Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV25111, Date: 2025-03-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV25111 Hearing Date: March 25, 2025 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: March
25, 2025
CASE NAME: Modvans,
Inc. v. Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV25111
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DEMURRER![]()
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Modvans, Inc.
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. Demurrers
to the First and Second Causes of Action for failure to state sufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty.
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Demurrers
to the First and Second Causes of Action are OVERRULED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff ModVans, Inc. (Plaintiff)
filed a Complaint against Defendants Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company, Nigel
Green Insurance Agency, Inc., and Amwins Access Insurance Services, LLC
(Defendants) with three causes of action for: (1) Breach of the Duty to Pay a
Covered Insurance Claim; (2) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
and (3) Negligence.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff had an insurance
policy issued by Defendant Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company (Atlantic) (the
Policy) that Defendant Nigel Green Insurance Agency, Inc. (Green) obtained for
it by working with Defendant Atlantic’s managing agent, Amwiss Access Insurance
Services, LLC (Amwiss). Plaintiff alleges that on December 11, 2023, a fire
destroyed its production facility which caused Plaintiff to sustain
approximately $5,800,500.00. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants improperly
bound the Policy at old coverage limits despite Plaintiff’s negotiation for an
increase and that Defendants are not performing under the Policy.
On November 8, 2024, Amwiss filed an Answer.
On November 19, 2024, Green filed an Answer.
On December 26, 2024, Atlantic filed the instant demurrer.
On March 12, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed an opposition. On March 17, 2025,
Atlantic timely filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Meet
and Confer
The parties met and conferred telephonically
on December 4, 2024 but were unable to resolve their disputes. (Nienow Decl. ¶¶
2-5.)
Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿
Request
for Judicial Notice
The court GRANTS Defendants’ request for
judicial notice.
ANALYSIS:
First Cause of
Action – Breach of the Duty to Pay a Covered Insurance Claim[1]
Atlantic contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff
did not allege breach.[2]
Atlantic further contends that Plaintiff insufficiently alleged facts that its
customers owned the destroyed vans warranting a higher payout and that there
are no facts supporting consequential damages.
Plaintiff argues that Atlantic applied the wrong standard at
demurrer, that they alleged Atlantic breached by deliberately misinterpreting
the coverage owed for the destroyed vans, and that Atlantic is adding its own
facts to the Complaint to make it subject to demurrer.
Atlantic replies that Plaintiff concludes the vehicles
belonged to customers and that Atlantic knew it misinterpreted the Policy,
which are not facts. Atlantic reiterates its argument on reply that Plaintiff
did not allege facts supporting consequential damages.
To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the
plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the
plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s
breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.”¿ (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98 [internal
citation omitted].) For a written contract, the plaintiff may “plead the legal
effect of the contract rather than the precise language.” (Ibid.) To “plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must
‘allege the substance of its relevant terms.[3]
Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated
a claim for breach of contract. First, Plaintiff alleges a written contract,
Policy No. 2810006756-1 issued by Atlantic and in Atlantic’s possession.
(Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Second, Plaintiff alleged the legal effect of the contract,
namely, a promise by Atlantic “to pay for certain losses sustained by ModVans
in exchange for premiums paid by ModVans.) (Compl. ¶ 12; see also Compl. ¶ 32 [Atlantic’s
reservation-of-rights letter indicates it would pay Plaintiff’s BPP loss “up to
the Policy’s limit of $600,000.”], ¶ 37 [Atlantic’s alleged performance.])
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the coverage included $120,000 per van for
Vehicles. (See Compl. ¶16(c); 21, 23, 24.) Third, Plaintiff alleges it
performed under the Policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26, 45.) Fourth, Plaintiff claims
Atlantic breached by delaying payment under the Policy despite receiving a
timely claim, and intentionally misclassified certain losses to avoid coverage.
(Compl. ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 33, 34, 46.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges resulting
damages.[4]
(Compl. ¶ 38.)
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Atlantic’s demurrer to
the First Cause of Action.
Second Cause of
Action – Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Atlantic contends that this claim fails because there is no
underlying breach and there are insufficient facts that it unreasonably
withheld benefits. Plaintiff argues an underlying breach of a specific
provision is not a prerequisite to this claim, that they alleged coverage for
which Atlantic unreasonably refused to pay, and any question on this is a
factual inquiry inappropriate for demurrer. Atlantic reiterates its position on
reply that this claim collapses because there is no viable breach of contract
and that Plaintiff’s allegations lack specificity.[5]
“‘‘Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.’ [Citation.]’
[Citation.]’” (Hicks v. E.T. Legg
& Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 508.) “‘[T]he scope of
conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the
purposes and express terms of the contract.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid. at 509.) “The covenant of good
faith and fair dealing . . . exists . . . to prevent one contracting party from
unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the
agreement actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel
National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349.)
The elements for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing are: (1) existence of a contract between plaintiff and
defendant; (2) plaintiff performed his contractual obligations or was excused
from performing them; (3) the conditions requiring defendant’s performance had
occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff’s right to
receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the
defendant’s conduct. (Merced
Irrigation Dist. v. County of Mariposa (E.D. Cal. 2013) 941 F.Supp.2d 1237,
1280 (discussing California law).) Allegations must demonstrate
defendant’s conduct for failure or refusal to discharge contractual
responsibilities was a conscious and deliberate act, not an honest mistake, bad
judgment or negligence. (Ibid.)
“‘[T]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring
compliance with the express terms of
the contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by
the contract.’” (Ragland v. U.S.
Bank National Assn. (2012) 209¿Cal.App.4th 182, 206 (citing to Pasadena Live v. City of Pasadena (2004)
114¿Cal.App.4th¿1089, 1094).)
“A ‘breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself’ and it
has been held that ‘[b]ad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken
judgment . . . .’” (Careau & Co. v.
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394
(citing to Congleton v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co. (1987) 189¿Cal.App.3d 51, 59).)
Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated
a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
only element at issue here is whether Atlantic unfairly interfered with
Plaintiff’s right to receive Policy benefits. Plaintiff so alleged. Notably,
Plaintiff alleged that Atlantic “did not notify ModVans of its claim position
within 40 days of the fire,” had a “phlegmatic” response time, “made fractional
initial payments,” “continued to delay investigating the claim,” misclassified
vans on the property to withhold coverage, and knew this position was wrong. (Compl.
¶¶ 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 47.) The court rejects Atlantic’s contention that these
facts are insufficient. Indeed, it appears Atlantic conflates the requirements
to allege this claim with the heightened pleading standard for fraud.
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Atlantic’s demurrer to
the Second Cause of Action.
CONCLUSION:
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:
1. Demurrers
to the First and Second Causes of Action are OVERRULED.
Defendants to ANSWER only by April 9, 2025.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 25, 2025 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The court will refer to this as a breach of contract claim.
[2]
In fact, Atlantic contends, Plaintiff alleged
that Atlantic performed.
[3]
Atlantic contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint is
uncertain because they did not attach the Policy or allege its terms verbatim.
Plaintiff argues they pled the legal effect of the Policy. Atlantic contends
that the material terms concerning “vehicles” vs. “inventory” were not set
forth in the Complaint and not attached, so the Complaint is uncertain. The
court rejects this argument because Plaintiff alleged the Policy by its legal
effect.
[4]
The court declines to analyze Atlantic’s consequential damages argument because
it would not dispose of the entire cause of action. Plaintiff’s cause of action
cannot be split. (Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
[5]
Atlantic’s authority in support of this proposition are summary judgment
proceedings. (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062 [summary adjudication of insurer’s policy exclusion
interpretation]; Swain v. California Cas.
Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1 [summary judgment]; Love v. Fire Ins. Exch. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136 [summary
judgment].) To the extent Atlantic raised factual challenges, the court rejects
them.