Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV17009, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

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1. Judgment on the Pleadings as to the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED as to the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action;

On July 9, 2024, Plaintiff Caitlin Scott (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Strategic Legal Practices, APC and Payam Shahian (Defendants) with four causes of action for: (1) Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Pregnancy, and Disability in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(a); (2) Failure to Reimburse Work-Related Expenses in Violation of Labor Code § 2802; (3) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy; and (4) Harassment and Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(j).

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is an attorney who obtained a position with Defendants’ firm after discussing a new trial team opportunity. Plaintiff further alleges that after about seven months in this role, she had a closed-door meeting with Defendant Shahian to discuss her intent to undergo fertility treatment and requested accommodations as well as to discuss her ADD diagnosis and its impact on her fertility plans. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shahian was openly hostile to Plaintiff during this meeting and subsequently bullied her at work after it. Plaintiff alleges further that Defendant Strategic Legal Practices failed to take corrective action. As a result, Plaintiff resigned.

On August 8, 2024, Defendant Strategic Legal Practices, APC (SLP) filed an Answer.

On November 4, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On January 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 5, 2025, Defendants filed a reply.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action alleged in the complaint, or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.¿ (Code Civ. Pro. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)¿ The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter which the court has judicially noticed.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd. (d).)¿ A motion may be made even though the movant has already demurred to the complaint or answer, on the same ground as is the basis for the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the demurrer has been overruled, “provided that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (g)(1).)¿¿¿

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded,” but “does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.”¿ (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220.)¿

Prior to filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person, via telephone, or by video conference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) Insufficient meet and confer is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) Here, the parties met and conferred via phone call on October 3, 2024 but were unable to resolve the dispute. (Bacon Decl. ¶ 4.) This requirement is therefore met.

First Cause of Action – Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Pregnancy, and Disability in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(a)

Defendants contend that this claim fails because Plaintiff did not allege an adverse employment action. Defendants highlight that one day of yelling does not support intolerable conduct at work prompting resignation.[1] Plaintiff argues that she alleged multiple incidents where Shahian was openly hostile to her. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Shahian’s bizarre meltdown was so utterly outrageous, offensive, cruel and inappropriate that it sufficiently supports an adverse employment action via hostile and abusive work environment. Defendants reply that there are no allegations of intolerable working conditions after May 31, 2023.

“It is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or any employer, because of . . . mental disability, [or] reproductive health decisionmaking, . . . to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Gov. Code § 12940(a).) An employer is also prohibited from harassing an employee for these reasons. [Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 (Bailey)]

There are two issues here: (1) severity or pervasiveness; and (2) adverse employment action.

Courts evaluate the “totality of the circumstances” in the work environment to evaluate whether a work environment is perceived as hostile or abusive. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 628 (Bailey).) This includes: “[T]he frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (Ibid. [citations omitted]) “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious), are not sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment.” (Ibid. [citations omitted]) Courts judge the objective severity of the harassment “from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” (Id. at p. 629.)

Defendants’ position that one day of shouting is insufficient as a matter of law is unpersuasive. Indeed, “although viable hostile work environment claims often involve repeated conduct, it is not required.” (Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5^th at p. 629.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two events: the closed-door setup meeting and the subsequent day of repeated shouting events. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-34.) Plaintiff alleges that on May 24, 2023, she confirmed to Shahian her intent to start fertility treatments which included ceasing her ADD medication. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-23.) Plaintiff alleges that Shahian reacted with “disappointment” and “hostility” to the news and refused her accommodation requests. (Ibid.) Thereafter, on May 31, 2023, Plaintiff alleges a series of outbursts by Shahian to her spanning several hours of a workday where he pulled her from a meeting to yell at her, called her cell phone after leaving her office to yell at her, and yelled at her at the end of the workday – well into the evening. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-28.) During this, Shahian allegedly yelled at Plaintiff to “provide her two weeks’ resignation notice and get out of his firm” and repeatedly yelled that she should focus on her work and not her pregnancy. (Ibid.) The next day, Plaintiff scheduled a “last-minute appointment with her psychiatrist” and “work[ed] from home.” (Compl. ¶ 31.) Her psychiatrist immediately advised her to take leave as a result. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-33.) Plaintiff did so. (Compl. ¶ 34.) This behavior allegedly carried out over separate days culminating with a course of conduct occurring over multiple hours concluding with a final outburst after 8:00 pm does not appear to be a single, isolated or trivial conduct. Even if can be considered a single incident of harassing conduct, Plaintiff has sufficiently met the requirements of Government Code section 12923(b) by pleading facts supporting the contention that the “harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” (Govt. Code § 12923(b).) This is enough to allege an unreasonable interference with an employee’s work performance at this stage.

FEHA discrimination claims “address only explicit changes in the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (See Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 (Bailey).) Constructive discharge is an adverse employment action. (Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253.)

“In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251.)

“The conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer. The proper focus is on whether the resignation was coerced, not whether it was simply one rational option for the employee.” (Id. at 1246.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action via constructive termination. Plaintiff makes a compelling argument that while on extended leave that was triggered by alleged intolerable yelling by Shahian, she decided to resign out of concern for her health and the health of her potential baby. (Opp. 7:12-17.) The cited portions of the Complaint sufficiently support this contention. (Complaint ¶¶ 21-30, 53, 72-73, 78.) Paragraph 27 is particularly telling. Plaintiff alleges that the final outburst by Defendant occurred after 8:00 p.m. when Defendant allegedly repeated the assertion that Plaintiff’s should have been focusing on her work instead of her fertility treatment and because of this poor performance, she should resign and get out of the firm. (Complaint ¶ 27.) [2]

Accordingly, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the First Cause of Action.

Third Cause of Action – Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

Defendants refer to and incorporate their previous arguments for this cause of action. Plaintiff argues she sufficiently alleged intolerable working conductions and forced resignation. Defendants’ reply is the same here.

For the same reasons articulated above, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Third Cause of Action.

Fourth Cause of Action – Harassment and Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(j)

Defendants contends that Plaintiff failed to allege severe or pervasive harassing conduct because the alleged conduct occurred on one day and contained one reference about pregnancy. Plaintiff argues that a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient at this stage. Plaintiff further argues that the totality of the circumstances show severe harassing conduct due to Plaintiff’s anticipated pregnancy and ADD. Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s allegations are not pervasive harassing conduct as a matter of law.[3]

A hostile work environment is a recognized form of harassment. To establish a hostile work environment, harassment must be so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment based on the protected characteristic. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1045, 1043.) Harassment must be of a repeated, routine, or generalized nature when the harassing conduct is not severe. (See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283.) Harassment that is occasional, isolated or sporadic is insufficient. (See id.)

Accordingly, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of Action.

1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED as to the First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action;

[1] Defendants also point out that Plaintiff sought, and promptly received, medical leave whereby she did not contact Defendants to discuss the May 31, 2023 shouting and Defendants did not disturb her leave to discuss work matters. Defendants reiterate this argument on reply.

[2]The court agrees that, read in isolation, paragraphs 41 and 73 alone are conclusory. However, read in conjunction with the other paragraphs that make factual assertions supporting intolerable conditions, paragraph 41 and 73 can also be construed as summations.

[3] As in the motion, Defendants predominantly rely on non-binding federal authorities.