Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV15491, Date: 2024-12-16 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24STCV15491    Hearing Date: December 16, 2024    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   December 16, 2024                                        

 

CASE NAME:           Madelaine Morris v. Zara Usa, Inc.

 

CASE NO.:                24STCV15491

 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS

 

MOVING PARTY:  Defendant Zara USA, Inc.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Madelaine Morris on behalf of all Aggrieved Employees only.

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      An Order compelling plaintiff Madelaine Morris to submit her individual claims under PAGA to arbitration; and

2.      An Order staying all prosecution and proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Matter is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff Madeline Morris on behalf of all other Aggrieved Employees (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint for Enforcement under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, et seq. against Defendant Zara USA, Inc. (Defendant).

 

On August 1, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration. On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Replies were due on or before December 9, 2024. As of December 12, 2024, the court has not received a reply brief.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of four trial court rulings that she cites at length in her opposition. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits A-D.) The court may decline to take judicial notice of materials not “necessary, helpful or relevant.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.) California Rule of Court, rule 8.115(b), prohibits citing or relying on unpublished decisions except for reasons not applicable here. Second, “A written trial court ruling in another case has no precedential value. ” (Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 885; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; In re Molz (2015) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845; Santa Ana Medical Hospital Center v. Belshé (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.) Here, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice includes four trial court opinions. As discussed above, this not only does not help the court, it is improper.

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice in its entirety.

 

Compel Arbitration

 

“California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes.  To further that policy, section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies.  Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.”  (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)   

 

In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement.  (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)  The opposing party has the burden to establish any defense to enforcement.  (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 [“The petitioner, T–Mobile here, bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party, plaintiffs here, bears the burden of proving any fact necessary to its defense.”].)   

 

Procedurally, a petition to compel arbitration or stay proceedings must state verbatim the provisions providing for arbitration, or must have a copy of them attached.  (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1330.)   

 

ANALYSIS

 

Existence of Arbitration Agreement  

 

“With respect to the moving party’s burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court.”  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160.) 

 

Here, Defendant presents evidence that on May 20, 2022, at the outset of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff viewed and physically signed the Arbitration Agreement.  (Declaration of Joanna Dmytryszyn [“Dmytryszyn Decl.”] ¶10, Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed it. (Declaration of Madelaine Morris [“Morris Decl.”] ¶ 4.)

 

Thus, Defendant met its burden that an arbitration agreement exists.

 

Burden on the¿Opposing Party to Establish Any Defense to Enforcement 

 

Because Defendant has established the existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement, the burden shifts to Plaintiff as the party opposing arbitration, to show why the agreement should not be enforced.   

 

Plaintiff contends that the motion should be denied as Defendant cannot compel to arbitration individual PAGA claims that do not exist.  Plaintiff also asserts that she has sufficiently alleged standing to prosecute representative PAGA claims under Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 (Balderas), which reversed an order striking a PAGA pleading for lack of individual PAGA claim.  Plaintiff thus contends that she cannot be compelled to arbitrate her representative claims.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff clearly has individual claims and is otherwise circumventing PAGA requirements.

 

Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claim is not arbitrable  

 

To have standing to bring a representative PAGA claim, a plaintiff need not also allege an individual PAGA cause of action.  (Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, 538.)  “The inability for an employee to pursue an individual PAGA claim does not prevent that employee from filing a representative PAGA action.”  (Balderas, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at 537.)  Representative PAGA claims are not derivative or dependent on a plaintiff’s individual claim for relief.  (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 86.)  PAGA standing “does not depend on maintaining an individual Labor Code violation.”  (Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924, 930.) 

 

As Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 1104, 1113 explicitly holds that an individual remedy is unnecessary to possess standing to pursue PAGA penalties, it necessarily follows that Plaintiff is not obligated to seek any individual remedy, in the form of any “individual” PAGA penalties, to possess standing to pursue PAGA penalties for fellow employees:¿ 

 

As Kim and Johnson make clear, a worker becomes an “aggrieved employee” with standing to litigate claims on behalf of fellow employees upon sustaining a Labor Code violation committed by his or her employer.  (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84–85, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 459 P.3d 1123; Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 478; § 2699, subd. (c).)  Standing under PAGA is not affected by enforcement of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff’s individual claim in another forum.  Arbitrating a PAGA plaintiff’s individual claim does not nullify the fact of the violation or extinguish the plaintiff’s status as an aggrieved employee, any more than the time-barring of remedies did in Johnson or the settlement of the individual damages claims did in Kim. (See Kim, at pp. 84–85, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 459 P.3d 1123; Johnson, at p. 930, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 478.) The operative complaint alleges that Adolph experienced Labor Code violations while driving for Uber. Under Kim, Adolph’s allegations that Labor Code violations were committed against him while he was employed by Uber suffice to confer standing to bring a PAGA action.¿¿(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal. 5th at 1121.)¿ 

 

To establish standing in a PAGA action, plaintiff need only allege that she is “(1) someone who was employed by the alleged violator and (2) someone against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”  (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1120 (internal quotations omitted).) Despite Labor Code Section 2699’s language stating that an employee must bring an action on behalf of himself and other current employees, the California Supreme Court has declined to “impose additional” standing requirements because doing so would “thwart¿the Legislature's clear intent to deputize employees to pursue sanctions on the state’s behalf.” (Id. at 1120, 1122.) 

 

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently established standing. First, Plaintiff has alleged that she was employed by Defendant, which Defendant does not dispute, stating in the Complaint that Plaintiff “is an individual who resides in California and was employed by ZARA USA, INC., on or about June 20, 2022 and worked for EMPLOYERS until on or about January 20, 2024.”  (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 14.)  Second, Plaintiff has alleged that she is someone against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed, stating in the Complaint that she “has suffered labor code violations” along with the aggrieved employees for “failure to provide employment records,” “failure to pay overtime and double time,” “failure to provide rest and meal periods,” “failure to pay minimum wages,” “failure to keep accurate payroll records and provide itemized wage statements,” “failure to pay reporting time wages,” “failure to pay split shift wages,” “failure to pay all wages earned on time,” “failure to pay all wages earned upon discharge or resignation,” and “failure to reimburse necessary, business-related expenses.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6.) Thus, Plaintiff has standing to assert her non-individual PAGA claim.  

 

Further, Viking River does not operate to divest Plaintiff of standing to pursue “non-individual” PAGA claims.¿ Adolph rejected that contention under California State law.¿ (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1119-1120.)¿ While Viking River may stand for the proposition that Plaintiff must arbitrate an “individual” PAGA claim, so long as she chooses to assert one, nothing in Viking River gives any court the authority to force a plaintiff to arbitrate an individual claim that he or she elects not to pursue, to begin with.¿ ¿ 

 

In sum, Plaintiff has sufficiently established standing as an employee against whom one or more of the alleged violations were committed, and Plaintiff elects not to pursue an individual PAGA claim, instead seeking to recover only for the “non-individual” PAGA claim.  Thus, there would be no individual claim to refer to arbitration.¿ As such, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s nonexistent individual claim must be arbitrated, fails. 

 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay action.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

1.      Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Matter is DENIED.

Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             December 16, 2024                 __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court