Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV25176, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

1. Demurrer to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action for Failure to State Sufficient Facts to Constitute a Cause of Action;

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff Alissa Mills (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant County of Los Angeles (Defendant) with eight causes of action for: (1) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (2) Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (3) Disability Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (4) Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (6) Harassment in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (7) Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; and (8) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Deputy Sheriff for the LASD from August 2007 until August 2023. Plaintiff alleges that she experienced racial, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination that Defendant failed to address. Plaintiff further alleges she sustained two work-related injuries that Defendant failed to accommodate. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after years of discrimination and harassment, she resigned her position due to that harassment and resulting mental health impact.

On February 7, 2025, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On May 27, 2025 Defendant filed a reply.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿¿

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)¿¿

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. (CCP) §430.41 and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to CCP §430.41(a)(2) & (3).¿Here, the parties met and conferred via telephone call on January 21, 2025. (Muradyan Decl. ¶ 2.) This requirement is therefore met.

First Cause of Action – Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5

Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff failed to allege facts that she participated in any whistleblowing activities or facts her employment was negatively affected as a result. Plaintiff argues that she sufficiently alleged facts that she engaged in protected activities. Plaintiff refers to paragraphs 47, 16, 18, 22, 28, 36, 38, 40, and 41. Defendant replies that her cut and paste allegations are insufficient.

Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) provides: “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties.”¿ (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)¿

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim for retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5. First, Plaintiff alleged she disclosed information to her various supervisors, testified at deposition in her workers’ compensation case, and to the (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 16 [“Plaintiff then disclosed to Barclay discriminatory and harassing behavior by Pena and others at MET.”], 18 [“Plaintiff also disclosed [to Gannon and Briz] the constant conversations that the male Deputies were having about their sexual escapades and attempts to lure female deputies into having sex with them.”], 22 [“When Plaintiff learned about this incident from the gay social worker and confirmed the details with the female social worker, Plaintiff disclosed the discrimination and harassment to the ombudsman.”], 38 [“Plaintiff met with Briz for lunch, where she disclosed the continuous discrimination, harassment, and retaliation that she had been subjected to.”], 40 [“Plaintiff contacted the COC and disclosed her reasonable belief about the misuse and abuse of public funds and County resources for personal gain, and that the completed reported [sic] had been withheld from the COC.”], 41 [workers’ compensation case deposition.]) Accepting these allegations as true at the demurrer stage, these allegations violate various statutes. The court therefore rejects Defendant’s argument that they are not whistleblowing activity. Second, Plaintiff alleged resulting adverse employment actions. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 40 [“Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was informed that her annual evaluation was being held up because CPB operations did not want her to receive an outstanding rating.”], 43 [Internal Affairs complaint following workers’ compensation deposition], 45 [identifying totality of negative actions at work ranging from denial of reasonable accommodations, forced to work in violation of work restrictions, transfers to inadequately staffed positions, essentially demotions, denial of performance evaluations, punitive reassignments, and constructive termination.])

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the First Cause of Action.

Second Cause of Action – Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant contends that this claim fails as uncertain because Plaintiff does not state the nature of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff argues that this claim is not uncertain because she alleged that she is a “black queer female” and was subjected to adverse employment actions “due to her race, color, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression and/or sexual orientation” and that such characteristics were a “substantial motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” Defendant replies that this is not a catch-all cause of action and Plaintiff failed to identify what discrimination she suffered.

A party may demur to a complaint where “[t]he pleading is uncertain,” meaning also that it is “ambiguous [or] unintelligible.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) The law encourages courts to liberally construe pleadings and disfavors demurrers for uncertainty. (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279. 292.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, the Second Cause of Action is not uncertain. Notably, Plaintiff identifies that she was discriminated against based on her “race, color, sex, gender, gender identify, gender expression, and/or sexual orientation.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) When read in conjunction with the rest of the Complaint, this is not uncertain.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Second Cause of Action.

Third Cause of Action – Disability Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff did not allege that her assignments or work environment were in any way affected because of her disability. Plaintiff argues she alleged an adverse employment action. Defendant replies that Plaintiff did not address this in her opposition at all.

In order to plead a prima facie case for disability discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) plaintiff suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) plaintiff could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.¿ (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159-160.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for disability discrimination. The only element at issue is whether Plaintiff was subject to adverse employment actions due to her disability. Plaintiff did allege adverse employment actions because of her disability, including, “demotion.” (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 39.)

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action.

Fourth Cause of Action – Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff’s alleges that Defendant held IPM meetings. Plaintiff’s argument here is the same as for the Fourth Cause of Action. Defendant’s reply is the same as for the Fourth Cause of Action.

In order to allege a cause of action for failure to engage in interactive process, a plaintiff must allege the following facts: (1) plaintiff was an employee of defendant, (2) plaintiff had a disability known by defendant, (3) plaintiff requested that defendant make a reasonable accommodation for his or her disability so that he or she may be able to perform the essential job requirements, (4) plaintiff was willing to participate in an interactive process to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made so that he or she would be able to perform the essential job requirements, and (5) defendant failed to participate in a timely food-faith interactive process with plaintiff to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made.¿ (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n); CACI No. 2546 [Disability Discrimination—Reasonable Accommodation—Failure to Engage in Interactive Process].) “Two principles underlie a cause of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.¿ First, the employee must request an accommodation.¿ Second, the parties must engage in an interactive process regarding the requested accommodation and, if the process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith.”¿ (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54.)¿

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process. The only issue here is whether Plaintiff’s allegations that there were meetings that Plaintiff’s supervisors labeled as “interactive process” meetings defeat this claim as a matter of law. (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 39.) Reading the Complaint liberally, and in context, these allegations do not defeat this claim at the demurrer stage. The first meeting was set “to sign paperwork” and was afterwards labeled an “interactive process” meeting. (Compl. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges the second meeting was to restore her as an investigator at RAMP that was labeled as an “interactive process” meeting. (Compl. ¶ 39.) However, Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Suarez refused to engage in the interactive process at all. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.) This shows at least one instance of failure to engage in the interactive process – regardless of how Defendant seeks to characterize the identified meetings in the Complaint.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action.

Fifth Cause of Action – Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff’s allegations show she was accommodated and there are otherwise no facts that Defendant did not provide accommodations. Plaintiff alleges she did allege repeated requests for reasonable accommodations that were ignored, half-heartedly complied with, or directly violated. Defendant replies that this claim is weak.

To allege a cause of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) plaintiff has a disability, (2) plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonable accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.”¿ (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969.)¿

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate. First, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Suarez did not honor her requests for reasonable accommodations, subsequent supervisors directed Plaintiff to work in violation of her medical restrictions, and supervisors pressured her to remove restrictions. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26, 35, 39.) This is sufficient at the demurrer stage.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action.

Sixth Cause of Action – Harassment in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff alleged a series of isolated incidents throughout the span of many years, many of which included comments that were not directed to Plaintiff, as well as facts showing Defendant took corrective action. Defendant further contends that this claim fails as uncertain because Plaintiff did not plead the nature of the alleged harassment.[1] Plaintiff argues that she alleged severe or pervasive harassment under FEHA. Plaintiff’s argument here is the same as for the Second Cause of Action concerning uncertainty. Defendant replies that this claim remains insufficiently plead.[2]

Generally, to state a claim under FEHA for harassment, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the employer harassed the employee; (2) on the basis of race, sex, or other grounds specified in Gov. Code § 12940(h); and (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. (Etter v. Veriflo Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 457, 465.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for FEHA harassment. The only element at issue is whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Here, Plaintiff alleged Mr. Suarez repeatedly harassed her based on her race, gender, and sexual orientation (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant reassigned her as a result and pressured her to remove medical restrictions that kept her away from Mr. Suarez. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 34, 39.)

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action.

Seventh Cause of Action – Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant refers to its arguments for the First Cause of Action to support their demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action. Plaintiff does the same. Defendant’s reply appears to reiterate the same arguments.

“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”¿ (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)¿ A plaintiff will have engaged in a “protected activity” if he or she (a) made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in proceedings or hearings under FEHA, or (b) opposed acts which are unlawful under FEHA.¿ (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h) [“It is an unlawful employment practice . . .: ¶(h) For any employer . . . to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person had opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.”].)¿¿¿

As the parties did, the court also adopts its reasoning from the First Cause of Action.

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action.

Eighth Cause of Action – Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.

Defendant incorporates all previous arguments here and insists that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts showing a work environment harassment claim. Plaintiff argues that she sufficiently alleged this claim, including facts that her repeated disclosures and complaints fell on deaf ears, which ultimately resulted in her constructive termination. Defendant’s reply appears to reiterate the same arguments.

To state a claim for failure to prevent harassment or discrimination under FEHA, the plaintiff must allege: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by employees or non-employees; (2) the defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff (defendant is plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of duty (failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff. (Trujillo v. No. County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289; Carter v. Cal. Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 931; Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (k). See also Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1630 [after employers are informed of harassment, they must take immediate and appropriate action reasonably calculated to end the harassment]; Thompson v. City Of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 880 [“An employer who knows or should have known of unlawful harassment and retaliation, and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, may be liable for the resulting damages, pursuant to Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1).”]; ibid. [employees have no cause of action for a failure to investigate unlawful harassment or retaliation and to take corrective action, unless actionable misconduct has occurred]; Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925, fn.4 [“courts have required a finding of actual discrimination or harassment under FEHA before a plaintiff may prevail under section 12940, subdivision (k).”]; Kelley v. Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 208 [courts have required actual discrimination or harassment in order to support claims for failure to prevent discrimination or harassment].)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for failure to prevent retaliation, discrimination, and harassment. As discussed in the prior causes of action, Plaintiff alleged harassment by Mr. Suarez, disability discrimination, and whistleblower retaliation. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 39.)

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action.

[1] The court disregards this argument for similar reasons to the Second Cause of Action.

[2] The court declines to address the arguments concerning statute of limitations issues because they are raised for the first time on reply since Plaintiff would not have the opportunity to respond to them. [Hahn v. Diaz-Barba (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1193.]