Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 21STCV17649, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV17649    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 45

FIRE GUARD CORPORATION vs STANFORD AND 12TH STREET, LP, et al.

MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Date of Hearing:          March 5, 2025                         Trial Date:       N/A

Department:               45                                            Case No:          21STCV17649

Moving Party:             Defendant Shu C. Kou

Responding Party:       Mayer Separzadeh

Notice:                         Proper

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case consists of three separate actions that were consolidated.

The first case is the breach of contract action (21STCV17649), filed on May 11, 2021. In this case, Plaintiff Fire Guard Corporation dba Builtright Engineering and Construction (“Fire Guard”) alleges the following: at all relevant times, Defendants Shu C. Kou and Shan C. Kou (collectively, the “Kous”) owned the real property located at 901 East 12th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90021 (the “Property”). Pursuant to the parties’ written contract, Fire Guard rendered services and supplied certain materials to the Kous to be used, and which were actually used, in the construction of work of improvement at the Property. Fire Guard performed all of its conditions and promises under the contract, but the Kous breached the contract by failing to pay the agreed-upon consideration. As a result of the breach, Fire Guard has incurred damages in the amount of $269,190, with interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per annum since February 5, 2021.  

On July 7, 2021, in this case (21STCV17649), the Kous filed a Cross-Complaint against Stanford and 12th Street, LP, Stanford Mart, LP, Separzadeh, Shahin S. Zackary, Said Bral, and Roes 1 through 25, inclusive, asserting the following causes of action: (1) Implied contractual indemnity; (2) Express contractual indemnity; (3) Breach of lease; (4) Breach of guaranty; and (5) Account stated.

In their cross-complaint, the Kous allege that on or about November 8, 2025, Kou and Stanford Mart, LP, entered into a ground lease (the “Lease”), whose terms contain confidential and proprietary information. Under the terms of the Lease, Stanford Mart, LP was to pay rent to the Kous, and discharge any liens against the Property for work performed at the Property. On or about November 2005, Cross-Defendants Separzadeh, Shahin S. Zackary, and Said Bral delivered a written guaranty agreement (the “Guaranty”) to the Kus. Under the Guaranty, the cross-defendants were obligated to pay Kou for all amounts owed by Stanford Mart, LP when those amounts became due under the Lease. The cross-defendants breached the Guaranty by failing to pay the rent due under the Lease.

On May 17, 2023, the Kou Family Irrevocable Grantor Trust filed an unlawful detainer action (23STCV10843). On September 14, 2023, the trust filed the operative First Amended Complaint in that case against Stanford Mart L.P. and Does 1 to 100. The unlawful detainer action alleges that Stanford Mart L.P. breached a rental agreement with the Kou Family Irrevocable Grantor Trust by failing to pay rent.  

On July 5, 2023, Mayer Separzadeh (“Separzadeh”) and Stanford Mart, L.P. filed their own lawsuit (23STCV15591) against the Kous, Ming Bin Kou (as Co-Trustee of The Kou Family Irrevocable Grantor Trust, dated March 2022), Ming Shin Kou (as Co-Trustee of The Kou Family Irrevocable Grantor Trust, dated March 2022), and Does 1 to 25, inclusive, asserting the following causes of action: (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of written contract (lease), (3) specific performance, (4) declaratory relief (guaranty), (5) cancellation of instruments-guaranty (Civ. Code, § 3412), and (6) cancellation of instruments-lease (Civ. Code, § 3412).  

The three cases were consolidated on May 8, 2024, and assigned to this Court (Department 45) for all purposes. This case (21STCV17649) was designated as the lead case.

On February 7, 2025, Shu C. Kou (“Mrs. Kou”) filed this motion to bifurcate. Mrs. Kou argues in her motion that the lead case in this consolidated matter (21STCV17649) should be tried first before the other two related matters. Mrs. Kou argues that the lead case should be bifurcated because she and her deceased husband, Mr. Kou, had trial preference, and waiting for certain procedural requirements unique to the Separzadeh case to work out would impede her ability to have trial preference.

Separzadeh filed an opposition to Mrs. Kou’s motion on February 24, 2025. In that opposition, Separzadeh argues that Mrs. Kou’s trial preference claims are moot and superseded by the Court’s 10/18/2024 Order, which required that all discovery obligations be satisfied by all parties before the Court shall set the action for trial. Additionally, Separzadeh argues that a preference order is not a valid reason to bifurcate the trial. Separzadeh also outlines the arguments against bifurcation, as discussed below.

The reply was due by February 28, 2025.

TENTATIVE RULING: DENY

The Court has broad discretion and authority to bifurcate issues at trial. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1048 provides in pertinent part:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any . . . separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 598.)

Bifurcation is “within the discretion of the court […] and the exercise of such discretion will not be interfered with on appeal except when there has been a manifest abuse thereof.” (McLellan v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 353.)

Furthermore, the order of proof at trial is within the trial court’s discretion. (Evid. Code § 320.)

ANALYSIS

Mrs. Kou argues that bifurcation will ensure that she is not prejudiced and that her case is heard in a timely manner in line with the trial preference order. Because her husband, Mr. Kou, is recently deceased, that will mean that that there will be additional procedural issues in the Separzadeh case, where he was a defendant. In the lead case, where the Kous were cross-complainants, Mrs. Kou plans to substitute herself as her husband’s successor in interest.

Because of the additional procedural issues in the Separzadeh case, Mrs. Kou argues that bifurcating the cases would promote efficiency and prevent delays to Mrs. Kou’s right to trial preference.

As a secondary argument, Mrs. Kou argues that because there is an overlap of issues between the two cases, there is no substantial prejudice risked to Separzadeh by bifurcating the cases for trial. However, this argument appears to actually weigh against bifurcation because the substantial overlap in the issues would mean that bifurcating the cases would risk inconsistent rulings and lead to two substantially similar trials, which would not promote judicial efficiency.

As previously noted, Separzadeh opposes the motion to bifurcate on several bases. The first being that the Court’s 10/18/2024 Order now governs trial setting, not the previous trial preference order that Mrs. Kou references in her motion. The 10/18/2024 Order stated that “If, and only if, the Discovery Referee determines all discovery obligations are satisfied by all parties, the Court shall then set the above-entitled action for trial …”. See Tran Dec. Exh. 1 (No. 7 of the Order).” This Order was based on a Stipulation between the parties, and Separzadeh argues that it supersedes the trial preference order. Separzadeh also argues that a preference order is not a valid reason under Code of Civ. Procedure Sections 598 and 1048(b) to bifurcate the trial, but the Court will note that Mrs. Kou was specifically arguing that she would be prejudiced if the trial preference order is not followed. Prejudice is a valid reason to bifurcate under Section 1048(b).

Next, Separzadeh argues that the Court has already found and ruled that substantial prejudice to the parties would result if the two cases are tried separately. Specifically, Separzadeh is referring to the 4/29/2024 and 5/8/2024 Orders that consolidated the related cases. Based on these Orders and the risk of inconsistent rulings and judgments should the cases be tried separately, Separzadeh argues that they should be tried together.

Separzadeh also argues that forcing Separzadeh and Stanford Mart to present two substantially identical trials would result in extreme prejudice to them. First, there would be a duplication of evidence and testimony because the evidence and testimony would be virtually identical across the claims. Next, there is a risk of inconsistent rulings should the cases be bifurcated, and that was one of the reasons why they were consolidated in the first place. Third, there would be a significant increase in litigation costs and delays should there be two trials. Fourth, Separzadeh argues that there would be jury or bench confusion if the two matters are bifurcated.

Finally, Separzadeh argues that there are no requests or orders to set aside the orders consolidating the three actions, nor was there any evidence submitted in support of Mrs. Kou’s motion to bifurcate.

Based on the arguments submitted by the parties, the Court does not find that bifurcation would support the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation. In fact, bifurcation would actually inconvenience witnesses due to those witnesses having to appear for multiple trials, and it would not promote judicial efficiency to bifurcate the matters. The cases were consolidated because of the substantial similarity in the issues, and they should be tried together for that reason.

The court notes a further procedural obstacle to the current motion.  Mr. Kou is not currently represented in this action either by a personal representative or a successor-in-interest.  The court does not believe Ms. Kou can request any relief on the cross-complaint until that substitution has occurred.

Accordingly, Mrs. Kou’s motion to bifurcate is DENIED.