Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV00533, Date: 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22VECV00533    Hearing Date: January 10, 2023    Dept: W

bo bennike, et al. V. jmf development, et al. 

 

demurrer and motion to strike Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

 

Date of Hearing:          January 10, 2023                     Trial Date:        

Department:               W                                             Case No.:          22VECV00533

 

Moving Party:              Defendants, JMF Development LLC and JMF Enterprises II LLC

Responding Party:        None

 

BACKGROUND 

 

Plaintiffs Bo Bennike and Shania Warren-Bennike (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that they were tenants of the property located at 13951 Moorpark St., Sherman Oaks, CA, 91423 (the “Subject Property”), owned and operated by Defendants JMF Development LLC and JMF Enterprises II LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). As tenants of Subject Property, they were forced to live under uninhabitable conditions. They allege that the subject property suffered a major sewage leak that resulted in the stench of sewage for several months. At one point there was toxic black mold in the apartment. During the remediation to address the mold problem, their apartment had no heat for seven days during the winter. There was a water leak in Plaintiffs’ unit due to faulty dishwasher, and Defendants had to remove the floor and wall from the kitchen. The also allege that the security gates don’t close and make excessive noise, the hardwood floors were improperly installed and cause excessive noise, as does the elevator. Plaintiffs claim they have complained about these defects, but Defendants ignored their complaints and subjected them to harassment.

 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 14, 2022. The FAC was filed on July 28, 2022. On September 9, 2022, Defendants filed a demurrer as to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and a motion to strike as to the claims for punitive damages. On October 13, 2022, the Court overruled Defendants’ demurrer and granted the motion to strike with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging: (1) Negligence, (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Intentional Violation of Statutory Duty to Maintain Habitable Conditions, (4) Negligent Violation of Statutory Duty to Maintain Habitable Conditions, (5) Breach of Contract, (6) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (7) Nuisance, and (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 

On November 28, 2022, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. As of January 5, 2022, there has been no opposition filed.  

 

Defendants demur to the eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that the SAC fails to state sufficient facts to support the cause of action and the cause of action is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. (The court notes that there are only eight causes of action, but the last cause for IIED is sometime referred to as the eighth and sometimes as the ninth cause of action. The court will refer to it as the eighth cause of action in this decision.)

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING 

 

1.      Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action for IIED is overruled.

2.      Defendants’ motion to strike is granted, without leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 

Demurrer

 

 A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)  A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.) 

 

Motion to Strike

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

 

ANALYSIS 

 

Meet and Confer

 

Defendants have filed a declaration showing an attempt to meet and confer. (Buddingh Decl. ¶ 2). Defense counsel states that parties met and conferred via email about issues on November 21, 2022; however, the parties could not come to an agreement. (Buddingh Decl. ¶ 2.)

 

Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement.

Demurrer – Eighth Cause of Action – IIED

 

The Court previously overruled Defendants’ demurrer as to the IIED cause of action on October 13, 2022.

 

Case law is split on whether a defendant may properly demur to the amended complaint on grounds overruled in the prior demurrer. At lease one case holds such demurrers are improper because the court is “foreclosed from rendering a new determination on the viability of those claims” absent a timely motion for reconsideration under CCP § 1008.” (Bennett v. Suncloud (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 91, 96-97.) However, other courts have allowed demurrers to amended pleadings on grounds previously overruled. (See Pacific States Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Coachella (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) Due to this split, the Court will consider Defendants’ demurrer.

 

However, the Court finds that Defendants’ demurrer largely repeats the same arguments in the previous demurrer, and thus has the same deficiencies.

 

Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the Plaintiff to show “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160). Conduct is considered outrageous when it “is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” (Id.)

 

Defendants argue that the cause of action for IIED fails because the SAC “makes contradictory general allegations that Defendants failed to address their concerns, when earlier and more specific allegations plead the contrary.” (Demurrer 6: 18-19.) In addition, Defendants argue that there are no specific facts indicating that Defendants engaged in any willful or intentional conduct.

 

Outrageous Conduct

 

For conduct to be outrageous it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (See Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 130.) Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” (Id.)

 

Defendants argue that the conduct alleged is not outrageous. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Plaintiffs informed Defendants of various conditions that needed to be repaired and that in response to those complaints, Defendants made repairs. (SAC ¶ 16 [hired company to clean up raw sewage], ¶ 23 [hired mold remediation specialists], ¶ 29 [replaced floorboards], and ¶ 33 [removed floor and wall of kitchen].) While it is true that some of the allegations in the complaint do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct (e.g., a noisy elevator or squeaky security gate), many of the allegations are of far more serious conditions. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew of leaking sewage but allowed the condition to continue unabated for months, despite the obvious health and safety issues posed; that defendants allowed the allegedly toxic mold to remain unabated for a lengthy period; and when remediating it, forced plaintiffs to live without heat for a week during the winter months; that defendants undertook repairs in such a manner that they allowed vermin infestations and other health issues. (SAC ¶ 99.) A jury could find that such conduct, if proven, was outrageous and not to be tolerated in a civilized society.

 

Intentional Conduct

 

For an IIED, the complaint must allege that the defendant intended to cause emotional distress. (Yau, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pg. 160.) “The tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conduct -- conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 210, citing to Spackman v. Good (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 518, 530 [“Where the offensive conduct was not undertaken for the purpose of causing the harm received proof of the intent of the actor to cause such harm, in substance, may be supplied by proof of circumstances showing the conduct was of that nature which reasonably should have been recognized as likely to cause the harm sustained.”].) This requirement is also satisfied where defendant is aware of plaintiff’s presence and commits outrageous acts with reckless disregard of the probability that those acts will cause plaintiff severe emotional distress. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001-1002.)

 

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege any specific facts that their actions were intentional or reckless. (Demurrer 7:20-21.) Plaintiffs have adequately alleged at least reckless disregard for the natural consequences of their action and inaction. Plaintiffs allege various serious problems with the property that are likely to cause health issues, e.g. water intrusion, black mold, sewage leakage. They allege that Defendants should have known about the health effects of the exposure to these problems, and that they intentionally failed to address these serious and dangerous conditions. (Compl. ¶ 93, 99.) This is sufficient at this stage to at least show reckless disregard for the natural consequences of their inaction.

 

 

Severe or Extreme Emotional Distress

 

Although emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was severe and not trivial or transient.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376.) Such distress must be “of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.)

 

Defendants argue that the complaint does not allege any facts that would constitute severe or extreme emotional distress. The court disagrees. Plaintiffs have alleged that plaintiffs suffered sleeplessness, worry, fear, discomfort, and that their health deteriorated due to the mold, water intrusion, and the stench of sewage. (SAC ¶ 93, 97.) These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for IIED.

 

Inconsistent claims

 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s IIED cause of action should be overruled because their claims are inconsistent. They state that the allegation that the SAC allegation that “Starting in 12/2/21, and periodically thereafter, Plaintiffs informed Defendants about the water intrusion, moisture concerns, the existence of mold, the stench of sewage at the Property and other health, safety, and nuisance concerns regarding the Property” (SAC ¶ 91) is inconsistent because Plaintiffs allege also that “in early January 2022, Plaintiffs smelled strong foul odors throughout their unit” (SAC ¶ 18) and “In January 2022, there was a major sewage leak at the Property’s main sewage line.” (SAC ¶ 15.)

 

Although it is unclear what Plaintiffs had complained about starting in December of 2021 because the rest of the problems seem to have been brought to Plaintiffs attention in early 2022, this inconsistency does not render this cause of action insufficient. Plaintiff still has sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct, intentional actions, and severe emotional distress.

Defendants’ demurrer is overruled. 

Defendant’s Motion to Strike – Punitive Damages  

 

Defendants move to strike paragraph 99 of the complaint and the prayer for punitive damages. The Court previously granted the motion to strike as to these punitive damages allegations. The court agrees that plaintiffs have again failed to adequately allege a claim for punitive damages.

 

The SAC provides the additional allegation that “Starting in 12/2/21, and periodically thereafter, Plaintiffs informed Defendants property managers about the water intrusion, moisture concerns, the existence of mold, the stench of sewage at The Property and other health, safety and nuisance concerns regarding the Property. Plaintiffs complained to Defendants property managers that the condition of the Property displaced them from their home and caused them to suffer emotional and physical damages. Defendants had the means to remedy to issues that caused harm to Plaintiffs but intentionally failed to do so. Instead of remediating the issues at the Property, Defendant’s property managers harassed the Plaintiffs. The conduct alleged herein warrants an award of punitive damages because Defendants’ conduct was willful, malicious and oppressive.” (SAC ¶ 99.)

 

Defendants move to strike paragraph 99 of the complaint and the prayer for punitive damages. The court agrees that plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege a claim for punitive damages. Although the conduct alleged is sufficient to support a finding of “malice, oppression or fraud,” as required for punitive damages, the SAC only states that the Plaintiffs complained to the property managers about the conditions of the property. The SAC fails to identify or allege that the required advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud or malice was undertaken by an officer, director or managing agent of the corporate defendants.

 

Plaintiffs have filed no opposition to this motion to strike.

 

Because the court has already given Plaintiffs leave to amend to remedy this deficiency and they have failed to do so, the court does not grant leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION 

 

Defendants’ Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.