Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV02299, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22VECV02299    Hearing Date: April 4, 2023    Dept: W

KAREN SORONOW, et al. v. SUNSHINE'S PLACE II, et al.

MOTION TO STRIKE portions of the complaint

Date of Hearing:        April 4, 2023                          Trial Date:       None set.

Department:              W                                            Case No.:        22VECV02299

Moving Party:             Defendant Sunshine’s Place, II

Responding Party:     Plaintiff Karen Soronow                   

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Karen Soronow filed a complaint on December 6, 2022 against Defendant Sunshine’s Place, II alleging (1) Wrongful Death – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and/or Retention; (2) Survival – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and/or Retention; (3) Wrongful Death – Negligence; (4) Survival – Negligence; and (5) Elder Abuse. Plaintiff alleges her mother, Joyce Soronow, was a resident of Sunshine’s Place, II. While under Sunshine’s care, Plaintiff alleges failed to provide for her basic needs, caused a lapse in her care, and inflicted terrible pain and suffering that caused Joyce’s fatal injuries.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendant Sunshine’s Place, II’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.  

MEET AND CONFER

The party moving to strike shall meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading to determine if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections in the motion to strike. (CCP § 435.5(a).)  A declaration shall be filed and served by the moving party with the motion to strike.  (CCP § 435.5(a)(3).)  However, the failure to meet and confer in good faith is not a basis to grant or deny the motion to strike.  (CCP § 435.5(a)(4).)

Defendant does not attach a meet and confer declaration to their motion to strike as required. Defendant does not dispute they failed to meet and confer in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike. (CCP §435.5(a)(4).) As a result, the court does not deny the motion on this ground. However, the court admonishes Defendant to comply with all procedural and statutory requirements going forward.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Sunshine’s Place, II moves to strike portions of the plaintiff’s Complaint including Paragraphs 54, 76 82 and Prayer for punitive damages.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP §436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §436(b).)  The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP §436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (CCP §437.)

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code §3294(a).)  “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code §3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code §3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to defendant with the intention on the part of defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code 3294(c)(3).)

Defendant Sunshine’s Place, II argues Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages. Defendant contends Plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to malice, oppression, or fraud nor do they allege sufficient facts against a corporate defendant. Defendants contends nowhere in the complaint has Plaintiff alleged an employee or agent of the Defendant intended to cause injury, acted with “a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”, engaged in despicable conduct, or made intentional misrepresentations or concealed material facts with the intention of causing Plaintiff injury. Moreover, any allegations are conclusory as they are not pled with sufficient facts to support a claim that any officer, director, or managing agent of the defendant personally engaged, ratified, or had knowledge of any malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant improperly seeks to impose a heightened pleading requirement unsupported by California law. The court disagrees. Plaintiff cites to the general pleading standard. However, when alleging punitive damages, a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) As such, the court looks at Plaintiff’s allegations for punitive damages with the heightened standard for finding of fraud, malice, or oppression. (See Looney v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 539-540.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew of Joyce’s condition (dementia, risk for falls, etc.) and knew Defendant was unfit to provide the higher level of care required by state, yet failed to take the necessary precautions or steps to provide the requisite supervision and assistance to Joyce to prevent her from falling over the course of her stay at the facility. (Compl. ¶¶18, 25, 28.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant, through its officer, directors, and/or managing agents, knew that its employees were unfit to work at Sunshine and despite this knowledge, hired employees without taking any precautions towards safeguarding Sunshine residents. (Compl. ¶¶46, 52, 74.) Plaintiff also alleges Sunshine wrongfully authorized and consented to the abuse and neglect of Joyce by failing to take reasonable action to prevent this prohibited conduct and protect Joyce from foreseeable harm. (Compl. ¶64.) This is sufficient for the purposes of a motion to strike. Moreover, at this stage, Plaintiff alleging that persons acted with the “consent” of Defendant is “a sufficient allegation that the corporations had authorized their agent’s acts; a corporation is liable for punitive damages when it authorizes the wrongful act.” (O’Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 798, 806, citing Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 895.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.