Judge: Upinder S. Kalra, Case: BC716488, Date: 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC716488    Hearing Date: August 10, 2022    Dept: 51

Tentative Ruling

Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51

HEARING DATE:   August 10, 2022                                             

CASE NAME:            Marshonda Whitaker v. Abraham Mayer, et al.

CASE NO.:                BC716488

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant FPI Management, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Marshonda Whitaker

REQUESTED RELIEF:

1.      An order granting summary judgment as to First Amended Complaint

TENTATIVE RULING:

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

On August 7, 2018, Plaintiff Marshonda Whitaker (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Abraham Mayer; Afton Properties, Inc.; Afton Holdings, LLC; Afton Holdings II, LLC; CMIF Fountains LP; Canyon Partners Real Estate LLC; and Does 1 through 30.  This action arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute.  Plaintiff alleges she reported a leak in the ceiling from the roof in the master bedroom, that the leak was not properly repaired, and that, as a result, there was extensive moisture and water damage, as well as mold.  Plaintiff alleges she and her children moved out of the premises during the time Plaintiff was unable to occupy the premises and Defendants were making remediation efforts.  Plaintiff alleges that, despite being unable to occupy the premises, she remained responsible for the electricity bill in her unit.  Plaintiff alleges Defendants placed a notice on the premises stating she abandoned her unit, despite the fact that the premises were still not in a habitable or tenantable condition.  Plaintiff alleges she did not abandon her lease, she simply refused to pay rent and return to an uninhabitable unit.

On April 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed amendments to complaint, substituting in 38300 30th Street Multi LLC; 38300 30th Street LLC; Palmdale Ralty Holdings LLC; FPI Management, Inc.; Sunquest Buildings, Inc.; and Pinnacle Property Management for Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively.

On June 26, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants alleging four causes of action: (1) Breach of Lease Agreement, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Habitability, (3) Constructive Eviction, and (4) Negligence.

On May 5, 2022, Defendant FPI Management, Inc., filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s opposition papers were filed on July 27, 2022.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a) provides that a “party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” The motion shall be granted if there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Subdivision (p)(2) of the same section provides that where a defendant presents evidence showing one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established, then the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (See Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 727, 732.) 

The moving party’s burden on summary judgment “is more properly one of persuasion rather than proof, since he must persuade the court that there is no material fact for a reasonable trier of fact to find, and not to prove any such fact to the satisfaction of the court itself as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 fn.11, original italics.) 

ANALYSIS:

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the First Amended Complaint fails to state triable issues of material fact. These are the only two causes of action asserted against Defendant FPI, the third and fourth causes of action

1.      Third Cause of Action: Construction Eviction

“[A]ny disturbance of the tenant’s possession by the lessor or at his procurement . . . which has the effect of depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, amounts to a constructive eviction, provided the tenant vacates the premises within a reasonable time.”  (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 292.) 

Defendant contends that the third cause of action fails as there are no triable issues of material facts. The Defendant 38300 30^th Street, LLC, filed a Motion to Deem Request for Admissions, which was granted on November 4, 2021. Here, the moving Defendant asserts that because these RFAs were deemed admitted, the Plaintiff fails to carry the burden. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot argue and is precluded from arguing that she had any knowledge of the facts to support this cause of action or that she suffered damages because of Defendant’s action. Because the Plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support a cause of action for Constructive Eviction, this claim fails.

This reliance on the RFAs is insufficient to meet the burden required for summary adjudication. “Although admissions are dispositive in most cases, a trial court retains discretion to determine their scope and effect.”  (Fredericks v. Filbert Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 272, 277.)  “An admission of a fact may be misleading.”  (Id.)  “In those cases in which the court determines that an admission may be susceptible of different meanings, the court must use its discretion to determine the scope and effect of the admission so that it accurately reflects what facts are admitted in light of other evidence.”  (Id.)

A review of the first paragraph on page 2 of the RFAs shows that 38300 30^th Street. Defendants defined “Defendants” to include “Defendants 38300 30^th Street. LLC; 38300 30^th Street Multi, LLC, and Palmdale Realty Holding, LLC” (FPI Management Evidence in Support, Ex. D, Defendants’ Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff Marshonda Whitaker, Set One, p. 2: 1-3). While this definition is not under the definitions section of the RFAs, it tends to show that 38300 30^th Street Defendants’ references to “Defendants” in their RFAs is still confined to only themselves as opposed to all defendants in this action. The court notes that in reviewing evidence presented on summary judgment, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1990) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-839). In light of the definition on page 2 and the lack of any clear evidence showing “Defendants” was meant to reference all defendants in this action, the Court finds that the use of “Defendants” as opposed to “DEFENDANTS” in the subject RFAs does not extend the admissions to all defendants in this action. Rather, the use of “Defendants,” even if not capitalized, was meant to refer to only 38300 30^th Street Defendants such that the subject RFAs only pertain to 38300 30^th Street Defendants.

Defendant further contends that since RFAs Nos. 17-23 did not refer to Defendants to “Defendants 38300 30th Street, LLC; 38300 30th Street Multi, LLC; and Palmdale Realty Holding, LLC.,” Plaintiff will be unable to prove that they incurred any damage under CCP § 2033.410. This argument too fails. While it is true that RFAs Nos. 17-23 do not limit the responses to “Defendants,” the admissions requests knowledge of  “documents’ not evidence. There are other forms of evidence in which damages can be established other than documents.

            As moving Defendant has failed to meet its burden, the burden has not shifted to Plaintiff to demonstrate triable issues of material fact exist as to this cause of action.

2.      Fourth Cause of Action: Negligence

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) 

            Similar to the above argument, the Defendant asserts that the fourth cause of action fails because the RFAs previously deemed admitted indicate that the Plaintiff does not have any facts to prove this cause of action. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot argue and is precluded from arguing that she had any knowledge of the facts to support this cause of action or that she suffered damages because of Defendant’s action.

As discussed above, reliance on the RFAs is insufficient to meet Defendant’s initial burden required for summary judgment.

As Defendant moved for Summary Judgment, rather than Summary Adjudication, the entire motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Conclusion:

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows:

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Moving party is to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:             August 10, 2022                      __________________________________                                                                                                                Upinder S. Kalra

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court