Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 24STCV30503, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV30503    Hearing Date: April 14, 2025    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

 

HEARING DATE:   April 14, 2025                                    

 

CASE NAME:           Norma Jimenez v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                24STCV30503

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY:  Defendant FCA US LLC

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Norma Jimenez

 

REQUESTED RELIEF:

 

1.      Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

1.      Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with 21 days’ leave to amend.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff Norma Jimenez (Plaintiff) filed a Song-Beverly Complaint against Defendants FCA US, LLC and Cerritos Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram (Defendants) with six causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(D); (2) Violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(B); (3) Violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(A)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (5) Negligent Repair; and (6) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.

 

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with FCA regarding a 2021 Jeep Wrangler (the Vehicle) that she purchased with, apparently, a defective engine. Plaintiff further alleges that FCA concealed this defect and that Cerritos Dodge were negligent in their repairs of the Vehicle.

 

On December 23, 2024, Defendant Cerritos Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram (Cerritos Dodge) filed an Answer.

 

On January 21, 2025, Defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA) filed the instant demurrer. On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On April 2, 2025, FCA filed a reply.

 

LEGAL STANDARD:

 

Meet and Confer

 

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). ¿The meet and confer requirement also applies to motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.)¿Here, despite FCA’s multiple attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel, the meet and confer requirement is not met. (Cranford Decl. ¶¶ 3-7.) However, failure to meet and confer is not a sufficient ground to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)¿¿

 

Demurrer

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Sixth Cause of Action – Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment

 

FCA contends that the court should sustain its demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action because Plaintiff failed to allege facts that FCA owed Plaintiff a duty to disclose the purportedly concealed facts based on a buyer/seller relationship or contractual relationship arising before or at the time of sale. FCA further contends that Plaintiff failed to allege facts of damages other than those already covered by the Song Beverly Act or for unrecoverable risk of damage.

 

Plaintiff argues that they sufficiently alleged this claim pursuant to Dhital v. Nissan N. A., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (Dhital), that the warranty contract provides a duty to disclose, that there is a transactional relationship between Plaintiff and FCA. Plaintiff further argues that she may seek recovery under multiple theories at the pleading stage. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests leave to amend.    

 

FCA replies that case law clearly requires a direct relationship and that Plaintiff adds propositions that do not exist to support their argument. FCA further replies that Dhital is distinguishable because the plaintiff there alleged they bought the subject vehicle from Nissan.

 

The elements of a claim for fraudulent inducement – concealment are: “(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-844 [review denied] (internal citations omitted).) “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.” (Ibid.) “Fraud, including concealment, must be pleaded with¿specificity.” (Ibid; Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc.¿(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 132.) 

 

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff insufficiently alleged a claim for fraudulent inducement – concealment. Notably, Plaintiff did not allege a transactional relationship between the parties warranting a duty to disclose. First, Plaintiff’s reliance on Dhital is incomplete. The court emphasizes that Dhital states: “Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 [emphasis added].) Here, unlike Dhital, Plaintiff’s Complaint has no discussion regarding an authorized dealership for the sale of the Vehicle. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges only that she “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2021 Jeep Wrangler, vehicle identification number 1C4HJXENXMW613937 (hereafter "Vehicle"), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant FCA.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) Further, Plaintiff only references Defendant’s agents in the capacity of repairs. (See Compl. ¶¶ 40, 42, 46.) Thus, as alleged, there is no transactional relationship between the parties.[1]¿¿ 

 

Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS FCA’s demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action with leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the court decides the pending motion as follows:

 

1.      Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with 21 days’ leave to amend.

Moving party is to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:             April 14, 2025                         __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


[1] The court declines to address the damages argument now.




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