Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case BC660220 2022-11-07 Tentative Ruling

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MOVING PARTY: Defendants City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department, Matthew Diller, Amar Pal, Brad Gorby, Shawn Murphy, and Matthew McNulty

On May 4, 2017, Plaintiff Pamela Monk (“Plaintiff”) filed an initial Complaint in pro per against Defendants City of Los Angeles, et al. (“Defendants”). The complaint was based on injuries Plaintiff sustained from an alleged false arrest and imprisonment by Los Angeles Police Department officers.

On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and on April 26, 2018, the federal court remanded this matter to state court.

On June 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, which was GRANTED.

On September 15, 2020, Defendants City of Los Angeles, Matthew Diller, Amar Pal, Brad Gorby, Shawn Murphy, and Matthew McNulty filed an Answer.

On August 9, 2022, Defendants City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department, Matthew Diller, Amar Pal, Brad Gorby, Shawn Murphy, and Matthew McNulty filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 438 states, in relevant part: “(b)(1) A party may move for judgment on the pleadings. . . . (c)(1) The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: . . . . (B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: (i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”

A motion for judgment on the pleadings “has the purpose and effect of a general demurrer.” (Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146 (citation omitted).) “[T]he trial court generally confines itself to the complaint and accepts as true all material facts alleged therein. As appropriate, however, it may extend its consideration to matters that are subject to judicial notice. In this, it performs essentially the same task that it would undertake in ruling on a general demurrer.” (Id. (citations omitted).)

A party moving for judgment on the pleadings must meet and confer in person or telephonically with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).) The moving party must file a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a)(3).)

Defendants City of Los Angles, Los Angeles Police Department, Matthew Diller, Amar Pal, Brad Gorby, Shawn Murphy, and Matthew McNulty (“Defendants”) move for a judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the second cause of action for negligence fails. Specifically, this cause of action does not state sufficient facts to support a cause of action, the Defendants are shielded by Governmental immunity, and there is no vicarious liability for non-enforcement.

“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)

Here, the second cause of action for negligence is based on Government Code §§ 815.2 and 820. Government Code § 815.2 states, “(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability. Government Code § 820(a) provides “Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”

Defendants contend that under Government Code § 815(a), they are not liable for an injury unless provided by statute. Even if a plaintiff wanted to establish liability against a public entity, that plaintiff must plead with particularity the existence of statutory liability, “including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) Defendants argue that the SAC does not allege any statutory basis for the negligence claim. (Motion 4: 9-11.) Defendants further argue that as public entities, they are immune from liability, both under Gov. Code §§ 818.2 and 820.4.[1] Lastly, while Government Code § 815.2 allows for vicarious liability, this liability against City of Los Angeles “can only survive…if immunity did not shield the City of Los Angeles and its employees under the negligence theory plead by Plaintiff.” (Motion 6: 5-7.)

Plaintiff argues that the SAC states sufficient facts for a negligence cause of action as the SAC pleads various basis for negligence liability, including negligently failing to follow orders of their superior, negligently failing to provide medical care, negligently arresting Plaintiff and not reading her Miranda rights, etc. (Opp. 6: 13-19, SAC ¶ 64.) Moreover, Defendants are not shielded by governmental immunity because Plaintiff has established that there was a special relationship. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she detrimentally relied on Detective Mayer’s promise that LAPD officers would enforce the restraining order. (Opp. 9: 19-10.)

As stated above, one element for a negligence claim that a plaintiff must establish is duty. Here, the SAC fails to establish a duty that Defendants owed to Plaintiff or was breached. “Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating ‘defendant had a duty under the law‘; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. [citation omitted] Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or ‘enactment,‘ the statute or ‘enactment‘ claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified.” (Searcy, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at 802.) The SAC only states that Defendants did not perform their duty to enforce a court order, duty to follow superior’s orders, and duty to remove Smith from the premises. These are insufficient allegations of duty. Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants breached their duty of reasonable car fails. As the Court in Searcy states, duty is created by a statute or enactment that must be identified. Here, nowhere in the SAC is any statutory duty or enactment acknowledged. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish the element of duty for a negligence claim.

Even still, had there been a duty identified, Defendants are protected by governmental immunity. The Court in Wright stated that “sovereign immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute…Consequently, the general rule is that a public entity is not liable unless a statute imposes liability.” (Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.)

Moreover, under Government Code § 815.2, a public entity is “vicariously liable for its employee's negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment (see Gov. Code, § 820), but section 815.2, subdivision (b), adds the important qualification that a public entity is not liable for injuries committed by an employee who is immune from liability for such injuries.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1180.)

Here, the negligence cause of action is based on failure to enforce a restraining order and then later negligently arresting and charging the Plaintiff with false charges. (SAC ¶ 64.) However, public entities are immune and not liable for injuries, unless a statute imposes liability and under Government Code § 818.2, a public entity is not liable for injuries “caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or failing to enforce any law.” Here, the allegations surround whether Defendants failed to enforce the restraining order, which then resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. However, based on above, a public entity is not liable for injuries that were caused by failing to enforce any law. Therefore, Defendants have immunity from being liable under the negligence claim raised in the SAC.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s argument that there was a special relationship also fails. A special relationship can trigger a duty of care, but only in certain circumstances. Whether or not there has been detrimental reliance by plaintiff on the officer’s conduct is determinative of whether a special relationship exists. However, the Court in Camp stated that this special relationship is found in a “limited class of unique cases.” (Camp v. State of California (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 967, 977.) The Court stated that a special relationship is not established when an officer is called for assistance and “took some action at the scene” or when an officer “took control of the situation.” (Id.) The Court stated that a special relationship exists when “police officers who made misrepresentations that induced a citizen's detrimental reliance [citations], placed a citizen in harm's way [citations], or lulled a citizen into a false sense of security and then withdrew essential safety precautions.” (Id.)

Here, the Plaintiff has failed to establish a special relationship. First, Plaintiff states that she detrimentally relied on Detective Mayer’s assurances that the LAPD would enforce the move out. However, the negligence cause of action is not alleged against Detective Mayer. Plaintiff did not plead any allegations that she detrimentally relied on the Defendant Officers.[2] And second, there are no allegations of any type reliance on any of the officers. Thus, there is no special relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants to establish duty or immunity.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, as to the Second Cause of Action.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, as to the Second Cause of Action.

[1] Government Code § 818.2 states: A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law. Government Code § 820.4 states: A public employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.

[2] The Second Cause of Action is alleged against Defendants City of Los Angeles, Diller, Pal, Gorby, Murphy, McNulty, and Does 1 through 40.