Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 19VECV01235, Date: 2023-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19VECV01235    Hearing Date: February 14, 2023    Dept: W

ANYIA, ET AL. V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

Date of Hearing:        February 14, 2023                 Trial Date:       March 6, 2023

Department:              W                                            Case No.:        19VECV01235

Moving Party:             Defendant City of Los Angeles

Responding Party:     Plaintiff Alfred Anyia

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that on August 25, 2018, their home had been invaded and occupied by unknown persons numbering over 200 people. The unknown persons were drinking, partying, having sex, looting, destroying and damaging the subject property. Plaintiffs immediately contacted the LAPD and that after several more 911 calls, the LAPD finally arrived 40 minutes later. By that time, Plaintiffs’ property had been trashed and burglarized and items worth over $150,000 were stolen, destroyed, or damaged. Plaintiffs further allege despite overwhelming evidence, the LAPD failed to properly investigate the matter.

On August 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department, Doe John 1, and Doe John 2 asserting causes of action for: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision; (3) Negligent Hiring and Training; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Respondeat Superior; (6) Negligence against Does 1-3 Battery; (7) Trespass; (8) Intrusion into Seclusion; (9) Privacy Violation; and (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant City of Los Angeles (“City Defendant”) demurred to the complaint on February 14, 2020. Before the hearing on the demurrer, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. At the hearing on the demurrer, the court ordered Plaintiffs may keep the first amended complaint filed on 6/30/20 or they may file a revised first amended complaint.

Plaintiffs filed a revised FAC on July 21, 2020. Plaintiffs FAC asserts causes of action for (1) Negligence against Defendants LAPD and the City; (2) Negligent Supervision against Defendants LAPD and the City; (3) Negligent Hiring and Training against Defendants LAPD and the City; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendants LAPD and the City; (5) Respondeat Superior against Defendants LAPD and the City; (6) Negligence against Does 1-4; (7) Trespass against John Does; (8) Intrusion into Seclusion; (9) Privacy Violation; (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Defendants LAPD and the City; (11) Promissory Estoppel against Defendants LAPD and the City; (12) Discrimination – Violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act; (13) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against John Does 1-4; and (14) Monell Claims – Violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Defendants LAPD and the City.

City Defendant now demurs to the FAC on the grounds the claims are barred by the immunities conferred by Government Code §§ 815.2(b), 845 and 821.6 and are additionally barred due to Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Government Tort Claims Act.

City Defendant notes that the LAPD has been named in the complaint; however, the LAPD is a non-suable entity. (See Alcala v. City of Corcoran (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 666.)

[Tentative] Ruling:

City Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

City Defendant moves this court for a judgment on the pleadings on the grounds Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, allege sufficient facts to support a Monell claim against Defendant City.

It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense.  (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; See also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 [The non statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.].)  

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion on several procedural grounds. Plaintiff first argues the motion is defective because City Defendant has not stated any material change in law under Code of Civil Procedure section 438(g)(1). However, this only applies if Defendant’s demurrer on the same ground had been previously overruled and there has been no intervening material change in the applicable law.

Plaintiff also opposes the motion on the grounds the motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 438(f)(2) and (e). The court disagrees. Defendant has filed their answer and the time to demur has expired. Moreover, a pretrial conference order has not been entered and the instant motion is not being brought within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial.

Turning to Plaintiff’s substantive argument they have stated facts sufficient to support their Monell cause of action, Plaintiff argues for the purpose of the pleading stage, all Plaintiff needs to allege is the failure of City Defendant to train/supervise and the existence of a constitutional violation: the discrimination of the Plaintiffs on the basis of their race, color and/or national original. (FAC ¶¶183-186.) Plaintiff contends as long as Plaintiff has stated an underlying constitutional violation committed by an individual, there will be municipal liability for failing to train, supervise, discipline or screen.

In Defendant’s moving papers, Defendant argues Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that any purported unconstitutional custom, practice or policy was the moving force behind the involved Officers’ investigation into the burglary. Defendants further argue this one incident is not sufficient to impose Monell liability under a failure to train theory and nor can Defendant City be held vicariously liable under Monell.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that local governmental entities and local officials can be liable under section 1983, provided that an official policy or custom leads to the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690-91; see also Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1295.) The Monell Court further held a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. (See Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (1985) 471 U.S. 808, 818; Harman, supra, 136 CalApp.4th at 1296.) Establishing a custom for the purposes of section 1983 requires significant proof that the alleged custom is well-settled and permanent as to constitute the force of law. (See Harman, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1302.) A single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to hold a municipality liable under section 1983 and Monell. (See Oklahoma City, supra, 471 U.S. at 823-24; see also Buenavista v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1178-79.)  

“Generally, a party may demonstrate municipal responsibility for a constitutional violation in one of three ways. First, a plaintiff might show that an entity with decision-making authority within the municipality expressly enacted or authorized the policy that led to the injury. [Citation.] Second, a plaintiff might prove that the municipality caused the injury by showing the violation was the result of municipal custom. [Citation.] Finally, a plaintiff might show that the constitutional violation is the product of inadequate training on the part of the municipality. [Citation.]” (Ramirez v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (9th Cir. 2001) 22 Fed.Appx. 828, 830.)

In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s allegations are based on a constitutional violation that is the product of inadequate training on the part of the City Defendant. Plaintiff alleges City Defendant failed to train, supervise, and discipline their police officers from harming the public unnecessarily based on their race, color, and/or national origin. (FAC ¶183.) Plaintiff further alleges City Defendant failed to train, supervise, and disciplined their officers in properly investigating crimes and refraining from engaging in any form of discrimination against Plaintiffs based on their race, color, and/or national origin while investigating. (FAC ¶184.) This is sufficient to support a Monell claim at the pleading stage. The court notes there does not need to be a directive or order attributable to a final municipal policymaker to establish a municipality’s failure to train. (See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 390 holding “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”)

Whether this was a “single incident” or a pattern of constitutional violates is better suited where the parties can present evidence. The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 321-322.) This contention is better suited where Defendant may present evidence such as motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, City Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.