Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 19VECV01053, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19VECV01053 Hearing Date: October 19, 2022 Dept: W
GEAORGE
VANEK, TRUSTEE OF THE VANEK FAMILY TRUST V. SAM VAZIRI VANCE, INC., DBA SAMA
EYEWEAR, A CORPORATION, ET AL.
MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’s FEES
Date of Hearing: October 19, 2022 Trial Date: Already
held.
Department: W Case No.: 19VECVO 1053
Moving Party: George Vanek, Trustee if the Vanek Family Trust
Responding Party: No opposition
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, George Vanek, Trustee if the Vanek
Family Trust (“Vanek”) filed suit on July 25, 2019, against Defendants Sam Vaziri
Vance, Inc., dba Sama Eyewear (“Sama”) (the lessee under the commercial lease),
and Ross Vance and Sheila Vance, the guarantors of the lease. The complaint
alleged a breach of contract claim. Defendants filed their answer to the
Complaint on October 15, 2019. Concurrently Defendants filed a cross-complaint
for negligence. After successful
demurrers, the cross-complainants did not amend, and the cross-complaint was
eventually dismissed.
On May 2, 2022, this action was tried before the
court. On July 7, 2022, this Court issued a tentative statement of decision
finding in favor of Plaintiff on its claim for breach of contract. On August
18, 2022, the Court’s tentative statement of decision became final. The parties
have stipulated that both written agreements (the lease and the personal
guarantees) were signed by Defendants and constitute authentic agreements
between the parties. Each written agreement contain an attorney fee provision.
This Court’s statement of decision found in favor of Plaintiff under the breach
of contract claim and awarded Plaintiff the total sum of $32,712.57 against
Defendants.
Plaintiff now seeks to have attorney’s fees and
costs awarded in Plaintiff’s favor based upon the attorney fee provision in the
written agreements signed by Defendants and the fact that Plaintiff was deemed
the prevailing party.
[TENTATIVE]
RULING
Plaintiff’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A prevailing party is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees in addition to other costs. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(10).)
“Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant
in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor
defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who
do not recover any relief against that defendant. (CCP §
1032(a)(4).) In all other circumstances, the “prevailing party” shall be
as determined by the court. (Id.)
The fee setting inquiry ordinarily begins with
the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22
Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on
consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the
fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v.
Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)
In determining whether to adjust the lodestar
figure, the court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the
amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case,
the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the
case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770,
774.) The prevailing party bears the burden of proof and the amount is
left to the trial court’s sound discretion. (Christian Research
Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1320.) A fee
request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting
the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. (Serrano
v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)
In challenging attorney fees as excessive
because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the
challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient
argument and citations to the evidence.¿ (Premier Medical Management
Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
550, 564.)¿ General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or
unrelated do not suffice.¿ (Ibid.)¿
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s Motion For
an Order Adding Attorney’s fees to the Judgment is unopposed by Defendants.
Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees
in this action because they are the prevailing party. This Court’s statement of
decision found in favor of Plaintiff under the breach of contract claim and
awarded Plaintiff the total sum of $32,712.57 against Defendants. (Declaration
of Richard P. Petersen (“Petersen Decl.”) ¶ 4-5.) Civil Code section 1717 states
that “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides
that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract,
shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then
the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code, §
1717(a).) Here, both the lease and the personal
guarantees written agreements contained attorney fee provisions. (Petersen Decl. ¶
2, Exh. A, B.) Moreover, both parties stipulated that both written agreements
were signed by Defendants and constituted authentic agreements between the
parties. (Petersen Decl. ¶ 5.) Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees
pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.
Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees are reasonable given
the circumstances of the case. “Even after determining that a party is entitled
to fees because it ‘prevailed,’ the trial court must still determine what
amount of fees would be ‘reasonable’ in light of the relative extent or degree
of the party's success in obtaining the results sought.” (Sokolow v. County
of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 247.) Here, Plaintiff is
requesting $15,480.00 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff has set forth the
attorney’s fees claimed by Plaintiff in an itemized detailed billing summary of
Richard P. Petersen. (Petersen Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. E.) All fees claimed by
Plaintiff are reasonable and customary as they were incurred in the normal
course of litigation. Plaintiff’s attorney billed 77.40 hours in prosecuting
this matter through trial and after Plaintiff prepared the matter for trial on
two prior occasions which were continued due to Defendant’s attorney’s health
issues. Plaintiff’s attorney’s hourly fee is $200.00 which is reasonable based
on the attorney’s 30 years of experience, and hourly rate charged in the
community.
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover
attorney’s fees in this action because he is the prevailing party, the contract
between Plaintiff and Defendants expressly contained an attorney fee provision,
and the attorney’s fees claimed are reasonable.
Memorandum of Costs
Plaintiff is also entitled to recover reasonable
costs for this action. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any
action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. §1032(b).) Here, Plaintiff seeks costs
of $2,129.66 which are set forth in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs filed on
September 14, 2022, plus the additional sum of $1,060.00 for attorney’s fees
and costs incurred in preparing Plaintiff’s Motion For an Order Adding
Attorney’s Fees to The Judgment. (Petersen Decl. ¶ 9-10.) By filing this
motion, Plaintiff has incurred three hours in preparation of this motion, a
$60.00 filing fee, and will incur at least two hours at the appearance of the
hearing.
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs in
the amount of $3,189.66.
CONCLUSION &
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the court awards
Plaintiff $15,480.00 in attorney’s fees and $3,189.66 in costs. Plaintiff is ordered to
prepare and serve a notice of ruling and proposed final judgment in accordance
with California Rule of Court 3.1312 within 10 days.