Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22STCV31454, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV31454    Hearing Date: February 11, 2025    Dept: 45

JANE DOE W.E.S. V. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL, ET AL.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Date of Hearing:         February 11, 2025                   Trial Date:       May 4, 2026  

Department:               45                                            Case No.:         22STCV31454

Moving Party:             Defendant Los Angles Unified School District

Responding Party:       Plaintiff Jane Doe W.E.S.

Meet and Confer:       Yes. (Barr Decl. ¶ 4-6, Ex. B.)

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an allegation of childhood sexual abuse dating back to 1977 or 1978. Plaintiff Jane Doe W.E.S. (“Doe”) alleges she was in tenth grade when she was assaulted by her Biology teacher, Frank Ezykowski, at Birmingham High school, a charter school within the Los Angeles Unified School District. Plaintiff filed the original complaint on September 26, 2022, against Defendant LAUSD and defendant Birmingham Community Charter High pursuant to AB 218’s revival of the statute of limitations through Government Code § 905(m).

Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on November 9, 2022, alleging:

1)         Childhood Sexual Assault

2)         Sexual Battery

3)         Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

4)         Negligence

5)         Negligent Hiring, Retention, & Supervision of Unfit Employee

6)         Negligent Supervision of a Minor

7)         Negligent Failure to Warn, Trait, & Educate

Defendant LAUSD then filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on April 4, 2024. On January 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition and request for judicial notice. Defendant then filed a Reply and Objections to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice on February 4, 2025.

[TENTATIVE] RULING:

1.      Defendant LAUSD’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff requests this court take judicial notice of Exhibits 1-66 which consist primarily of minute orders, notices of rulings and other court records from other cases. Plaintiff also requests judicial notice be taken of relevant assembly floor analysis records. Defendant objects to Exhibits 10-66, arguing the records contain immaterial holdings from Superior Court cases. The Court concurs.

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-9 and sustains Defendant’s objections with respect to Exhibits 10-66, finding they are indeed records from non-binding superior court cases.

LEGAL STANDARD

The objection that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is normally raised at an early stage in the proceedings by a general demurrer.  However, a general demurrer is not the only procedural device available for this purpose, and it is possible to raise the objection more than once by different methods. The most common alternative method is a motion at the trial, or prior to trial, for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to CCP section 438(c)(1)(B).

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.)

ANALYSIS

Moving Papers

Defendant LAUSD argues that Plaintiff’s operative FAC is barred because AB 218 violates the California Constitution by (1) retroactively eliminating the claims-presentation requirement, improperly creating an “improper gift of public funds” contrary to Article XVI, section 6; and (2) violating a defendant’s right to due process rights, per Chambers v. Gallagher (1918) 177 Cal. 704. The Court further notes, as does Defendant, that at the time Defendant filed this motion, Defendant raised pure issues of law that had yet to be decided by California appellate courts. As Plaintiff argues on Opposition, however, Contra Costa was subsequently decided in August 2024 at the appellate level, specifically resolving this question of law. (See West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243.)

Gift of Improper Public Funds

Defendant argues that a predicate for the filing of the underlying childhood abuse action is that Plaintiff submit a Government Code claim when the incident allegedly occurred—1977. Plaintiff did not submit such claim and Defendant now argues that AB 218 violates the California Constitution in attempting to exempt Plaintiff from the pleading requirements of the Government Claims Act because an essential element of a cause of action against a public entity is establishing the underlying claim was timely presented for money or damages to a public entity.  (Mot., pg. 10.) Defendant argues:

Claims for personal injury damages normally must be presented within six months after accrual, although claims of a minor must be presented within one year. (Gov. Code, §§ 911.2, 911.4.) The timing provisions of the Act for presentations of claims are akin to a statute of limitations, but are not statute of limitations, and instead is a “claim presentation deadline.” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209, as modified.) Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against a public entity and, thus, an element of the cause of action. (Ibid.)

(Mot., pg. 10.)

Thus, Defendant contends that AB 218 effectively attempts to circumvent the sovereign immunity conferred by the Government Claims Act and creates liability, where no liability existed before. As such, Defendant argues AB 218 contravenes the California Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman, which stated that “the legislature has no power to create a liability against the state for any [] past act of negligence” and that the imposition of liability for a “past act of negligence” “would, in effect, would be the making of a gift.”  (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517 [emphasis added]); see also Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 328.)

On Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the applicable waiver of the claim presentation requirement in Plaintiff’s FAC does not violate the California Constitution. Like Defendant, Plaintiff also cites Chapman but argues Chapman favors Plaintiff’s position:

The fact that the state is not subject to an action on behalf of a citizen does not establish that he has no claim against the state, or that no liability exists from the state to him. It only shows that he cannot enforce against the state his claim, and make it answer in a court of law for its liability. What is made out by this objection is not that there is no liability and no claim, but that there is no remedy. (Chapman, 104 Cal. at p. 696 (emphasis added).)

(Opp., pg. 11.)

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that in Contra Costa, the district also raised constitutionality challenges on the basis plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act when she was sexually assaulted by her guidance counselor from 1979 to 1983 and failed to present her claim to the District within six months of the date of her last assault. (West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243.) Then, in December 2023, the district filed a petition in the Court of Appeal seeking issuance of a writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Contra Costa County to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. On July 31, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its decision, denying the district’s request for a writ of mandate, and wholly rejecting the districts arguments AB 218 was an unconstitutional gift of public funds. (Id. at p. 1243) Relying on the decision in Chapman, the Court concluded there was no gift clause violation if liability existed when the alleged misconduct occurred and finding, “the liability of the state accrued at the time of its [contractual] breach.” (Id; quoting Chapman, supra, at p. 696, 38 P.457.) Under the GCA, the claims presentation requirement is not part of the District’s substantive liability, so retroactive waiver of the requirement does not “create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” (Id. at p. 1243; quoting Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696, 38 P. 457.) Thus, the Contra Costa court rejected the argument the statute created any new liability.

Plaintiff further asserts that even if AB 218 did constitute the allocation of money for a claim where no liability previously existed (gift), the legislature is free to enact such laws for the goal of advancing a public purpose. (Opp., pg. 15.) In this case, AB 218 promotes California’s strong interest in protecting victims of childhood sexual abuse and affording access to such victims to recover damages against those responsible for the abuse—which is at the core of AB 218. (See Coats, supra, 46 Cal. App. 5th at p. 430 [Court highlighted that throughout the many amendments to Section 340.1, “the Legislature has consistently worked to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation from the responsible parties, on several occasions in direct response to restrictive judicial opinions.”].)

On Reply, Defendant reiterates its prior arguments and also argues that it disagrees with the Contra Costa Court’s decision and reasoning: “[T]he Court’s ruling in that case contravenes Supreme Court precedent; simply put, it was wrongly decided and should not be followed here.” (Reply, pg. 9.)

In this case, the Court finds that Contra Costa is precisely on point. Thus, this Court is bound by Contra Costa’s findings that applying AB 218 does not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. Furthermore, AB 218 does promote a public purpose in California by permitting plaintiffs access to justice in cases of childhood sexual abuse and attempting to deter such future conduct.

Thus, this Court finds Defendant’s argument—that AB 218 confers an unconstitutional gift of public funds—fails to support Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Due Process

Defendant argues that in Chambers v. Gallagher (1918) 177 Cal.704, the California Supreme Court held that the state controller that sought to collect an inheritance tax under a revived statute of limitations violated the due process clause of the California Constitution (Id. at 708.) Defendant does acknowledge that the US Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion in construing the due process clause. (Mot., pg. 18.) In Opposition, Plaintiff again cites to Contra Costa. This Court again agrees that West Contra Costa is factually on point and that it is, therefore, appropriate to apply its analysis to Defendant’s instant due process argument. Thus, Defendant’s argument is refuted by binding authority.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC raises no due process concerns.

CONCLUSION