Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 21STCV05592, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV05592    Hearing Date: February 19, 2025    Dept: 45

COLLEEN CHAPMAN v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Date of Hearing:          February 19, 2025                   Trial Date:       None

Department:               45                                            Case No.:         21STCV05592

Complaint Filed:            February 11, 2021

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Colleen Chapman

Responding Party:       Defendant General Motors LLC

Notice:                         Proper

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Colleen Chapman (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) sold Plaintiff a defective vehicle and refused to repair it in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

On February 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(A)(3); (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty; and (5) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability.

On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s 988 Offer to Compromise.

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement.

On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees.

On December 5, 2024, Defendant filed its Opposition.

On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed their Reply.

[Tentative] Ruling

1.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $33,983.  

LEGAL STANDARD

A prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.  (CCP § 1033.5(a)(10).)  “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.  (CCP § 1032(a)(4).)  In all other circumstances, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court.  (Id.)

The fee setting inquiry ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.)  “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”  (Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

The prevailing party bears the burden of proof and the amount is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1320.)  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)

ANALYSIS

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs request judicial notice be taken of twenty-two (22) orders granting motions for attorney fees in various cases.

The orders of other trial courts as to the reasonability of attorney’s fees is not relevant to the determination of this Motion.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Requests for Judicial Notice Nos. 1-22 are DENIED.

Objections to Evidence

The court has ruled separately on plaintiff’s objections to defendant’s evidence.

Prevailing Party

The parties have settled this matter via an offer made pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 998 (“§ 998 offer”) (Castro Decl., Ex. 3.) Per the § 998 offer, Defendant has agreed to pay Plaintiff $63,000 including any loan payoff of the subject vehicle. (Id.) The parties agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter and that Defendant will pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $20,000 or, in the alternative, pursuant to a noticed motion. (Id.) Defendant agreed to pay pre-judgment interest pursuant to Civil Code sections 3287(b) and 3289(b). (Id.) Defendant agreed to waive its costs in this action. (Id.)

Plaintiff now seeks $49,468.62 in fees comprised of the following: $33,537 in attorney fees for 71.7 hours of work; $11,737.95 as a 1.35 fee multiplier, $693.67 in costs and expenses; and $3,500 for review of opposition, drafting of a Reply and attending the hearing. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 83, Ex. 23.)

As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable fees and costs. (Civ. Code § 1794(d).)

Reasonableness

“Even after determining that a party is entitled to fees because it ‘prevailed,’ the trial court must still determine what amount of fees would be ‘reasonable’ in light of the relative extent or degree of the party's success in obtaining the results sought.” (Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 247.)

In Opposition, Defendant argues that this was a routine lemon law case for which Plaintiff’s Counsel has managed to bill grossly excessive amounts for preparing basic template-based discovery and motions. (Opp., 1:11-18.) Defendant also argues that a multiplier is not warranted in this straightforward single-vehicle lemon law case. (Opp., 1:19-20.) Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Counsel should not benefit from inefficiencies that resulted from the excessive number of billing timekeepers, such that Plaintiff’s fees should be reduced by at least 40.3 hours ($18,550.77) and the court should deny recovery for all costs claimed.

“In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the ‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 100.) In making this determination, “[t]he court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market.” (Id.)

A total of seventeen (17) attorneys and/or paralegals worked on this matter. The Court finds that counsels’ hourly rates—ranging between $285 and $595—are reasonable given their experience and the locality of the services provided.

The total number of billable hours claimed by Plaintiff's attorneys is 71.7 hours. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s billing records and finds that the reasonable number of hours spent by Plaintiff’s attorneys in this matter is ___ hours. In making this determination, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is not entitled to fees for time billed for Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant’s Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents (“MTC further”).  In addition, some of the time expended was unreasonable given the simplicity of the task performed and the fact that the work done was identical to work performed in other cases.  

On November 17, 2022, Tyson Smith billed 4.9 hours ($2,254.00) to “Draft P's MTC further RFPs and for Monetary Sanctions, and supporting documents; perform extensive analysis of D' deficient discovery responses and document production.” (Shahian Decl., Ex. 23.) The MTC further was filed on November 22, 2022. On July 17, 2023, Nino Sanaia billed 1 hour ($425) to “Prepare for hearing on P's MTC further RFPs; draft hearing outcome memo on Court Ordered continuance.” (Shahian Decl., Ex. 23.) The Court continued the hearing on the motion based on multiple errors in the motion and ordered Plaintiff to file and serve an errata addressing the errors. (Minute Order, 7/17/23.)  On August 4, 2023, Rabiya Tirmizi billed 1.5 hours ($375.00) to “Revise and finalize P's Notice of Errata to Revise MTC further RFPs.” (Shahian Decl., Ex. 23.) The Motion to Compel Further was ultimately vacated by the Court on August 14, 2023 due to Plaintiff’s failure to appear at the hearing, which Defendant managed to attend. (Minute Order, 8/14/23.) The 7.4 hours, totaling $3,054, billed for this motion ultimately culminated in the hearing on the motion being vacated. Plaintiff’s own errors in the initial filing necessitated further billing, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to appear at the hearing prevented the motion from being heard at all. Defendant should not be required to reimburse Plaintiff’s counsel for time spent correcting their own errors, or for their misuse of time in failing to appear at the hearing.

With respect to other tasks, plaintiff’s counsel billed 8.6 to draft initial discovery responses, nearly all of which were blanket boilerplate objections, 3.4 to draft boiler plate motions in limine, and 3.2 to draft discovery requests, much of which was duplicative of requests in other cases.  The court finds that amount of time spent on all of these tasks was  unreasonable given the routine nature of the work and that much of the work had previously been done in other cases. Accordingly, the court reduces the time requested for drafting initial discovery responses by 4 hours, at the  billing rate of $525, reduces the time requested for drafting motions in limine by 1.5 (at $595 per hour), and the time spent on drafting discovery by 1.5 (at $595 per hour), for a further reduction of the lodestar by $3885. 

Further, the Court will not award any fee multiplier. The Court does not believe this matter involved any complex or novel legal issues warranting any multiplier. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel litigates dozens of matters nearly identical to this one, often using templates and generally abiding by the same litigation strategy.

Plaintiff requests $3,500 for reviewing Defendant’s Opposition, drafting their Reply and attending the hearing. This amount appears reasonable.

Accordingly, the court awards $30,098 as reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff requests $693.67 in costs, which the court also grants.  

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $30,098, plus costs of $693.67..