Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: 25STCV02250, Date: 2025-05-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV02250    Hearing Date: May 20, 2025    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   May 20, 2025                                     

CASE NAME:           Travis Sheffield v. City of Los Angeles, et al.

CASE NO.:                25STCV02250

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY:  Defendant Florence Equity Partners LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): None

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      Demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

TENTATIVE RULING:

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On January 28, 2025, Plaintiff Travis Sheffield (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, Burton Mark & Cassandra TRS, M & C Burton Trust, and Florence Equity Partners LLC (Defendants) with four causes of action for: (1) Liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property; (2) Vicarious Liability for the Wrongful Acts or Omissions by Public Entity Employees and/or Retention of Unfit Employee; (3) Premises Liability; and (4) Negligence.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk and sustained injuries.

On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to the State of California.

On February 10, 2025, Defendant Florence Equity Partners LLC (FEP) filed the instant demurrer to the Complaint.

On February 28, 2025, Defendant County of Los Angeles (County) filed an Answer.

On March 3, 2025, Defendant Burton Mark & Cassandra TRA filed an Answer and Cross-Complaint.

On March 20, 2025, Defendant City of Los Angeles (City) filed an Answer and Cross-Complaint.

On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a fictitious name amendment to the Complaint correcting DOE 1 to Mark & Cassandra Burton, Trustees of the M & C Burton Trust.

On April 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal as to County.

Oppositions to FEP’s demurrer were due on or before May 7, 2025. As of May 15, 2025, the court has not received any opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD:

Meet and Confer¿ 

¿¿ 

Prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to satisfy their meet and confer obligations pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41, and demonstrate that they so satisfied their meet and confer obligation by submitting a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(2) & (3). Here, the parties exchanged emails about liability for the first and second causes of action and that Plaintiff would not amend the Complaint. (Brahmbhatt Decl. ¶¶ 4-8.) The court is not convinced this is sufficient meet and confer efforts. Still, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)

Demurrer¿¿ 

¿¿ 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿(Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. …. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿(Hahn¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿ 

¿ 

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 (Frantz).)¿ 

ANALYSIS:

Third Cause of Action – Premises Liability

FEP contends that this claim fails to sufficiently allege duty. Specifically, FEB provides authorities that indicate that, as a matter of law, a landowner has no duty to maintain a public sidewalk abutting their property. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

The elements of a premises liability claim are: (1) that defendant was the owner, occupant or lessor of the premises; (2) defendant was negligent in the use, maintenance or management of premises; and (3) negligence was a cause of the injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619 [citing BAJI 8.00, and stating, “Premises liability is a form of negligence….”])

Under the common law, a landowner abutting a public sidewalk “has always been liable for injuries occurring on a public sidewalk which were caused by the abutter’s negligence or nuisance involving some act or omission other than the mere failure to maintain or repair the sidewalk.” (Williams v. Foster (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 510, 515.) Put differently, there is no affirmative duty to maintain a public sidewalk. (See Id. at p. 520.)

Upon reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff insufficiently alleged a claim against FEP for premises liability. The court agrees that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that FEP owed Plaintiff a duty. Indeed, the Complaint generally alleges that FEP (and other defendants) “owned, maintained, controlled, possessed, repaired, inspected, operated, designed, built, managed and cleaned certain sidewalk surface . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this “negligence” that he sustained injuries. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31.) As articulated in Willaims, there are simply no facts alleged of FEP’s acts other than “failure to maintain or repair the sidewalk.” (Williams, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 515, 520.)

Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS FEP’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action.

Fourth Cause of Action – Negligence

FEP contends this claim fails for the same reasons articulated above. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

A claim for negligence requires: (1) a legal duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)¿¿Civ. Code § 1714 does not “impose a presumptive duty of care to guard against any conceivable harm that a negligent act might cause.” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 399.)  

For the same reasons identified in the Third Cause of Action, the court SUSTAINS FEP’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action.

Leave to Amend 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted if there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the defect. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1035.) The burden is on Plaintiff to establish that the defect is reasonably capable of cure with leave to amend. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) Here, Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The court is inclined to sustain without leave to amend but will consider oral argument at the hearing as to whether Plaintiff can cure these defects.

CONCLUSION:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             May 20, 2025                          __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court