Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 20STCV28982, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV28982    Hearing Date: January 30, 2025    Dept: 45

PADILLA V. WALNUT HILL CAR WASH, LLC, ET AL.

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

 

Date of Hearing:          1/30/2025                               Trial Date:       N/A

Department:               45                                            Case No.:         20STCV28982

 

Moving Party:             Defendants Walnut Hill Car Wash, LLC and Michael Aminpour

Responding Party:       Plaintiff Inocente Padilla

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING

 

Defendants’ motion is denied.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Inocente Padilla filed this action on July 31, 2020 against defendants Walnut Hill Car Wash, LLC and Michael Aminpour, alleging eight causes of action involving wage-and-hour claims. He filed his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) with leave of court on June 7, 2024, adding an additional cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The operative FAC asserts the following claims:

 

            1. Failure to pay wages owed,

            2. Failure to pay minimum wage,

            3. Failure to pay overtime compensation,

            4. Failure to provide rest periods,

            5. Failure to provide itemized wage statements,

            6. Waiting time penalties,

            7. Unfair competition,

            8. Failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records, and

            9. Wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

 

The FAC alleges Defendants hired Plaintiff on August 20, 2006 as a full-time, nonexempt car dealer. (FAC, ¶ 16.) From July 31, 2016 to January 19, 2019, Plaintiff allegedly worked five days a week, 8:00 am to 6:00 pm, with a daily 30-minute meal break, for a total of approximately 57 hours worked per week. (Id. at ¶ 17.) From the periods of July 31, 2016 to December 31, 2017 and January 1, 2018 to January 19, 2019, Plaintiff was allegedly paid $10.50/hour and $13.25/hour, respectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.) However, Plaintiff was allegedly not paid for more than 30 hours worked per week. (Id. at ¶ 19.) From July 31, 2016 to January 19, 2019, Plaintiff was allegedly not allowed to take his statutory 10-minute rest breaks for every four hours worked. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

 

Plaintiff alleges his medical providers informed him on January 19, 2019 that he would require injections as treatment for pain arising from an injury he sustained at work. (Id. at ¶ 21.) He in turn informed his supervisors, who agreed to grant him 30 days of medical leave. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff asked for written confirmation that his job would remain open during his leave. (Id. at ¶ 23.) They refused his request. (Ibid.) He took leave anyway on his doctors’ orders. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

 

On February 19, 2019, Plaintiff attempted to contact his supervisors to arrange his return to work. (Id. at ¶ 25.) They did not respond. (Ibid.) Around February 21, 2019, he concluded his employment was terminated and sought work elsewhere. (Id. at ¶ 26.) He alleges he never received any outstanding wages owed after his departure, and he requested his personnel records the September following his termination and was refused. (Id., ¶¶ 27, 72.)

 

Defendants filed this motion for judgment on the FAC on September 17, 2024. Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 16, 2025. Defendants filed no reply.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is … not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999, citations omitted.)

 

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer: that under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) The court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220, citing Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)

 

/ / /

 

MEETING AND CONFERENCE

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 439 requires a party to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with its adversary before it moves for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants’ counsel filed a declaration showing he spoke to Plaintiff’s counsel in person regarding the basis for Defendant’s motion. (Bitton Decl., ¶ 3.) Section 439 is satisfied.

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

Defendants request judicial notice of a Joint Order Approving Compromise and Release in two consolidated Workers’ Compensation cases numbered ADJ11994367 and ADJ117425005, allegedly between the same parties to the instant lawsuit.

The request is granted.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Defendant argues it is entitled to judgment, in whole or in part, on several bases:

 

            (1) as to Plaintiff’s first through seventh causes of action, that Plaintiff released his wage and hour claims in the noticed Joint Order made by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and/or that he is judicially estopped from asserting them in this subsequent action;

 

            (2) as to Plaintiff’s fifth and eighth causes of action, that his claims are time-barred; and

 

            (3) as to Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action, that he has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

 

            The Court takes up each argument in turn.

 

1. The Workers’ Compensation Order defeats Plaintiff’s First through Seventh Causes of Action

 

“‘Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to a subsequent action by the parties or their privies on the same cause of action.’” (Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 (Villacres), quoting Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 582, 589–590, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 224 (Amin).) The doctrine is based on public policy, recognizing there must “‘“be an end to litigation.”’” (Villacres, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, citing Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 77.)

 

A second aspect of the res judicata doctrine is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. (Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1299, 243 Cal.Rptr. 390 (Frommhagen).) Under this aspect of the doctrine, “‘“the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable. ...”’” (Villacres, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 576, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, quoting Amin, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 589–590, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 224.) Collateral estoppel precludes the litigation of a claim that was related to the subject matter of the first action and could have been raised in that action, even though it was not expressly pleaded. (Villacres, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 576, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, citing Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181–182, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37.) This preclusive effect applies where, as here, the previous action was dismissed with prejudice based on a court-approved settlement agreement. (Villacres, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 577, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 398.)

 

To analyze the collateral estoppel effect of the prior settlement agreement in a workers’ compensation case, this court may take judicial notice of the settlement agreement and order.   (See Frommhagen, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1299, 243 Cal.Rptr. 390 [when reviewing demurrer based on res judicata, judicial notice may be taken of official acts or records of any court in this state]; Evid. Code, § 452.) Where “all of the facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general demurrer. [Citation.]” (Frommhagen, at p. 1299, 243 Cal.Rptr. 390.)

 

Having reviewed the settlement agreement in the workers’ compensation case, the court finds that plaintiff is collaterally estopped to maintain this action against the same defendants on claims for failure to pay “wages, vacation pay, or any other benefits such as, without limitation, meal periods, rest breaks, sick pay and/or overtime compensation” as set forth in Addendum A.  (See Request for Judicial Notice.)  The settlement agreement was signed by Padilla, who was represented by counsel at the time. Thus, plaintiff’s claims based on failure to pay wages (Causes of Action One through five and seven) are barred as a matter of law. (See Shine v. Williams-Sonoma Inc. (23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1079-1081.)  The Sixth Cause of action for waiting time penalties is not clearly covered by the prior settlement agreement language.  Thus, that claim is not barred. 

 

2. Plaintiff’s  eighth cause of action is not time-barred.

 

Plaintiff asserts claims for waiting time penalties (5th Cause of Action) and failure to permit inspection of employment records (Eighth Cause of Action).

 

Plaintiff alleges he was fired as of February 21, 2019. He filed his lawsuit July 31, 2020, more than a year later. Defendants argue his fifth and eighth causes of action are both subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and therefore both are barred.  As stated above, plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties is barred by the prior workers’ compensation agreement. 

 

Plaintiff, however, did not release his claim based on his employer’s failure to permit inspection of records.  That claims is not time-barred. Plaintiff’s claim accrued when he requested his records and Defendants failed to produce them. (See Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 [cause of action accrues when complete with all of its elements].) Plaintiff alleges he requested his records on September 13, 2019 (FAC, ¶ 72); he filed less than a year later.

 

3. Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action is sufficiently pled.

 

A claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy requires the plaintiff to prove (1) he was employed by the employer; (2) he was discharged; (3) the alleged violation of public policy motivated his discharge; and (4) the discharge caused him harm. (Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623.)

 

Defendant argues Plaintiff has not pled constructive discharge. He does not need to. He alleges actual discharge - albeit based on his employer’s nonaction. Whether he can show discharge – actual or constructive – is a question for a later stage. Here, he has pled his supervisors failed to respond to his calls when he tried to return to work. That is sufficient to state his claim.