Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV00917, Date: 2022-10-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22VECV00917    Hearing Date: October 28, 2022    Dept: W

Raul Aguila, et al. v. hunt properties inc.,  et al.,

 

demurrer

 

Date of Hearing:          October 28, 2022                    Trial Date: None set.  

Department:               W                                             Case No.: 22VECV00917        

 

Moving Party: Cross-Defendant Raul Aguila and Orley Onofre        

Responding Party: None.       

 

BACKGROUND

 

Hunt Properties, Inc. (“Hunt”) is the owner of the commercial real property located at 7108 De Soto Avenue in Canoga Park, California (“Subject Property”).  Henry Becker (“Becker”) is a manager and/or employee of Hunt.  Since about 2015, Raul Aguila (“Aguila”) was a tenant of the Subject Property.  Orley Onofre (“Onofre”) is an employee of Aguila.  Aguila and Onofre (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), allege, beginning in January of 2022, Becker has engaged in pattern of racist and harassing behavior in an effort to drive-out Plaintiffs from the Subject Property, and force Plaintiffs to terminate the governing lease agreement.  Becker’s harassment included physical harassment, and verbal harassment.  Plaintiffs made clear they refused to vacate the Subject Property despite Becker’s harassing behavior, Becker then served Plaintiffs with a 30-day Notice to Quit, notifying Plaintiffs the tenancy had ended and Plaintiffs would be required to vacate the Subject Property within thirty days.  Plaintiffs allege Hunt’s employment and failure to properly train Becker constitutes negligence.  Plaintiffs further allege Becker’s conduct caused Plaintiffs’ emotional distress. 

 

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiffs initiated the present action by filing a Complaint against Hunt and Becker.  Plaintiffs allege causes of action for: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Retention and Supervision; (3) Threats of Violence in Violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.7(B); and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

  

On September 8, 2022, Becker (hereinafter “Defendant”) filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff alleging causes of action for: (1) Nuisance; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligence. 

 

Plaintiffs Demur to Defendant’s Cross-Complaint.  Defendant did not file any opposition.

 

[Tentative] Ruling

 

Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s nuisance cause of action is OVERRULED.

 

Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s IIED and Negligence causes of action are SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)  “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”  (Hahnsupra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Plaintiffs demur to all of the causes of action in the Cross-Complaint.

 

Nuisance

 

Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of property may amount to a nuisance, so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable.  (See Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302; see also Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.) 

 

“The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.”  (Friends of H Street v. City of Sacramento (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 152, 160.)  Thus, to allege a cause of action for private nuisance, the plaintiff must allege injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his land.  (See Adams v. MHC Colony Park Limited Partnership (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 610.) 

 

Whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable is a question of fact requiring determination of all the circumstances of the case.  (See Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 263-64.)  

 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant fails to allege facts showing interference that is substantial and unreasonable.

 

The Cross-Complaint alleges in relevant that Plaintiffs made disruptive noise between midnight and 5:00 a.m., including banging on the walls connected with Defendant’s unit, and smoked cigarettes in the common areas.  (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 28-29.)

 

Here, the Court finds that making disruptive noises between midnight and 5:00 a.m., which included banging on walls, would be substantial and unreasonable.  Whether in fact it occurred and was substantial and unreasonable is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact and not at the demurrer stage.  While the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant failed to allege the specific facts constituting a nuisance under the allegations for this specific cause of action, looking at all of the allegations in the Cross-Complaint as a whole, the Court finds that Defendant has stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

 

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ contention that this cause of action is duplicative of Defendant’s negligence cause of action is misguided, as, is discussed below, Defendant failed to set forth the basic elements to establish a cause of action for negligence.

 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s nuisance cause of action is OVERRULED.

 

IIED

 

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.  (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’”  (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).)¿¿ 

 

Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.”  (McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372.)¿¿ 

¿

“[I]t is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.”  (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)  “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  (Id.)  While there is no bright-line as to what constitutes outrageous conduct and thus this involves a case-by-case analysis, courts can determine whether conduct was sufficiently outrageous at the demurrer stage.  (Id. at 494.)¿ 

“Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.”  (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004.)¿¿ 

 

Plaintiffs contends that Defendant failed to allege facts to show that they intended to injure Defendant, and allege facts to show outrageous conduct.  The Court agrees.

 

A review of the Cross-Complaint reveals that Defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Plaintiffs intended or acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress.

 

In addition to the facts alleged above, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs were connected to multiple crimes at the Subject Property, created tortious acts against Defendant, Plaintiffs were served with subpoenas for crimes committed at the Subject Property, Aguila has been in prison and reprimanded for tax fraud, Defendant has over 60 notices related to Plaintiffs’ tortious acts, Plaintiffs have invited guests to the Subject Property to threaten and intimidate Defendant, Plaintiffs left the air conditioning and lights on and caused financial damage to Defendant, and Plaintiffs filed false police report.  (Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 6-31.)

 

Here, some of the allegations included by Defendant do not relate to Plaintiffs acts against Defendant, but relate to their acts against other persons.  In addition, Defendant’s conclusory allegations that Plaintiffs committed tortious acts against Defendant is insufficient to establish that they engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.  Furthermore, Defendant fails to allege that he suffered emotional distress.

 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s IIED cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Negligence

 

The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)¿¿ 

 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to allege what duty they owed him, that there was a breach of that duty, and that they caused Defendant’s injury.

 

Defendant’s allegations reveals that Defendant simply alleges that Plaintiffs “for years, has been put on notice with complete disrespect for any building rules or regulations, cross-defendant has lost tenant income, customers.”  (Cross-Compl., ¶ 42.)  In addition, Defendant alleged that as a result of Plaintiffs “negligence,” he suffered financial damages.  (Id. at ¶ 43.)

 

Defendant’s Cross-Complaint reveals that Defendant failed to allege the duty that Plaintiffs’ owed him, that they breached that duty, and that as a result of breaching that duty they caused Defendant’s injuries.

 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s Negligence cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s nuisance cause of action is OVERRULED.

 

Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s IIED and Negligence causes of action are SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.