Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 19STCV26696, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV26696    Hearing Date: April 20, 2023    Dept: W

LANCE LOBDELL, ET AL. V. REGAL MEDICAL GROUP, INC., ET AL.

DEFENDANT DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE DBA NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing:        April 20, 2023                                    Trial Date:       February 6, 2024

Department:              W                                                        Case No.:        19STCV26696

Moving Party:            Defendant Dignity Community Care DBA Northridge Hospital Medical Center

Opposing Party:        Unopposed

BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2019, Plaintiffs Lance Lobdell (“Lance”) and Debra Lobdell (“Debra”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action for damages for medical negligence and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Regal Medical Group, Inc.; Lakeside Community Healthcare; Northridge Hospital Medical Center; Michael R. Shapiro, M.D.; Michael R. Shapiro, M.D., Inc.; Ryan McBirney, PA; Mary Ann H. Trephan, M.D.; Kalpesh Patel, M.D.; Hrair Darakjian, M.D.; Mission Community Hospital; N’deya Kama, M.D.; Ali Ozhand, M.D.; Emily Alexiadis, NP; and Aaron M. Shelub.

On December 6, 2022, Defendant Dignity Community Care DBA Northridge Hospital Medical Center (“Moving Defendant”) filed this motion for summary judgment.  On March 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition.  

[TENTATIVE] RULING:

Defendant Dignity Community Care DBA Northridge Hospital Medical Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Dignity Community Care DBA Northridge Hospital Medical Center moves the court for summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiffs Lance and Debra Lobdell on all causes of action alleged against Defendant in Plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that there are no triable issues of material fact in this action.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Minor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67).  

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to establish an essential element or to negate a defense. (CCP §437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)  Once the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.  [citations.]”  (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)  

“Both the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  Thus, in a medical malpractice case, “[w]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”  (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-85 (citations omitted).)  An expert declaration, if uncontradicted, is conclusive proof as to the prevailing standard of care and the propriety of the particular conduct of the health care provider.”  (Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 988, 999.)

In support of Moving Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Moving Defendant submits the expert declaration of Ronald S. Kvitne, MD (“Dr. Kvitne”). Dr. Kvitne is board-certified in orthopedic surgery. (Kvitne Decl. ¶1.) Based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records regarding his treatment as well as his education, training, knowledge, and familiarity with the standard of care, Dr. Kvitne opines that the care and treatment provided to Plaintiff by Moving Defendant was at all times within the standard of care required of employees of an acute care hospital practicing in the professional community. (Kvitne Decl. ¶12.) Specifically, said employees followed the treating physicians' orders, performed appropriate assessments and charted accurately. (Kvitne Decl. ¶12.) Dr. Kvitne further opines that the employees of Moving Defendant did not cause or contribute to Plaintiff’s alleges injuries and damages. (Kvitne Decl. ¶13.)

Moving Defendant’s further submit the Conditions of Admission signed by Plaintiff Lance Lobdell’s wife, Plaintiff Debra Lobdell. (COE, Exh. B). The Conditions of Admissions includes notice that “Doctors and surgeons providing services to Patient, … are not employees or agents of the Hospital.” Moving Defendant contends because Plaintiffs were specifically given notice, in writing, that the Moving Defendant’s physicians were not employees of the hospital, there are no grounds upon which to hold the hospital liable on any theory of ostensible agency. (See Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1454-55.)

Plaintiff did not submit a competing expert declaration showing that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Moving Defendant’s conduct complied with the applicable standard of care. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not submit evidence disputing they did not have actual notice of the true relationship between Moving Defendant’s and the treating physicians.  Therefore, Moving Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice and Plaintiff Lobdell’s loss of consortium claims.  

In light of the foregoing, Defendant Dignity Community Care DBA Northridge Hospital Medical Center’s Motion for Summary judgment is GRANTED.