Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Case Number: BC714153, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

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1. An Order awarding $525,964.50 in attorneys’ fees to be paid from the residual settlement fund.

On July 13, 2018, Plaintiff Tina Turrieta (“Plaintiff”), filed a representative Private Attorneys General Complaint against Defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Defendant”) pursuant to Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (“PAGA”). Plaintiff alleges that Lyft misclassifies its Drivers as independent contractors instead of employees in order to deprive Drivers of benefits due them and to gain an economic advantage. The causes of action asserted in the Complaint are:

On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney fees on appeal. Any oppositions were due on or before May 6, 2025. As of May 14, 2025, the court has not received any oppositions.

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), the party prevailing in the Court of Appeal in a civil case (other than a juvenile case) is entitled to costs on appeal.¿¿

The prevailing party is the respondent if the Court of Appeal affirms the judgment without modification or dismisses the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)¿“If the Court of Appeal reverses the judgment in part or modifies it, or if there is more than one notice of appeal, the opinion must specify the award or denial of costs.” (Id. at (a)(3).)

The court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as irrelevant. “A written trial court ruling in another case has no precedential value. ” (Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 885; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; In re Molz (2015) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845; Santa Ana Medical Hospital Center v. Belshé (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.)

Plaintiff contends that the court should award attorneys fees on appeal since she is the prevailing party, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court awarded costs, and counsel was required to devote an additional 826.7 hours to the appellate process. Plaintiff further contends that she only seeks recovery of these attorneys fees from the residual fund. As such, Plaintiff recognizes that she may not recover the entire 826.7 hours’ worth of fees.

Labor Code § 2699, subdivision (g) provides that an employee whose action results in the payment of civil penalties “shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.” This includes attorney fees on appeal. (Atempa v. Pedrazanni (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 830 n. 19.)

Here, the court cannot award the additional attorneys fees as requested. Notably, while the court agrees that it could award attorneys’ fees on appeal from the employer, Plaintiff provided no authority indicating that the court can order payment of the requested fees from the residual fund.[1] Furthermore, recent authority undermines Plaintiff’s position. In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 2025 WL 1392271 (May 14, 2025), the California Court of Appeal ruled that a prevailing defendant cannot recover costs from the LWDW when the LWDA did not participate in the litigation. (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff is seeking costs from the unclaimed residual funds. These funds, by operation of law, escheat to the LWDA. As such, it appears to the court, Plaintiff is seeking to utilize funds that belong to the LWDA to satisfy their costs. This seems to do exactly what the Court of Appeal said you cannot do in Rose. Hobby Lobby. The court cannot reasonably continue with a lodestar analysis as a result.

[1] The remittitur is silent as to who Plaintiff can seek recovery of the fees. It seems circular that Plaintiff, on behalf of the state, would recover fees from the other aggrieved employee Plaintiffs, who are also on behalf of the state