Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22STCV30804, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV30804    Hearing Date: February 25, 2025    Dept: 45

IAN SAWREY V. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

 

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

 

Date of Hearing:          02/25/25                                 Trial Date:       05/19/25

Department:               45                                            Case No.:         21STCV10123

 

Moving Party:             Plaintiffs Ian Sawrey et al. all cases consolidated under LASC Case No. 22STCV30804

 

Responding Party:       Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiffs Ian Sawrey, John Doe 7067, James Bunch, and Dion Nizzi (collectively, “Moving Plaintiffs”) were allegedly sexually assaulted by their teacher, Defendant Gary Paul Letherer (“Letherer”), while they were minor students enrolled at Toland Way Elementary School within Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) from approximately 1973 to 1977. Plaintiff G.M. was also allegedly sexually assaulted by Letherer from approximately 1971-1973 at Toland Way Elementary School.

 

The first of the Moving Plaintiffs, Ian Sawrey initiated his lawsuit on September 20, 2022, in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The case was assigned for all purposes to Judge Theresa Traber in Department 47. On December 30, 2022, the Court issued an Order of Related Cases for the Sawrey action, the John Doe 7067 Action (No. 22STCV35391), and the James Eric Bunch, et al. Action (No. 22STCV39153). All three cases were transferred to Judge Theresa Traber in Department 47 for all purposes. On November 14, 2023, all three cases were consolidated for all purposes including trial. On June 7, 20254, the Court found that the following cases, 21STCV10123 and 22STCV30804, are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). 21STCV10123 is the lead case. For good cause shown, said cases are assigned to Judge Mel Red Recana in Department 45 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse for all purposes. (06/07/24 Minute Order.) As of January 3, 2025, the case was reassigned to Judge Virginia Keeny.  

 

Plaintiff G.M. filed his action on March 15, 2021. The case was initially assigned to

the Personal Injury (PI) Court. On July 28, 2022, the case was reassigned to an independent calendar court, for all purposes, to Judge Mel Red Recana in Department 45. On June 18, 2024, the Court set the current trial date of May 19, 2025. On May 20, 2024, Moving Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case with regard to Plaintiff G.M.’s case, and on May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Related Case with regard to Moving Plaintiffs’ consolidated case. On June 7, 2024, this Court found the cases related with Plaintiff G.M.’s case deemed the lead case. Accordingly, the Moving Plaintiffs’ case was reassigned

to Judge Mel Red Recana in Department 45 for all purposes.

 

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking the consolidation of Ian Sawrey v. LAUSD et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV30804 (filed September 20,

2022) (previously consolidated with John Doe 7067 v. LAUSD, et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV35391 (filed November 4, 2022), and James Eric Bunch, et al. v. DOE 1, et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV39153 (filed December 16, 2022)); and G.M. v. LAUSD, LASC Case No. 21STCV10123.

 

On February 10, 2025, Defendant LAUSD filed an opposition.

 

On February 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

 

[Tentative] Ruling

 

The Court GRANTS the Motion to Consolidate.

 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Section 1048(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits consolidation of separate cases

involving common questions of law and fact that are pending before the same court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(a).)¿ “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(a).)¿

 

The purpose of consolidation is to enhance trial court efficiency and to avoid inconsistent adjudications. (See Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, supra, 48 Cal App.4th at 978- 979.) The Court may consolidate actions in its sole discretion as long as: (1) there are common questions of law and fact; (2) economy and convenience would be served by a joint trial; and (3) there is no prejudice to a substantial right. (See Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 861, 867; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300, subd. (a) [defining related cases as involving “the same parties and are based on the same or similar claims;” arising “from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact;” or “[a]re likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.”].) The decision to grant or deny a motion to consolidate rests solely in the sound discretion of the Court. (Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d, 509, 511.)

 

ANALYSIS

 

Parties’ Arguments


Plaintiffs argue that consolidation is appropriate because both cases involve the alleged sexual assault of minors, all students of LAUSD at Toland Way Elementary School in a similar manner, over the same time period of 1971 to 1977, by the same perpetrator, LAUSD’s employee and teacher Gary Paul Letherer. (Mot. to Consolidate at p. 12.) Moreover, all cases assert the same causes of action of negligence and negligent supervision and retention of Letherer against Defendant LAUSD. (Id. at p.13.) Also, all cases are before the same judge after being ordered related, therefore, consolidation would enhance trial efficiency, avoid inconsistent ruling, and advance the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants will not suffer prejudice due to consolidation because the cases involve nearly identical legal issues as to institutional liability, common questions of fact, same witnesses, and evidence. (Id. at p. 14.)

 

In opposition, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ claims present some commonalities, including the same defendant, same alleged perpetrator, and modus operandi. (Opp. at p.1.) However, Defendant also argues that each Plaintiff has a distinct legal action involving individualized issues bearing on liability, causation, and damages. (Id.) Specifically, Defendant argues that no evidence exists that the sexual abuse of

each plaintiff by Letherer overlaps, or that each plaintiff was sexually abused at the same time or on the same occasion by Letherer. (Id. at p.5.) Moreover, the alleged sexual abuse in each case occurred at different times, on separate occasions, during different school years spanning a 6-year period. (Id.) Defendant further argues that consolidation would prejudice LAUSD because Plaintiffs’ testimony—of sexual assault committed against minors—will undoubtedly be emotionally persuasive to the jury and the jury will be confused as to notice issues as to each Plaintiff. (Id. at p.8.) LAUSD further argues that a combined trial would cause a jury to award higher damages than supported by evidence and allow Plaintiffs to enter inadmissible evidence. (Id. at p.9.) LAUSD requests that all five cases should be severed and adjudicated separately. (Id. at p. 10.)

 

In reply, Plaintiffs reiterates that all cases share common questions of law and fact, which permits consolidation of the separate cases. (Reply at p.2.) Plaintiffs further note that LAUSD’s contention that consolidation will increase the potential to confuse the jury on issues of damages can be easily addressed through motions in limine and/or instructions to the jury. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that LAUSD’s concern regarding the admissibility of evidence can also be easily addressed through motions in limine and/or limiting instructions to the jury. (Id.)

 

Common Questions of Law and Fact

 

There are common questions of law and fact between all cases. Moving Plaintiffs were allegedly sexually assaulted by their teacher, Defendant Letherer, while they were minor students enrolled at Toland Way Elementary School within Defendant LAUSD from approximately 1973 to 1977. (Sawrey First Amended Complaint 22STCV30804 at ¶¶ 1,3, 20; Doe 7067 First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1,5,13-49; Bunch First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2,7,14-49.) Plaintiff G.M. was also sexually assaulted by Letherer from approximately 1971-1973 at Toland Way Elementary School. (G.M. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1,3-4,9-24.) Moreover, all cases assert the same causes of action of negligence and negligent supervision and retention against Defendant LAUSD. (Phan Decl. ¶ 7.) Although the Court notes that the alleged abuse took place from a span of six years, all of the claims against LAUSD arise from the same related transaction, which was the negligent hiring and supervision of Leatherer.

 

The Court finds Moe v. Anderson instructive even though joinder was disputed rather than consolidation. (Moe v. Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826, 835-836.) In Moe, the Court of Appeals held that although the lawsuit arose from separate incidents of sexual assault as to the alleged perpetrator, the claims arose from the same series of transactions or occurrences which was the negligent hiring and supervision as to the defendant employer. (Id. at 828) Here, LAUSD is the defendant employer who hired Letherer during the alleged sexual assaults and therefore all cases relate to the same series of transactions or occurrences.

 

Therefore, there are common questions of law and fact between all cases.

 

Economy and Convenience by Joint Trial

 

Consolidation will conserve judicial resources by having one trial which will limit duplicative testimony, pretrial proceedings, and preparation for trial. For instance, this Court has already set these cases for trial on the same date, May 19, 2025. Furthermore, while LAUSD declined to stipulate to consolidation for trial, it has stipulated to consolidate for discovery, reflecting the substantial overlap of these cases and the efficiency gained by treating them alike at least for discovery. (Phan Decl. ¶ 9.)

 

No Prejudice to a Substantial Right

 

LAUSD failed to show prejudice to a substantial right because its arguments are purely speculative. For instance, LAUSD states “[i]f a jury is allowed to see all five cases and finds LAUSD at fault on one case, the jury may feel compelled to provide an award to all five plaintiffs out of sympathy, unsupported by the evidence.” (emphasis added.) (Opp. at p. 10.) LAUSD also argues “in a combined trial, the jury may be tempted to award higher damages than supported by the evidence.” (emphasis added.) (Id. at p. 9.) LAUSD further argues “[t]here is no way to avoid the extensive confusion and undue prejudice that would result, to the detriment of LAUSD. Given the anticipated manner in which Plaintiffs’ counsel will try the case, the jury is unlikely to understand discrete notice issues or even care what LAUSD did or didn’t do in any specific year in conjunction with each of the individuals plaintiff’s claims.” (emphasis added.) (Id. at p. 8.) The Court notes that these arguments are conclusory and speculative.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Court GRANTS the Motion to Consolidate.