Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 19STCV27768, Date: 2025-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV27768    Hearing Date: April 28, 2025    Dept: 45

ALLIED PACIFIC OF CALIFORNIA IPA vs SOLOMON SAKURADA, et al.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYs’ FEES

Date of Hearing:        April 28, 2025                        Trial Date:       None set

Department:              45                                            Case No.:        19STCV27768

Moving Party:            Defendants J.A.C. Windows, Inc. and Solomon Sakurada

Responding Party:     Unopposed

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Allied Pacific of California IPA filed this action on August 6, 2019. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 20, 2020 against Defendants J.A.C. Window, Inc., New World International, LLC, Chang Chih International Investment LLC, Solomon Sakurada, and Howard Ran, alleging causes of action for (1) Quiet Title; (2) Declaratory Relief; (3) Specific Performance; (4) Breach of Contract; (5) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Fraudulent Inducement; (7) Fraudulent Concealment; and (8) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations.

On October 15, 2020, the court sustained defendants J.A.C. Window, Inc., Solomon Sakurada, and Howard Ran’s demurrer to the first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action of the SAC, without leave to amend. The court sustained their demurrer to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement, with leave to amend.

The court sustained defendants New World International, LLC and Chang Chih International Investment LLC’s demurrer to the first, second, and eighth causes of action of the SAC, without leave to amend.

On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) with a cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement against defendants J.A.C. Window, Inc. and Solomon Sakurada.

On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff dismissed the entire action of all parties and all causes of action.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED, in the reduced amount of $41,625.00.

DISCUSSION

Defendants J.A.C. Windows, Inc. and Solomon Sakurada move the court for an order awarding the Defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees, other legal fees and costs incurred in this action on the grounds Defendants were parties to a contract that included an attorneys’ fees provision and Defendants are the prevailing parties against Plaintiff in this action.

As a general rule, each party to litigation must bear its own attorney fees, unless otherwise provided by statute or contract. (CCP §1021.) However, Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.”

“Ordinarily, in an action on a contract providing for an award of attorney fees, Civil Code section 1717 entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees, even when the party prevails on the ground that the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or nonexistent…” (Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, Ltd. v. Area Developers (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1081-1082.) Contractual attorney's fees must ordinarily be sought by noticed motion, unless the parties stipulate otherwise. (See CCP § 1033.5(c)(5); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(a).) A motion is necessary to determine both entitlement to, and the amount of, any fees. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(a) [motion procedure applies when court determines entitlement to fees, amount of fees, or both]; P R Burke Corp. v Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Auth. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.)

Defendants first argue they are the prevailing parties entitling them to attorneys’ fees under the Lease. Defendants maintain by winning the demurrers without leave to amend, they are clearly the “prevailing” parties pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4). Section 1032(a)(4) provides “prevailing party” includes a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.

In the instant case, the court agrees Defendants are the prevailing party by having their demurrer to the complaint sustained without leave to amend. The court also notes Plaintiffs dismissed the entire complaint in January 2025.

Defendants argues the basis for their attorney fees is Paragraph 41 of the Lease. Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 provides for attorney’s fees specifically provided by statute and Civil Code section 1717(a) provides for attorney’s fees in actions “on a contract.” Paragraph 41 of the Lease states: “In any action or proceeding arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing Landlord or Tenant, except as provided in paragraph 35A”. Defendants maintain the above provision is extremely broad and encompasses all claims “arising out of” the Lease. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s quiet title, declaratory relief and intentional interference with contractual relations is also covered by the Lease provision along with Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

The court agrees the attorney fees’ clause is broad enough to encompass Plaintiff’s noncontract claims. (See Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071.)

Next, Defendants argue their request for $43,875.00 in attorneys’ fees is reasonable. The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, n.23.)

First, looking at the hours expended, the court agrees the hours were reasonably expended. “An attorney’s testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Steiny and Company, Inc. v. California Electric Supply Company, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293; see also Padilla v. McClellan (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.)  Counsel billed a total of 87.5 hours in this case, not including the instant motion. (Alkana Decl. ¶11.) During the course of the litigation, Counsel prepared demurrers, motions to strike, made court appearances, propounded discovery and communicated with the client. (Alkana Decl. ¶¶9, 10.) The court finds these hours reasonable given Plaintiff initially filed their complaint against Defendant in 2019. The court notes Counsel spent an additional 4 hours preparing the instant motion and anticipates another 5 hours reviewing the opposition and preparing a reply. (Alkana Decl. ¶14.) Counsel also anticipates another hour for attending the hearing. (Alkana Decl. ¶14.) Because the motion is unopposed, the court strikes Counsel’s request for reviewing the opposition and preparing a reply ($2,250.00).

The court further notes Counsel’s hourly rate reasonable. Counsel’s hourly rate during the time of this litigation was between $450.00 and $500.00. (Alkana Decl. ¶12.) Counsel graduated from the University of San Diego and obtained their California law license in December 1974. (Alkana Decl. ¶12.) Counsel continuously worked in the field of civil litigation in the areas of commercial real estate and/or business litigation. (Alkana Decl. ¶12.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED, in the reduced amount of $41,625.00.