Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV02537, Date: 2023-03-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22VECV02537    Hearing Date: March 2, 2023    Dept: W

PATRICIA LABORDE v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al.

Defendant dch thousand oaks-f, inc.’s demurrer with motion to strike

Date of Hearing:        March 2, 2023                                   Trial Date:       None set.  

Department:              W                                                        Case No.:        22VECV02537

Moving Party:            Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks

Responding Party:     Plaintiff Patricia Laborde

Meet and Confer:      Yes. (Leach Decl. ¶2.)

BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff Patricia Laborde filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company and DCH Thousand Oaks-F Inc. dba Ford of Thousand Oaks (erroneously sued as DCH Ford Thousand Oaks), asserting causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b); and (4) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations. Plaintiff alleges she brought her vehicle to the dealership several times for issues regarding her vehicle. On each occasion the dealership took the vehicle into the back while she waited and then returned the subject vehicle to her and stated it could find nothing wrong. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Ford Motor agreed to repurchase the vehicle; however, Defendant DCH re-routed the check to its location.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc.’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc.’s Motion to Strike is MOOT.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests this court take judicial notice of the complaint filed in the instant action (Exh. A). The court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice.

ANALYSIS

Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks demurs to the fourth cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations on the ground Plaintiff’s claim fails to state facts upon which relief can be granted. Defendant also moves to strike the entirety of paragraph four of the “Prayer for Relief” which reads: “For punitive damages related to cause of action four only”.

Fourth Cause of Action

The elements for the tort of intentional interference with the performance of a contract are: “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and another party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Asahi Kasei Pharma Corporation v. Actelion Ltd. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 945, 958.) 

Defendant DCH argues the complaint makes clear that there was not a valid and existing contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Ford Motor for the repurchase of the subject vehicle. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she and Ford Motor were negotiating a repurchase of the subject vehicle as part of the proposed settlement but Plaintiff “rejected the entire settlement” (Compl. ¶28), “reject[ed] the statutory refund check from Ford” (Compl ¶28), and “cancelled everything” (Compl. ¶90). Defendant DCH contends without an acceptance of the offer, Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for intentional interference with contract. (See Civ. Code §1550.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues she did accept Defendant Ford Motor’s statutory offer to repurchase the vehicle. Plaintiff alleges she reached out to Defendant Ford Motor about her defective car in August 2022 to demand a repurchase. (Compl. ¶20.) Defendant Ford sent a letter indicating they reviewed her request, agreed to repurchase the vehicle and asked for various documents. (Compl. ¶20.) Plaintiff provided those documents. (Compl. ¶20.) On September 6, 2022, Defendant Ford sent another letter again offering to purchase the vehicle and attached various calculations. (Compl. ¶21.) Defendant Ford sent two more letters with different calculations. (Compl. ¶¶22-23.) Plaintiff ultimately agreed to have Ford repurchase her vehicle pursuant to California law, but Ford never did so. (Compl. ¶24.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant DCH frustrated the performance of the contract. (Compl. ¶86.)

Plaintiff also argues if the court finds the fourth cause of action insufficiently pled, Plaintiff can also amend their complaint to instead allege intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage protects the same interest but does not require proof of a valid contract.

The court finds Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a valid contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Ford. Although Plaintiff alleges she agreed to have Defendant Ford repurchase her vehicle, Plaintiff also alleges she rejected Defendant Ford’s offer to repurchase the vehicle. These inconsistencies do not support the tort of intentional interference with the performance of a contract. However, the court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to pled intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Although Defendant DCH argues it would be antithetical to allow Plaintiff to change her cause of action, the court finds Plaintiff has not waived any right to assert the new claim. This matter is not like Vogel where the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint the day of trial or Moss Estate Co. where the defendant sought to amend their answer on the eve of trial more than a year after the original answer was filed. Plaintiff filed her complaint December 23, 2022 and now seeks to amend her complaint upon Defendant’s first demurrer to the complaint.

Accordingly, Defendant DCH’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Motion to Strike

Defendant DCH moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the grounds Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support her claim for intentional interference with the performance of a contract and the complaint relies on conclusory language and buzzwords rather than specific facts showing that DCH acted with malice, oppression, or fraud and the complaint does not plead any facts in support of its claim that one or more of DCH’s managing agents ratified, authorized, and/or approved the conduct.

Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT. The court notes when the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b).) As a result, general allegations of ratification by managing agents are not enough.