Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 20STCV06098, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV06098 Hearing Date: October 17, 2022 Dept: W
Julia Rosner, et al., v. Mike
Gerstein, et al.
Demurrer
Date of Hearing: October 17, 2022 Trial Date: April
10, 2023
Department: W Case
No.: 20STCV06098
Moving Party: Defendants
Shayke, Inc. and Mike Gerstein, Joinder filed by Intervenor Harleysville
Insurance Company
Responding Party: Plaintiffs Brian Rosner and Barbara
Rosner, individually and as successors in interest to Julia Rosner
BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff Julia
Rosner (“Julia”), by and through her successors in interests, Brian Rosner
& Barbara Rosner (“Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint against Shayke, Inc.
d/b/a Freedom Treatment Centers of California (“Shayke”); David Silberberg
(“Silberberg”); Mike Gerstein (“Gerstein”); and DOES 1 –100, inclusive,
alleging 5 causes of action arising from the death of Julia. On July 8, 2020, Plaintiffs named Defendant
Hatteras House Sober Living as Doe 1.
On July 21, 2022, the Court granted,
with leave to amend, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for dependent adult abuse/neglect. The Court granted the motion with leave to
amend based on Plaintiffs’ representation that they could allege facts that Julia
was a California resident.
On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the
First Amended Compliant (“FAC”), asserting the same causes of action as the
Complaint.
Shayke and Gerstein (hereinafter
referred to collectively as “Defendants”) now demur to the third cause of
action in the FAC. Intervenor
Harleysville Insurance Company joins Defendants’ Demurrer.
[Tentative] Ruling
Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’
Third Cause of Action is OVERRULED.
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court grants Defendants request to take judicial notice of
the Death Certificate of Julia Rosner (See Latham III Decl., Exh. 2
(incorrectly numbered exhibit 1 in the declaration of Robert A Latham III).)
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests
whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially
noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue Plaintiffs lack standing. Defendant contends the decedent does not
satisfy The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act’s (“DACPA”)
statutory residency requirement.
Defendants contend although the FAC alleges Julia
is a California resident, the judicially noticed death certificate shows
Plaintiff’s decedent’s residence as Westchester, New York. (See Latham III Decl., Exh. 2.) Defendants contend that the new allegations regarding
Julia’s residency in California fall short of establishing residency, and is
contradicted by Julia’s death certificate.
In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Julia’s
treatment “would have” extended more than a year, and that she “would have”
stayed near her support network in California are mere conclusions. Furthermore, Defendants contend that while DACPA
does not define residency, in the statutes for venue (CCP § 395) and marriage
dissolution (CCP § 4530) residency has been established with voter registration, continuous residency, a driver’s
license, registration of automobile, and receipt of mail, and Plaintiffs failed
to include allegations of when Julia moved to California, her mail receipt
address, whether she was a registered voter, had a registered vehicle, or had a
California driver’s license/ID. (Taff v. Goodman (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 771, 775; In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 157.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue Julia was a
resident of California, as she resided at two treatment facilities in
California, she planned on staying in California, her treatment would have
lasted longer than a year, she would have stayed near her support network in
California (and away from the place where her addiction began), and had
expressed a desire to move to California.
(FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs contend
that the allegations that Julia resided in California must be taken as true. Plaintiff further contend that proof of her
residency and intention to permanently remain in California were “killed by
Defendants,” and that she can no longer testify for herself. (See Opp. p. 5.)
While the Court must take the allegation in the FAC
as true, “'[t]he rule is well settled that a complaint otherwise good on its
face is nevertheless subject to demurrer when facts judicially noticed render
it defective. ...:’ The theory is that the pleader should not be allowed to
bypass a demurrer by suppressing facts which the court will judicially notice.’
[Citations.]” (Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 130.)
While DACPA does not define residency, other parts
of the Welfare and Institutions Code defines ‘residence’ as “the place where
one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary
purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.” (Welf. & Inst. Code §17101.) With the new allegations of the FAC, the Court
finds Plaintiffs have adequately alleged Julia was a resident of
California. While evidence of voter registration, a driver’s license/ID, registration of
automobile, and receipt of mail in California are some indicia of an intent to
establish residency, the court does not find them necessary, especially when
dealing with an individual whose disabilities might have prevented her from
seeking any or all of these benefits of residency. The allegation that Julia indicated that she
intended to stay in California and did not have a residence elsewhere is
sufficient at the pleading stage to adequately allege the basis for her
residency. The hearsay statements in the
death certificate cannot be deemed conclusive on this factual issue, even if
the court takes judicial notice of that document.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is OVERRULED.