Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 24STCV27425, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

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1. Demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty;

a. Prayer, Pg. 14, item (c) under First Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

b. Prayer, Pg. 15, item (c) under Third Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

c. Prayer, Pg. 15, item (c) under Fourth Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiffs Jovany Flores and Daniela Ramirez (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants Eddie Martinez and Jose Adrian Ramirez Perez (Defendants) with seven causes of action for: (1) negligence, (2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) unlawful and unfair business practices or acts in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (4) intentional misrepresentation; (5) violation of Civ. Code § 1940.2; (6) violation of Civ. Code § 789.3; and (7) violation of Civ. Code § 1947.12.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs were tenants from January 2010 through May 2024 at property located at 3714 55th St., Maywood, California 90270 (the Property) that Defendants owned. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants illegally converted the Property’s garage into a living unit and that Plaintiffs lived in that unit. Plaintiffs further contend that the Property was unfit for habitation.

On December 17, 2024, Defendant Jose Adrian Ramirez Perez (Perez) filed the instant demurrer with motion to strike. On March 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed oppositions. On March 10, 2025, Perez filed replies.

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. (CCP) §430.41 and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to CCP §430.41(a)(2) & (3).¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.) Here, the parties met and conferred on December 16, 2024 and were unable to resolve the dispute. (Beltram Decl. ¶ 2.) Accordingly, this requirement is met.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id.¿§¿437.)¿“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman¿(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿

Perez contends that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices by Perez, that Plaintiffs did not allege Perez violated antitrust laws, or that Plaintiffs are members of the public. Plaintiffs argue that Perez applies the incorrect standard, that they are members of the public, and that they alleged unlawful and illegal business practice via Perez’s continued renting out of an unpermitted unit.[1] Perez replies that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this claim and Plaintiff’s opposition improperly amends the Complaint’s allegations.

Unfair competition is any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices or act and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.)¿ A plaintiff needs to identify statutory, regulatory, or decisional law that the defendant has violated.¿ (Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 352.)¿Unfair competition “borrows” violations of other laws and authorizes a separate action pursuant to unfair competition. (See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) Unfair conduct in unfair competition actions must be violative of public policy and “tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.”¿ (Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 940.) As a statutory cause of action, allegations of unfair business practices must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.) The statutory violations must be specifically delineated and said violations must relate to a business activity.¿ (Ibid.)¿

A tenant who is no longer in possession of the premises has no standing to seek injunctive relief. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 928.) They can, however, seek other equitable relief because a UCL claim is equitable in nature. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144; Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)

Here, Plaintiffs sufficiently stated a UCL claim. First, they allege a multitude of violations: “an illegally converted addition,” notice from the City of Maywood for unpermitted dwelling, lack of Certificate of Occupancy,and Civil Code violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 21, 49-52, 54-56, 57-61.)[2] Second, Plaintiffs seek restitution (an equitable remedy) via return of rent paid. (Compl. ¶ 39(a).)

Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Perez’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action.

Perez contends that Plaintiffs failed to allege particular facts against Perez supporting a fraud claim.[3] Plaintiffs argue that they did sufficiently allege facts supporting fraud against Perez and that Perez ratified Defendant Martinez’s fraudulent conduct, too. Perez replies that Plaintiffs did not address their arguments at all and then repeats its arguments.

“The essential¿elements¿of a count for¿intentional¿misrepresentation¿are (1) a¿misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3)¿intent¿to induce reliance,¿(4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citation.] (Chapman v. Skype, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-31.) “ ‘ “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are similar to intentional fraud except for the requirement of scienter; in a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not allege that the defendant made an intentionally false statement, but simply one as to which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the statement to be true.” [Citations.] [Citation.]’ ” (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 454.) “Causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud and, therefore, each element must be pleaded with specificity. [Citations.]” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166, disapproved of on other grounds by Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905.)¿¿

A cause of action for fraud must be alleged with specificity such that Plaintiff pleads facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Similarly, “[t]he requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)¿

Here, Plaintiffs insufficiently stated a claim for intentional misrepresentation against Perez. First, no where does the complaint allege that defendants represented that the unit was legal or had a certificate of occupancy. Second, as to the allegation that Perez “represented to them that if there [were] ever any items that were in need of repair, [he] would fix them;” (Compl. ¶ 18), there is no facts alleged that at the time the representations were made, Defendants had the fraudulent intent.

Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS Perez’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action.

Perez seeks to strike various portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages, including the following:

2. P. 3, par. 6, line 10 of the Complaint stating: “surreptitiously and illegally”;

29. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 14, par. (c), line 19 in its entirety;

30. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 14, par. (c), line 19 in its entirety;

31. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 14, par. (c), line 24 in its entirety;

32. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 15, par. (c), line 1 in its entirety;

33. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 15, par. (c), line 6 in its entirety;

34. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 15, par. (c), line 11 in its entirety;

35. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 15, par. (c), line 18 in its entirety;

36. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 15, par. (c), line 28 in its entirety;

37. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 16, par. (d), line 1 in its entirety;

38. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages stated at P. 16, par. (e), line 10 in its entirety;

Perez contends that Plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action do not state facts warranting punitive damages. Perez contends that, at most, these allegations show he was an unsophisticated landlord. (MTS 8:15.) Perez additionally contends that the prayers for punitive damages for the Second, Third, and Sixth Causes of Action are inappropriate.[4] Plaintiffs argue that Perez surgically selects allegations while disregarding the Complaint as a whole, that (aside from the Third Cause of Action) punitive damages are warranted as plead.[5] Perez replies that Plaintiffs fabricated arguments to oppose.

“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there by circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)¿

In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages . . . . Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)¿

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiffs insufficiently stated a claim for punitive damages for the First Cause of Action. Notably, the allegations under the First Cause of Action lack allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-25.) Without more, punitive damages are not warranted.

In Stoiber v. Honeychuck, the premises was so dilapidated that it needed to be torn down. ((1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 912 [describing the following defects identified by the Kern County health Department: “heavy cockroach infestation, broken interior walls broken deteriorated flooring on front porch, falling ceiling, deteriorated, overfused electrical wiring, lack of proper plumbing connection to sewage system in bathroom, sewage under bathroom floor, leaking roof, broken, windows, and fire hazard.”]) The Court there found that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support her prayer for punitive damages because the defendant had actual knowledge of defective conditions in the premises, acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive, and malicious. (Id. at p. 920.)

Here, as in Stoiber, Plaintiffs alleged that Perez had actual knowledge of the defects (illegal conversion, LIST), that the defects were causing Plaintiffs damages, and that Perez’s conduct was willful, oppressive, and malicious. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Therefore, Plaintiffs alleged enough at this stage for punitive damages.

This is conceded. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion to strike as to these items.

Because Plaintiffs insufficiently alleged a claim for fraud, punitive damages fails as well.

v. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action – Violation of Civ. Code §§ 1940.2, 789.3, 1947.12

Perez contends that these statutes either do not warrant punitive damages or prohibit them. The court disagrees. First, Perez’s authority does not support their contention. Second, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient for punitive damages.

a. Prayer, Pg. 14, item (c) under First Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

b. Prayer, Pg. 15, item (c) under Third Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

c. Prayer, Pg. 15, item (c) under Fourth Cause of Action seeking punitive damages;

[1] The court agrees that Perez’s application of the antitrust violation is faulty. That applies when the alleged violation is between competitors. (See, e.g., Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 679.) The court therefore disregards that argument.

[2]The court disregards the allegation regarding the Los Angeles Municipal Code alleged in paragraph 37 which isinconsistent

[3] Perez notes that Plaintiffs alleged facts pertaining to Defendant Martinez. (Dem. 8:3-11, 8:24-25.)

[4] Perez also seeks to strike language seeking treble damages and identifies several repetitions of “illegal” and “unlawful” they seek to strike but has no argument on these points. The court therefore disregards those requests.

[5] Plaintiffs concede that punitive damages are not warranted for the UCL claim. (Opp. 10:4-7.)