Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: 25STCV00394, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

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On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff Arno Patrick Kuigoua filed a Complaint against Defendants Adam Michael Sacks, Law Offices of Adam Michael Sacks, and Eddie De La Fe (Defendants) with eight causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Fraudulent Inducement; (3) Unjust Enrichment; (4) Conversion; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200; and (8) Declaratory Relief.

According to the Complaint, Defendants colluded with Plaintiff’s prior attorney to settle another civil matter (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 20STCV19534) without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. Plaintiff further alleges he never received settlement funds.

On February 5, 2025, Defendant Adam Michael Sacks (Sacks) filed the instant motion to declare vexatious litigant.

On April 7, 2025, Sacks filed a supplemental declaration in support of the instant motion.

On April 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition and an objection to improper service and request for court order requiring proper service.[1]

A vexatious litigant means a person who, “[i]n the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations

other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(1).)

“‘The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant.’” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 828 [citation omitted].) “Any determination that a litigant is vexatious must comport with the intent and spirit of the vexatious litigant statute. The purpose of which is to address the problem created by the persistent and obsessive litigant who constantly has pending a number of groundless actions and whose conduct causes serious financial results to the unfortunate objects of his or her attacks and places an unreasonable burden on the courts.” (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 970-971.)

Sacks contends that deeming Plaintiff a vexatious litigant under CCP § 391(b)(1) is proper because he is relitigating an already-decided employment matter and is vindictively pursuing the various attorneys who had represented him related to those adverse rulings. Plaintiff argues that Sacks failed to properly serve this motion and failed to provide evidence supporting his arguments. There is no reply, but Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (a) [“‘Litigation’ means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court”]; Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, 406, n. 4 [“An action is counted as being within the ‘ “immediately preceding seven-year period” ’ so long as it was filed or maintained during that period. [Citation.] The seven-year period is measured as of the time the motion is filed”].)

The court notes the general rule that “[a] litigation is finally determined adversely to a plaintiff if he does not win the action or proceeding he began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff.” (Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.) This is because “[a]n action which is ultimately dismissed by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice, is nevertheless a

burden on the target of the litigation and the judicial system, albeit less of a burden than if the matter had proceeded to trial. A party who repeatedly files baseless actions only to dismiss them is no less vexatious than the party who follows the actions through to completion.” (Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779.) However, a dismissal after settlement may not constitute an adverse determination. “In the comparable context of a malicious prosecution action, a voluntary, unilateral dismissal of the underlying dispute is generally considered a termination in favor of the defendant. [Citation.] Only where the dismissal leaves some doubt regarding the defendant’s liability, as where the dismissal is part of a negotiated settlement, will the dismissal not be deemed a termination favorable to the defendant.” (Id. at pp. 779-780.)

4. Kuigoua v. Department of Veteran Affairs (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 499 (for underlying Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV09073);

5. Kuigoua v. Cal. Health Care System, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC608602, Court of Appeals Case No. B291984;

b. Matter disposed May 31, 2018 via summary judgment. Ruling affirmed on appeal. Remittitur issued October 29, 2020.

6. Kuigoua v. Carolyn Young Park, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV11514.

7. Kuigoua v. Adam Michael Sacks, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV19534.[2]

Here, it is not appropriate to deem Plaintiff a vexatious litigant under CCP § 391(b)(1). First, contrary to Sacks’ assertion, there are not “at least five” matters with a final determination. Instead, there are two – BC608602 and 20STCV09073 Second, there are not at least five matters where Plaintiff represented himself in pro per. Indeed, the two cases resolved on appeal had counsel. The court notes that Sacks’ provided no evidence that his counsel in those matters was somehow a sham. Thus, Sacks has not shown that the requirements of CCP § 391 are met.[3]

Accordingly, the court DENIES Sacks’ motion to deem Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

However, the court observes under CCP § 391.7, the court, on its own motion sets an Order to Show Cause re Vexatious Litigant under CCP § 391(b)(3) on August 4, 2025 at 9:00 am in that it appears that Plaintiff is trying repeatedly file unmeritorious pleadings in this matter by reasserting claims that have been previously repeatedly been rejected he Superior Court in 20STCV19534 where the court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and, thereafter, denied two motions for reconsideration. Plaintiff is ordered to respond in writing with supporting declarations at least five court days before that hearing date.

[1] Consistent with the law, the court used its discretion to take reasonable steps to enable Plaintiff as a pro se litigant to be heard. (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(8).) The court does reject Plaintiff’s contention concerning improper service because the proofs of service for the instant motion and the supplemental declaration indicate service by mail on Plaintiff. This is appropriate. (CCP § 1013(a).)

[2] This case is identified in the Complaint not in Sacks’ motion.

[3] The court rejects any other argument not addressed herein as irrelevant to this ruling.