Judge Virginia Keeny, Case 22VECV01479 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV01479, Date: 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22VECV01479 Hearing Date: April 10, 2023 Dept: W

BIJAN YAGHOOBIA V. CALMMA AND FITNESS, LLC

DEMURRER TO ANSWER

Date of Hearing: April 10, 2023 Trial Date: None set.

Department: W Case No.: 22VECV01479

Moving Party: Plaintiff Bijan Yaghoobia

Responding Party: No opposition.

Meet and Confer: Yes. (Yaghoobia Decl., Exh. C)

BACKGROUND

On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff Bijan Yaghoobia filed a complaint against Defendants CalMMA and Fitness, LLC and LisaMarie Garcia Sanchez, asserting causes of action for (1) Breach of Commercial Lease Agreement; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Negligence; (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (5) Waste; and (6) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.

Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff and Defendant CalMMA and Fitness, LLC (“CalMMA”) entered into a commercial lease agreement whereby Defendant CalMMA agreed to lease the subject commercial property from Plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Sanchez signed the lease agreement on behalf of CalMMA, which included a guarantor agreement. As part of the agreement, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were to obtain liability insurance. In April 2022, a fire broke out at the subject premises. Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached the commercial lease by failing to obtain insurance and provide Plaintiff a copy of the insurance as well as pay for the fire damages.

TENTATIVE RULLING

Plaintiff’s Demurrer to the Answer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Bijan Yaghoobia demur to Defendant Lisa Maria Garcia Sanchez’s answer on the grounds the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense and is uncertain.

A verified complaint must be denied positively or according to information and belief.¿ A general denial is effective to controvert all material allegations of an unverified complaint.¿ (CCP §431.30(d).)¿ Anything less than a general denial of the whole complaint is a “qualified” or “specific” denial.¿ A defendant can direct his or her denials to specific sentences, paragraphs, of parts of the complaint.¿ Although not widely used, a defendant can also effectively deny allegations in the complaint by alleging contrary or inconsistent facts.¿

In addition to denials, the answer should contain any and all affirmative defenses or objections to the complaint that defendant may have, and that would otherwise not be in issue under a simple denial.¿ Such defenses or objections are “new matter.”¿ (CCP § 431.30(b).) Generally, a defendant bears the burden of proving “new matter” and, as such, must be specifically pleaded in the answer. (California Academy of Sciences v. County of Fresno (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1442.)¿“The phrase ‘new matter’ refers to something relied on by a defendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff.” (Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community College District (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546; see also Cahil Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co. (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 367, 385 [“The basic consideration is whether the matters of defense are responsive to the essential allegations of the complaint, i.e., whether they are contradicting elements of plaintiff’s cause of action or whether they tender a new issue, in which case the burden of proof is upon the defendant as to the allegation constituting such new matter.”].)¿ Where the answer sets forth facts showing some essential allegation of the complaint is not true, such facts are not new matter but are denials.¿ (Ibid.; see also Statefarm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725 [holding a matter negating an essential allegation in the complaint does not constitute a new matter, and therefore, need not be specifically pled by the defendant].)¿¿¿

The same pleading of “ultimate facts” rather than evidentiary matter or legal conclusions is required as in pleading a complaint.¿ The answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint.¿ (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.)¿ The various affirmative defenses must be separately stated and must refer to the causes of action to which they relate “in a manner by which they may be intelligently distinguished.”¿ (CCP §431.30(g).)¿ Defenses must be pleaded in the nature of “yes, the allegations [of the complaint] are t

Plaintiff argues the answer is uncertain because Defendant Sanchez’s answer does not separately state any affirmative defense or refer to the causes of action against her. Rather, the answer only refers to a separate unlawful detainer action Plaintiff brought against Defendant.

Upon review of the answer, Defendant generally denies each statement of the complaint. (Answer, ¶3.) The court finds, however, the affirmative defense alleged is unclear. Defendant refers to the unlawful detainer action but also states that she is no longer an employee of CalMMA and will not be responsible for any business between Plaintiff and CalMMA. This affirmative defense does not refer to the causes of action to which they relate “in a manner by which they may be intelligently distinguished.”¿ (CCP §431.30(g).)

Accordingly, the demurrer to the answer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.