgment case. This is not a summary judgment case. Thus, the court declines to address that argument here.

[3] The court is not bound by the captions or labels of a cause of action in a pleading and the nature and character of a pleading is to be determined from the facts alleged, not the name given by the pleader to the cause of action. Thus, regardless of whether the complaint gives the causes of action a label imbued with personal property law meaning, it is the facts behind the label which govern the nature and character of the primary right sued upon. (Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1281.)

[4][I]t is sufficient to allege that an act was negligently done by defendant and that it caused damage to plaintiff. (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal. 2d 149, 154.)