Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 22VECV02537, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22VECV02537    Hearing Date: May 9, 2023    Dept: W

PATRICIA LABORDE v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al.

Defendant dch thousand oaks-f, inc.’s motion to strike portions of the first amended complaint

Date of Hearing:        May 9, 2023                                       Trial Date:       None set.  

Department:              W                                                        Case No.:        22VECV02537

Moving Party:            Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks

Responding Party:     Plaintiff Patricia Laborde

Meet and Confer:      Yes. (Sanders Decl. ¶2.)

BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff Patricia Laborde filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company and DCH Thousand Oaks-F Inc. dba Ford of Thousand Oaks (erroneously sued as DCH Ford Thousand Oaks), asserting causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b); and (4) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations.

On March 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges she brought her vehicle to the dealership several times for issues regarding her vehicle. On each occasion the dealership took the vehicle into the back while she waited and then returned the subject vehicle to her and stated it could find nothing wrong. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Ford Motor agreed to repurchase the vehicle; however, Defendant DCH re-routed the check to its location.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks requests this court take judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint (Exh. A). Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS

Defendant DCH Thousand Oaks-F, Inc. dba DCH Ford of Thousand Oaks moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to punitive damages, civil penalties, and attorney fees on the grounds the language of the FAC is improper and not in conformity with the law of the State of California.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.)

Punitive Damages

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s allegations regarding punitive damages on the grounds Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that DCH acted with “oppression, fraud, or malice” as required by California Civil Code section 3294(a). Defendant also contends Plaintiff has failed to allege the oppression, fraud, or malice was be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to defendant with the intention on the part of defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b).)  

Punitive damages thus require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pleaded in support of punitive damages. (See Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.) 

In the instant matter, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for their Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage cause of action. Plaintiff alleges Defendant had access to the check from Ford to Plaintiff and therefore knew how much money Plaintiff would be receiving from Ford upon return of her defective vehicle. (FAC ¶29.) With this knowledge, Plaintiff alleges Defendant sought to enrich itself at the expense of Plaintiff by intentionally selecting a used 2019 Lincoln MKC vehicle and packed the sales contract with dealership add-on items and then attempted to force Plaintiff to sign the contract to purchase the Lincoln vehicle, falsely asserting it as a requirement of the return of her defective vehicle by Ford. (FAC ¶92.)

Based on these allegations, the court finds Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. These allegations, taken as true, demonstrate intent to injure, despicable conduct, intentional misrepresentation or deceit. However, the court agrees Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, or ratification on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. Plaintiff generally alleges “All acts of corporate employees as alleged were authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporate employer.” (FAC ¶9.) Plaintiff’s claims “managing agents” set out to capture the entire amount of the payment from Ford to Plaintiff and shared the amount of restitution agreed by Ford to Plaintiff with sales employees are conclusory and are not sufficient to support a claim of punitive damages on a ratification theory. (FAC ¶¶30, 93.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike Paragraph 95 and Prayer, paragraph 4 is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Civil Penalties

Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s Prayer, paragraph 6 for civil penalties on the grounds that although under Song-Beverly a plaintiff may recover a civil penalty (Civ. Code § 1794(c)), there is no equivalent statute allowing for recovery of a civil penalty based on a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage.

Plaintiff seeks civil penalties in their first (Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty) and third (Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b)) causes of action. Neither cause of action is against Defendant. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to clarify her prayer for relief. 

Attorney Fees

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney fees on the grounds there is no statute equivalent to California Civil Code section 1794(d) that allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees based on a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage.

Plaintiff does not address this contention in their opposition. However, the request for attorney fees is only requested in their first cause of action. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to clarify her prayer for relief.