Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: BC653918, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC653918 Hearing Date: April 18, 2023 Dept: 51
Tentative Ruling
Judge Upinder S.
Kalra, Department 51
HEARING DATE: April
18, 2023
CASE NAME: Helene
G Sakellis v. Cedars Sinai Medical Center, et al.
CASE NO.: BC653918
MOTION
TO STRIKE SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Helene G Sakellis
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center
REQUESTED RELIEF:
1. An
order striking Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment
TENTATIVE RULING:
1. Motion
to Strike Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff Helene G. Sakellis
(“Plaintiff”) worked for Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (“CSMC”) as a
clinical nurse from July1992 to June 2016. Plaintiff alleges various claims
against Defendants CSMC, Anna Grief (“Grief”), and Does (collectively,
“Defendants”) for retaliation, discrimination based on her age and disability,
and defamation in relation to her termination from employment.
On March 14, 2017, Plaintiff
filed a Complaint, and on March 24, the operative First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) against Defendants for the following causes of action:
(1)
retaliation for exercising rights under the Labor Code §98.6;
(2)
retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of the Health and Safety Code
§1278.5;
(3)
retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of the Labor Code
§6310;
(4)
retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of the Labor Code
§1102.5;
(5)
defamation;
(6) discrimination
in violation of Gov’t Code §§12940 et seq.;
(7)
failure to prevent discrimination in violation of Gov’t Code §§12940(k);
(8)
wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and
(9)
declaratory judgment.
On April 17, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, which was GRANTED.
On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.
On October 13, 2021, the Appellate Court issued an
Remittitur, and reversed and remanded.
On March 17, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application
and Motion to Strike Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, which was
DENIED. The Court set the matter for hearing to be heard as a noticed motion.
On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike
Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 7, 2023, Defendant
filed an Opposition. On April 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
Motion to Strike
The court may, upon a motion, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).)
The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by
way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.) “When
the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court
should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v.
Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
Summary Judgment:
Additionally, CCP § 437c(f)(2)
states:
A motion for summary adjudication
may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and
shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. A
party shall not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior
motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court unless that party
establishes, to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or
circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the
summary judgment motion.
ANALYSIS:
Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s second Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Ex parte application:
Plaintiff first argues that under
CCP § 437c(f)(2), a party cannot move for summary judgment based on facts or
issues that were asserted in a previous motion unless the party establishes
that there are newly discovered facts or a change of law. The first motion for
summary judgment was reversed and remanded by the Second Appellate District
Court as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. Plaintiff argues that this second
motion repeats the same issues raised in the first. Specifically, the appeals
court determined that Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of § 98.6 and Labor
Code § 1102.5. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants did not establish newly
discovered facts. For example, first the issues raised in Defendant’s Separate
Statement are facts that were taken in 2023 deposition, but are not pertinent.
Second, other facts are from the deposition from May 2019, before Defendant’s
reply in June 2019. Plaintiff also argues that minimal discovery has commenced
after the appeal. Further, Plaintiff argues that many of the facts cited by
Defendant were already known to Defendant prior to their reply in June 2019. Plaintiff
also argues that Defendant’s reliance and citation to Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022), is irrelevant
and does not supply new law for their motion. Because Lawson provides a harder
standard than McDonnel Douglas, if
Defendant’s first motion failed under McDonnel
Douglas, it will fail under Lawson.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that this an appropriate remedy, citing to Ratti v. City & County of San Francisco,
2011 Sup. Ct. Motions LEXIS 10716 at p. 14.
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff cannot strike a motion for summary judgment. Under CCP §§
435-437, there are limited instances where a party may move to strike, which
include a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint. There is no
authority under these statutes that allow for Plaintiff strike this motion.
Even if it were, motions to strike require a meet and confer, which Plaintiff did
not do. Additionally, the authority that Plaintiff cites to is inapposite as
Ratti is a reply brief submitted by plaintiff, not a trial court order. Defendant
next argues that good cause exists to bring a renewed motion. After the Court
of Appeals remanded the case down, the parties have resumed discovery and thus,
Defendant has learned new facts from those depositions. Moreover, Lawson has since been determined, which
clarifies the burden of proof applicable to retaliation claims.
Supplemental Briefs after Ex-Parte Denial:
Plaintiff argues that the second
motion is frivolous, unnecessary, and improper based on CCP § 437c(f)(2),
as there has been no new evidence or facts and there is no new law that would
be pertinent to this current case. Plaintiff argues that this time could have
been spent preparing for trial, not preparing another motion. Lastly, counsel
should be sanctioned.
Defendant argues that the statutory
language of CCP § 437c(f)(2) indicates that a party cannot move for summary
judgment based on issues in a prior motion “and denied by the court.” Here, the
Court granted the summary judgment motion and was reversed on appeal.
Therefore, because there was no denial, this statute does not apply. Next,
Defendant argues that the new summary judgment motion address new materials,
specifically Plaintiff’s new “untimely” theory of the case. Specifically,
Plaintiff did not raise Nurse Manager Anna Grief’s comments about bring “breaks
to light because thanks to [Plaintiff] breaks will no be assigned.” This
comment was not raised in the opposition in the original motion. Moreover,
Defendant is bringing new facts into the second motion, as there has been new
testimony, specifically from Plaintiff that “completely upends her newly asserted
theory of the case.” Lastly, Defendant’s motion is proper under CCP §
437c(f)(2), even if it governed, as Defendant has included new facts and
circumstances as well as demonstrated a new law, Lawson, has clarified the standard for Plaintiff in bringing a
Labor Code § 1102.5 claim. Further, the parties both utilized post-appellate
discovery and therefore newly discovered facts may have, and did, get
discovered during that process.
The Court has found no authority
that would allow it to strike a Motion for Summary Judgment. Nor does Plaintiff
provide any authority, that indicates that this Court has the authority to
strike an entire motion for summary judgment. Whether or Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment is an improper second motion under
CCP § 437c(f)(2), procedurally, may be raised in an opposition, not a
motion to strike.
Moreover, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s citation on a Superior Court’s order in Ratti to be inappropriate. First, California Rule of Court, rule
8.115(b), prohibits citing or relying on unpublished decisions except for
reasons not applicable here. Second, “A written trial court ruling in another
case has no precedential value. .” (Budrow
v. Dave & Buster’s of California (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 885; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 744, 761; In re Molz
(2015) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845;
Santa Ana Medical Hospital Center v.
Belshé (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.)
Motion
to Strike Second Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, the
Court decides the pending motion as follows:
Motion to Strike Second Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
Moving party is to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April
18, 2023 __________________________________ Upinder
S. Kalra
Judge
of the Superior Court