Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: BC408948, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Attorney’s Fees & Costs: Plaintiffs Michael Khorshidi and Nejatolah Rabbanian

1. Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, as modified, for an award of $26,415.87 in attorney’s fees;

This action arises from a dissolved joint venture involving a downtown Los Angeles property.

On May 9, 2023, J&A and Abdi filed an appeal concerning the court’s ruling on their motion for elisor.

On May 15, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued a ruling that reversed and remanded the trial court’s ruling that denied J&A’s motion seeking an elisor.

On September 20, 2024, Abdi timely filed the instant motion for attorney fees after prevailing on appeal and memorandum of costs on appeal.

On January 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Abdi’s motion for attorney’s fees.

On January 21, 2025, Abdi filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to tax costs and a reply in support of their motion for attorney’s fees on appeal.

On January 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their motion to tax costs.

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), the party prevailing in the Court of Appeal in a civil case (other than a juvenile case) is entitled to costs on appeal.

The prevailing party is the respondent if the Court of Appeal affirms the judgment without modification or dismisses the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).) “If the Court of Appeal reverses the judgment in part or modifies it, or if there is more than one notice of appeal, the opinion must specify the award or denial of costs.” (Id. at (a)(3).)

Contractually authorized attorney fees, listed as costs under C.C.P. §1033.5, “may either be requested of the appellate court while the appeal is pending, or of the trial court upon issuance of the remittitur.” (Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 924 (Citations Omitted).)

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

Verification of the memorandum of costs by the prevailing party’s attorney establishes a prima facie showing that the claimed costs are proper.¿(See Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267 [“There is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum.”].

“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

Any motion to strike or tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the memorandum, plus an additional 5 days if served by mail or 2 days if served electronically. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1).) “Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(2).)

The court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h); See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23,37.) However, the court only takes judicial notice of the foregoing documents only as to “the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)¿¿

Abdi requests $56,305.00 for advancing his position at the trial court level on the elisor motion, $26,152.50 at the appellate court level, plus $4,925.00 for this motion for a total of $87,382.50 in attorney’s fees.

Plaintiffs argue this entire fee request is unreasonable because Abdi inserted himself into what was predominantly a dispute with the Javaheris. Plaintiffs further argue that the fees are also unreasonable block billing, inclusion of expert fees, inclusion of secretarial tasks, inclusion of interoffice communications, and excessive collaboration with Javaheris’ counsel.

Abdi replies he had an independent and critical interest in appointing an elisor which his counsel zealously pursued. Additionally, Abdi replies the fees are reasonable because their billing records are verified, clear, and appropriately staffed. Further, Abdi argues that the block billing format here does not impede this court’s ability to completely analyze the fees (i.e., staffing, time spent, and reasonable time expenditure).

As a threshold matter, the court addresses the scope of fees sought. The Court of Appeal awarded costs on appeal. (Remittitur, p. 26.) There is no authority before this court that those costs include trial court costs for the underlying elisor motion. Without such authority, Abdi’s recovery of costs, including fees, is limited to the appeal and this motion. The total sought is therefore $31,077.50.

Abdi, as Appellant, is the prevailing party because the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the ruling on the elisor motion. (Remittitur, p. 26.) Additionally, the Court of Appeal indicated Appellants, including Abdi, could recover their costs on appeal. (Ibid.).

When assessing the amount of any attorneys’ fee award including those made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, courts typically determine what is reasonable through the application of the “lodestar” method. Courts consider the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The court may then adjust “based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136.)

The lodestar method is well known. To determine a reasonable fee award, the court calculates a base fee amount from a compilation of (1) time reasonably spent and (2) the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48; see also Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449.)

“In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citation], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The rates here are reasonable. First, this court has previously found Abdi’s counsel’s rates reasonable. (Minute Order dated April 15, 2022.) Second, Plaintiffs do not challenge the hourly rates.

However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below.

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

Nonetheless, “[a] trial court may not rubberstamp a request for attorney fees but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) That said, the trial court is not required to “become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation.” (Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 642.) “To the extent a trial court is concerned that a particular fee award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1138.)

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Plaintiff still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges.

Upon reviewing the fee bill, the time spent is unreasonable. First, as before, Abdi impermissibly includes unrecoverable trial fees with recoverable appellate fees. (See April 15, 2022 Minute Order.) Second, several items in the bill have two numbers under the time column. (See, e.g., Exhibit A, May 2023 bill.) This impedes the court’s ability to determine what time was actually incurred. Third, the block billing does not help the court because it is intertwined with unrecoverable tasks. Finally, the overall hours expended for several tasks billed exceed the reasonable time spent by an attorney with 42 years’ experience plus an associate with 34 years’ experience.[1] Rather than comb through the extensive bill to line-item the bill to separate recoverable from nonrecoverable events, this court applies a negative multiplier of 15% to the fees sought on appeal. This leads to $31,077.50 minus $4,661.63 for a total of $26,415.87.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion for attorney’s fees, as modified, for an award of $26,415.87.

Abdi seeks $920.46 in filing fees and $87,382.50 in attorney’s fees via their timely filed cost memorandum.[2] Plaintiffs argue the filing fees are unreasonable because there is no way to tell if they are appropriately for the appeal. Abdi replies that the filing fees consisted of appropriate filing fees. Plaintiffs reply they only challenge the claimed attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on appeal to appellants, which included Abdi. (Remittitur p 26.) Plaintiffs do not oppose the claimed filing fees of $920.46. (Reply 2:17.) These costs are appropriate.

1. Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, as modified, for an award of $26,415.87 in attorney’s fees;

[1] The court does appreciate counsel’s efforts to appropriately bill paralegal tasks at the appropriate paralegal rate.

[2] The attorney’s fees were addressed fully in the motion for attorney’s fees.