Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 20VECV00383, Date: 2022-09-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20VECV00383 Hearing Date: September 29, 2022 Dept: W
GAMEBREAKER, Inc. v. ADIDAS AG, et
al.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Date of Hearing: September 29, 2022 Trial Date: April 24, 2023
Department: W Case
No.: 20VECV00383
Moving Party: Plaintiff
Gamebreaker, Inc.
Responding Party: Defendants Adidas AG and Adidas America,
Inc.
BACKGROUND
On
March 12, 2020 Plaintiff Gamebreaker, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Complaint. The operative pleading is the
First Amended Complaint, which alleges causes of action for (1) declaratory
relief, (2) breach of contract - orders, (3) recission of amendment due to
fraud, (4) fraud – false promise, (5) breach of contract – amendment, (6)
breach of contract – pricing, and (7) unfair business practices against
Defendants Adidas AG and Adidas America, Inc (“Defendants”).[1]
This
matter arises from Defendants alleged breach of contract, relating to
Defendants purchase of headgears from Plaintiffs, and the sale of the same to
third parties.
Plaintiff
moves the Court for summary adjudication as to its declaratory relief cause of
action.
[Tentative] Ruling
Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The function of a motion for summary judgment
or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party
cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order
of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section
437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As
to each claim as framed by the complaint, the moving party must satisfy the
initial burden of proof by presenting facts proving the essential elements of a
cause of action, negating the essential elements of a cause of action, or
establishing a defense. (CCP §
437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once
the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party
to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto. To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence.
(Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
ANALYSIS
Evidentiary
Objections
Defendant’s Objections Nos. 1-6 are OVERRULED.
Declaratory
Relief
Plaintiff
contends that Defendant’s April 29, 2019 Notice of Termination of the subject
contract (“contract”) was ineffective because no “Event of Default” (as defined
by the contract) had occurred and Defendants failed to comply with the
requirements for terminating the contract.
(Pl. UMF Nos. 5, 14.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court adjudicate that
Defendants Notice of Termination was ineffective, that the subject contract was
not terminated, and that Defendants remain bound by the terms of the subject
contract, including the pricing requirements.
Defendants
contend that Plaintiff is improperly moving for summary adjudication because
its declaratory relief cause of action does not completely dispose of a cause
of action, and the issue of whether the subject contract was validly terminated
has already been placed fully at-issue by the other causes of action asserted in
the FAC.
The Court
finds that the Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319,
which was cited by Defendants, is instructive.
In Hood, the plaintiff
brought an action against defendant for damages and injunctive relief alleging,
among other things, that defendant breached a noncompetition clause in a
contract between the parties. (Id.
at 322.) Defendant cross-complained
seeking injunctive relief and damages for breach of contract and sundry torts
arising from the termination of the contract.
(Id.) In the
cross-complaint defendant disputed plaintiff's right to terminate the contract. (Id.) Plaintiff moved for summary adjudication with
respect to defendant’s cross-complaint.
(Id.) The trial court
denied the motion on the ground it would not completely dispose of any of
the causes of action in defendants’ cross-complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff then amended its complaint to add a
cause of action for declaratory relief. (Id.) In its declaratory relief cause of action Plaintiff
sought determinations that defendant's activities violated the noncompetition
clause of the contract, that as a result plaintiff was entitled to terminate
the contract, and that it was within its rights in doing so. (Id.) Plaintiff then moved for summary adjudication
on its declaratory relief cause of action.
(Id.) This time the motion
was granted and defendant sought writ review in the Court of Appeal. (Id.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial
court to set aside its order granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary
adjudication because when the issues invoked in a cause of action for
declaratory relief are fully engaged in other causes of action, “declaratory
relief [is] unnecessary and superfluous.” (Id. at 324.) “The
declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating
and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.” (Id.)
“The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and
not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination
of identical issues.” (Id.)
The Hood court found that the declaratory relief sought “adds
nothing to those matters that were asserted and presumably will be resolved in
the underlying action.” (Id.)
The Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 839, 846 court in analyzing Hood
found that “it was clear to the [Hood] Court that what [plaintiff] had done was
to pluck certain issues out of the existing complaint and cross-complaint and
place them in a purported declaratory relief cause of action solely for the
purpose of moving for summary adjudication on that cause of action and thereby
making an end run around the restrictions of section 437c, subdivision (f).”
Here, in the Complaint, Plaintiff
asserted a cause of action for breach of contract, for, among other things,
Defendant’s violation of the pricing requirements of the contract. (See Compl., ¶¶ 22-26.) Plaintiff then amended its Complaint to
assert the cause of action for declaratory relief alleging that Defendant’s
Notice of Termination was ineffective and that Defendants remained bound by the
terms of the contract, including the pricing requirements of the contract. (See FAC ¶¶ 33-36.) Here, Plaintiff’s declaratory relief cause of
action was included “for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue
which can be determined in the main action.” (Hood, supra, 33
Cal.App.4th at 324.) Plaintiff
specifically requests that the Court find that Defendants are bound by the
terms of the contract, including the pricing agreement, which would require the
Court to determine the issue of whether Defendants are in breach of the
contract. Here, Plaintiff inserted the
allegation of Defendants’ ineffective Notice of Termination, which presumably,
would have been Defendants’ defense to the breach of contract claims in the Complaint. Here, whether Defendants’ Notice of
Termination was ineffective is a necessary part of the analysis to determine
whether Defendants breached the contract.
The trier of fact would have to consider and determine whether the
Notice of Termination was ineffective as part of the breach of contract
analysis. The declaratory relief cause
of action seeks determination of the same issues presented by Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claims, and whether Defendant’s Notice of Termination was
ineffective “adds nothing to those matters that were asserted” and are issues
that would have been resolved in the breach of contract claims asserted in the
Complaint. Plaintiff simply plucked out
an issue that was part of and would have been decided in the Complaint and
placed it in a declaratory relief cause of action.
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s
reliance on Supervalu, Inc. v. Wexford Underwriting Managers, Inc.
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 64 and Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 37
Cal.App.4th, to support that its declaratory relief cause of action is
sufficiently distinct from its other causes of action and that summary
adjudication is proper, is misplaced. Supervalu
and Southern Cal. Edison Co.’s are factually distinct, as the
declaratory relief causes of action involved the interpretation of “ambiguous”
language in the contracts at issue. In
contrast, here, Plaintiff is asking the Court to find that Defendants Notice of
Termination was ineffective, which, as discussed above in detail, is the same
issues presented by the breach of contract claims.
Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.