Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV00712, Date: 2023-02-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22VECV00712 Hearing Date: February 24, 2023 Dept: W
USB LEASING LT
V. BENJAMIN GABAYAN, et al.
plaintiff’s motion to strike
memorandum of costs
Date of Hearing: February
24, 2023 Trial
Date: None
set.
Department: W Case No.: 22VECV00712
Moving Party: Plaintiff USB Leasing LT
Responding Party: Defendant
Benjamin Gabayan
BACKGROUND
This action
arises from Defendants’ alleged repair and storage of a 2019 Range Rover (“the
vehicle”). Plaintiff claims to be the lienholder and legal owner of the
vehicle. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have been in possession of the vehicle
since January 2022. On April 22, 2022, Plaintiff called Star Motors to negotiate
for the release of the Vehicle and learned that the Vehicle was still located
at Star Motors’s body shop location. Plaintiff then briefly chronicles its
efforts to contact “Defendants’ employee … who handles impounds” and how Star
Motors has not provided any invoices or authorizations to substantiate any
costs related to the release of the Vehicle despite Plaintiff’s demand for
them.
Plaintiff has
sued Benjamin Gabayan, and individual, and B&F Paradise, Inc. d/b/a Star
Motors (“Star Motors”). Plaintiff alleges Star Motors operates as an alter ego
to Gabayan for the purposes of its complaint. Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint on October 28, 2022 alleging seven causes of action against the
defendants: for (1) claim and delivery; (2) violation of Civil Code section
3068; (3) violation of Vehicle Code section 10652.5; (4) violation of Civil
Code section 3071; (5) violation of Vehicle Code section 22651.07; (6)
conversion; and (7) declaratory relief (as to only the corporate defendant).
Plaintiff did not name Benjamin Gabayan in the First Amended Complaint.
[Tentative] Ruling
Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike Memorandum of Costs is DENIED.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff USB Leasing LT moves to
strike Defendant Benjamin Gabayan’s Memorandum of Costs filed November 2, 2022
on the grounds his request is not ripe and is not supported by law.
“A prevailing party who claims costs
must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of
mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code
of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of
entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment,
whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of
the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the
items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (CRC Rule
3.1700(a)(1).)“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served
and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum
was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil
Procedure section 1013.” (CRC Rule 3.1700(b)(1)).)
Plaintiff argues in this case, the
clerk has not entered a dismissal or judgment and therefore, Defendant Gabayan
is not a prevailing party. The court disagrees. As noted by Mr. Gabayan, the
operative first amended complaint operates as a dismissal in favor of him. (See
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142 holding “It has long been the rule that an amended
complaint that omits defendants named in the original complaint operates as a
dismissal as to them.”) Because Plaintiff’s first amended complaint effectively
dismissed Mr. Gabayan, Mr. Gabayan may be deemed a prevailing party entitled to
certain costs. Plaintiff did not need to also request dismissal of Mr. Gabayan
by the clerk as Code of Civil Procedure section 581 “is neither exclusive nor
mandatory.” (Ibid.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4)
provides that a “prevailing party” includes a defendant in whose favor a
dismissal is entered. Because Mr. Gabayan has been dismissed from the
proceeding, he is deemed the prevailing party. The court notes this is not an
action based on Civil Code section 1717 and therefore, the fact that this may
be a voluntary dismissal does not preclude the finding that Mr. Gabayan is a
prevailing party. (“Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed
pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for
purposes of [Civil Code section 1717].” (Civ. Code, § 1717(b)(2); see Shapira
v. Lifetech Resources, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 429, 441 (“A trial court
lacks discretion to award fees under section 1717(b)(2) where a case has been
voluntarily dismissed.”); see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th
599, 615.)
Plaintiff also argues the costs in this
case up to this point were shared by all defendants listed on the original
complaint and Defendant Gabayan has not submitted any proof he solely bared the
costs for this case.
In reply, Mr. Gabayan argues all
services rendered in this matter were billed half to Mr. Gabayan and half to Star
Motors, except for the demurrer, motion to strike and instant memorandum of
costs. Counsel for Mr. Gabayan breaks down what work was done on the demurrer
and motion to strike for Mr. Gabayan and what was done for Star Motors,
claiming he spent 8.25 hours defending solely Mr. Gabayan in this matter. (Omrani
Decl. ¶¶6-8.)
The court finds Mr. Gabayan is entitled
to the maximum $1,750 attorney fees each for Civil Code section 3068 and
Vehicle Code 10652.5. Each provide that “the prevailing party shall be entitled
to reasonable attorney's fees, not to exceed one thousand seven hundred fifty
dollars ($1,750). The recovery of those fees is in addition to any other right,
remedy, or cause of action of that party.” (See Civ. Code §3068(c); Veh. Code
§10652.5(c).)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Memorandum of Costs is DENIED.