Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV01224, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22VECV01224 Hearing Date: October 13, 2022 Dept: W
leonid
kamenetsky, et al. v. easy financial, llc., et al.
application for preliminary injunction
Date
of Hearing: October
13, 2022 Trial
Date: None set.
Department: W Case
No.: 22VECV01224
Moving Party: Plaintiffs
Leonid Kamenetsky; Friar Street Property, LLC; 14554 Friar, LLC.;
et al. Responding Party: Defendants
Easy Financial, LLC; Easy Realty and Loan, Inc.
BACKGROUND
This is a dispute
over a mortgage and a subsequent settlement agreement regarding the mortgage. Defendants
have foreclosed on a commercial property owned by Plaintiffs. On August 25,
2022, Plaintiffs Leonid Kamenetsky, Tanya Kurlyand,
Friar Street Property, LLC, and 14554 Friar, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) filed
their complaint against Defendants Easy Financial, LLC, Sunset Equity Group,
Easy Reality and Loan, Inc., Sunset Equity Funding, Benjamin Donel, Best
Alliance Foreclosure and Lien Services Corp., and Does 1 through 100, alleging
causes of action for (1) rescission, (2) conspiracy, (3) fraud, (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) accounting, and (7)
declaratory relief.
On the same day
of their complaint Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary
restraining order enjoining Defendants from furthering the foreclosure sale or
charging further fees or interest on the note secured by the subject property.
On August 29, 2022, the Court denied their application but set the matter for
hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. That matter has been continued to October 13,
2022.
Tentative Ruling:
Deny
LEGAL STANDARD
“An injunction may be granted in the following cases:
…
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that
the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce
waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.”
Code Civ. Proc. §
526.
“A preliminary
injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified
complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the
affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist
therefor. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the
opposing party.”
Code Civ. Proc. §
527(a).
“A trial court may grant a preliminary injunction upon a showing that (1) the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the ‘interim harm’ to that party if an injunction is denied is greater than ‘the [interim] harm the [opposing party] is likely to suffer if the ... injunction is
issued.’ [citation.] These two showings operate on a sliding scale: ‘[T]he
more likely it is that [the party seeking the injunction] will ultimately
prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the
injunction does not issue.’” [citation.] (Integrated
Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1183.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs—the parties seeking the preliminary
injunction—filed a verified complaint along with declarations in support of
their application. Defendants were provided with notice and have filed opposing
papers and declarations. The procedural requirements have been met.
Regarding the substantive requirements: Plaintiffs argue
they will be irreparably harmed should the Defendants be allowed to proceed
with the foreclosure sale during the course of this litigation, as Plaintiffs
have invested significant resources into the building and currently operate a
bail bonds business out of the building with developed goodwill among its
customers. Defendants do not appear to address the balance of harms but instead
offer compelling arguments for why Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits.
Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs have invested significant resources into the
building and currently operate a bail bonds business out of the building with
developed goodwill among its customers.
Defendants do not appear to dispute this harm. Rather, in
their opposition to the TRO application, Defendants argued there was no
emergency since a Notice of Sale had yet to be posted and a foreclosure sale
cannot legally happen until 20 days after a Notice of Sale has been posted.
However, Plaintiff states that since then, on August 31, 2022, a Notice of Sale
was posted on the subject property. (Leonid Kamenetsky Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendants
do not appear to dispute this.
It appears clear that Defendants intend to proceed with the
foreclosure sale and Plaintiffs will likely lose their building.
Merits
Defendants
present strong arguments for why Plaintiffs’ case will not succeed on the
merits. Most notably, Defendants point to the Settlement Agreement between the
parties executed in October of 2020. The Settlement Agreement, in relevant
part, reads:
“The total amount for settlement of all claims between the
Parties and relating to the Property and the Dispute relating to the Property
shall be $400,000, payable as follows:
(i)
Leonid Kamenetsky shall pay to EASY, on or before, November
30, 2020 the sum of $200,000.
(ii)
(ii) EASY shall extend to 14554 Friar LLC a loan for
the sum of $200,000, under the terms and conditions as the Assumption
Agreement, for a period of two (2) years from the date of this Settlement
Agreement. Upon the repayment of the $200,000 loan, Easy Financial LLC shall be
deemed as paid in full under the Subject Loan…”
(Ex Parte TRO Application, Ex. 1.)
In other words, Plaintiff Leonid Kamenetsky was to pay
$200,000 up front, and another $200,000 was to be financed for two years
according to the terms of the Assumption Agreement previously executed between
the parties. The terms of the Assumption Agreement call for:
“[A]n ongoing
interest rate to the outstanding indebtedness to be 12% per annum fixed
interest only payable on the first day of each month with a balloon payment for
the total indebtedness due and payable on or before March 11, 2018. The default
rate shall be 5% over and above the effective interest rate.
(Ex Parte TRO
Application, Ex. 2, ¶ 8.1.) In other words, the additional $200,000 would be
financed by monthly interest only payments with the principal $200,000 due at
the end. Except the principal (balloon) payment would be due two years after
the execution of the Settlement Agreement, or on October 25, 2022.
Defendants state
that Plaintiffs made late payments of $150,000 and $50,000 in December of 2022
to satisfy the initial, upfront obligation for $200,000. (Benjamin Donel Decl.
¶ 8.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this. However, after that Plaintiffs only made
one monthly interest payment for $2,000 ($200,000 @ 12% annual interest =
$2,000/month) in January of 2021. (Benjamin Donel Decl. ¶ 12.) This was despite
numerous attempts to notify Plaintiffs of their obligations to make monthly payments
and the late status of those payments. (Matthew Matoesian Decl., Exs. 1-7.)
According to Defendants, they even offered to waive the default fees from the
failed payments if Plaintiffs would begin making the required monthly interest
payments. (Benjamin Donel Decl. ¶ 11.) This establishes that Plaintiffs knew
they needed to make monthly interest payments and failed to do so.
Plaintiffs argue
they were not required to make monthly payments—only installment payments for
the remaining $200,000 principal. Plaintiffs further argue that the remaining
principal is not due until October 25, 2022, and therefore they are not in
default and a foreclosure sale is improper. Plaintiffs claim they never
received any of the emails regarding the late monthly payments. (Leonid
Kamenetsky Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant Benjamin Donel—CEO
of Easy Financial—agreed to modify the Settlement Agreement and verbally
implied that he would prefer lump sum payments as opposed to monthly interest
payments. (Leonid Kamenetsky Decl. ¶ 9.) The only evidence Plaintiffs offer for
this claim is a chain of text messages between the two where in December of
2020 Mr. Donel says he will send an email to his coworker to amend the
settlement. (Leonid Kamenetsky Decl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs do not offer a written
amended settlement agreement.
The court finds
that plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits. Based on the plain language of the Settlement
Agreement, defendants are likely to establish that plaintiffs have been in
default under the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement since February
2021. Given the low chance of prevailing on the
merits, the court finds a preliminary injunction unsupported by the facts and
law in this case.