Judge Virginia Keeny, Case Number: 23STCV03793, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 23STCV03793, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03793 Hearing Date: February 28, 2025 Dept: 45

ELDA DAVILA ROMAN, ET AL. V. LATIN AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES, ET AL.

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; MOTION TO STRIKE

Date of Hearing: February 28, 2025 Trial Date: October 13,

2025

Department: 45 Case No.: 23STCV03793

Moving Party: Defendants Latin American Council of Christian Churches and Joel Martinez

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Elda Davila Roman, Erika Roman, and Jim Roman

BACKGROUND

This action arises from alleged habitability issues at a property located at 3632 East Fifth Street, Los Angeles, California (the “Subject Property”). Plaintiffs allege that, throughout their respective tenancies, their units suffered from habitability issues including, but not limited to, ceiling leaks, water damage, and inoperable electrical outlets. Plaintiffs also allege that they were harassed by Defendants.

On February 21, 2023, Plaintiffs Elda Davila Roman (“Elda”), Erika Roman (“Erika”), and Jim Roman (“Jim”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Latin American Council of Christian Churches (“LACCC”), Joel Martinez (“Martinez”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1-10, alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence; (2) Tenant Harassment in Violation of the County of Los Angeles Rent Ordinance; (3) Breach of Contract; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (6) Unfair Business Practices; (7) Trespass; and (8) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.

On August 1, 2023, this action was deemed related to LASC Case No. 23STCV02316, with 23STCV02316 being deemed the lead case. (08/01/23 Minute Order.)

On May 3, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to the third, fourth, fifth and seventh causes of action in the complaint. Also, on such date, Defendants filed a motion to strike references to attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and treble damages from the complaint.

On May 17, 2024, pursuant to stipulation, the Court entered an order: (1) dismissing Plaintiff Jim Roman’s claims for bodily injury and emotional distress with prejudice; (2) dismissing Plaintiff Jim Roman’s fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress with prejudice; (3) indicating that this action shall not be consolidated with LASC Case No. 23STCV02316; and (4) ordering the parties to use their best efforts to complete mediation in this matter within 60 days of the deposition of Jim Roman. (05/17/24 Stipulation and Order at p. 4.)

Initially, given the common last names of Plaintiffs, the Court will refer to the Plaintiffs by their first names for purposes of clarity and to avoid any confusion. The Court does not intend any disrespect by referring to Plaintiffs by their first names.

[Tentative] Ruling

The Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART the demurrer of Defendants to the complaint.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the third and fifth causes of action in the complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action in the complaint with 20 days leave to amend.

The Court GRANTS IN PART the motion to strike. The Court DENIES the request to strike attorney’s fees from the complaint. The Court GRANTS the request to strike punitive damages and treble damages allegations from the complaint with 20 days leave to amend.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)¿On demurrer, a court does “not accept contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Simonyan v. Nationwide Insurance Company of America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 889, 895.)

Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to support the allegations pled to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435(b)(1).) A court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) A court may “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).)

DEMURRER

Meet and Confer Requirement

Pertinent Allegations of the Complaint

The complaint alleges the following: Plaintiffs Elda and Jim are former tenants at the Subject Property and resided in Unit 8 at the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs Elda and Jim moved into Unit 8 around June 1, 2010, pursuant to a written lease. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Erika is also a former tenant at the Subject Property, and Plaintiff Erika resided in Unit 6 at the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Erika moved into Unit 6 on March 12, 2020, pursuant to a written lease. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Defendant LACCC owned the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 4.) Along with Defendant LACCC, Defendant Martinez managed the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 5.)

Plaintiffs Elda and Jim allege that, throughout their tenancy, their unit exhibited habitability issues such as water damaged countertops, inoperable electrical outlets, cracked bathroom ceilings, and discolored bathroom walls. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-17.) Defendants failed to repair such conditions even after complaints were made by Plaintiffs Elda and Jim. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-17.) Plaintiffs Elda and Jim allege that they were told they had to vacate the unit so that Defendant LACCC’s seminary students from Texas could move into Unit 8. (Compl., ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs Elda and Jim allege that they vacated Unit 8 on May 21, 2022, due to Defendants’ harassment. (Compl., ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff Erika alleges that, throughout her tenancy, her unit had a cracked living room ceiling. (Compl., ¶¶ 25-26.) Defendants failed to repair such condition even after complaints were made by Plaintiff Erika. (Compl., ¶ 26.) Plaintiff Erika alleges that, on February 28, 2022, Defendants told her to move out in writing. (Compl., ¶ 27.) Within three days of receiving the sixty-day notice, Plaintiff Erika approached Defendant Martinez and asked why Defendants told her to move. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Defendant Martinez informed Plaintiff Erika that she needed to vacate Unit 6 so that Defendant LACCC’s Texas seminary students could move into the unit. (Compl., ¶ 28.) On April 30, 2022, Plaintiff Erika vacated Unit 6 due to Defendants’ harassment. (Compl., ¶ 32.)

The Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract is Sufficiently Alleged

Defendants contend that the third cause of action for breach of contract is insufficiently alleged because Plaintiffs have failed to plead the requisite elements, and Plaintiffs have failed to attach any contract to the complaint. Plaintiffs assert that the breach of contract claim is sufficiently alleged, and also argue that they are not required to attach the lease to the complaint.

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Oasis West).) If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307 (Harris).) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199 (Construction Protective Services).)

Plaintiffs allege that implied in their residential lease agreements is an implied warranty of habitability and an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, wherein Defendant LACCC promised to inspect and maintain the Subject Property in a clean, safe, and habitable condition and to provide Plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 54.) Plaintiffs met all their obligations under their leases and allege that Defendant LACCC breached the implied warranty of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment “by failing to inspect or maintain Units 6 and 8 in a clean, safe, and habitable condition, by harassing Plaintiffs, and by demanding, and causing Plaintiffs to vacate their rental unit without just cause.” (Compl., ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs allege they were damaged by the actions of Defendant LACCC. (Compl., ¶ 60.)

The Court finds that the third cause of action for breach of contract is sufficiently alleged. The third cause of action is premised on the breach of the written lease agreements between the parties. Plaintiffs have set forth the required elements for a breach of contract claim under Oasis West, supra, 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently set forth the legal effect of the contract in that they have alleged what was required of Defendants pursuant to the implied warranty of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Compl., ¶ 54.) Plaintiffs allege that such warranty and covenant are implied in the leases, which Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached. (Compl., ¶ 54.) The failure of Plaintiffs to “either . . . attach or to set out verbatim the terms of the contract [is] not fatal to [their] breach of contract cause of action.” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.) Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the legal effect of the leases.

The Court therefore OVERRULES Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action for breach of contract.

The Fourth Cause of Action for IIED is Insufficiently Alleged

Defendants assert that the fourth cause of action is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiffs argue that the IIED cause of action pleads facts which support a jury finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.

Initially, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fourth cause of action on the grounds of uncertainty. The allegations “are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant[s] of the issues that must be met . . . .” (Bacon v. Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605.)

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009 [citation and ellipses omitted].) “Liability for IIED does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007 (Crouch).)

Pursuant to the fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege the following: Defendants’ demands that Plaintiffs vacate Unit 6 and Unit 8 without just cause in violation of the Rent Ordinance was outrageous. (Compl., ¶ 114.) Defendants’ conduct of trespassing in the Unit 6 and Unit 8 was outrageous. (Compl., ¶ 115.) Defendants’ harassment of Plaintiffs from Unit 6 and Unit 8 was outrageous. (Compl., ¶ 116.) Defendants intended to cause Plaintiffs emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress. (Compl., ¶ 117.) Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress in the form of annoyance, mental anguish, sleeplessness, anxiety, worry, fear, discomfort, shame, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation. (Compl., ¶ 118.) Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress. (Compl., ¶ 119.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for IIED. Pursuant to the fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs have not set forth how Defendants purportedly trespassed in Unit 6 and Unit 8. Moreover, the Court does not find that the allegations as to harassment are extreme and outrageous. (Compl., ¶¶ 18-19, 29-32.) Additionally, Defendants’ alleged demand that Plaintiffs vacate Unit 6 and Unit 8 without just cause is not extreme and outrageous conduct for the purpose of an IIED cause of action. (Compl., ¶ 114.) Also, the failure to make repairs, as alleged, does not give rise to a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. In sum, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts of which “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the action, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” (Crouch, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.)

The Court therefore SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court finds that there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Plaintiffs may allege facts which, if proven, would state a cause of action for IIED. Thus, leave to amend will be allowed as to the fourth cause of action.

The Fifth Cause of Action for Discrimination in Violation of the FEHA is Sufficiently Alleged

Defendants contend that the fifth cause of action is insufficiently alleged because Plaintiffs failed to address the filing of an administrative complaint with the DFEH or the procurement of a right to sue letter. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ cited authority is inapposite and that there is no requirement for an administrative remedy where a tenancy is concerned.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. The Court finds that Defendants’ reliance on Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336 is inapposite as such case addressed the issue of exhausting administrative remedies in the employer-employee context. Kim does not stand for the rule that a tenant or former tenant must exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing a discrimination claim against a landlord. The Court informs Defendants that “[a] case is not authority for a proposition not considered therein or an issue not presented by its own particular facts.” (McConnell v. Advantest America, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 596, 611.)

The Court therefore OVERRULES Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for discrimination in violation of the FEHA.

The Seventh Cause of Action for Trespass is Insufficiently Alleged

To set forth a cause of action for trespass, Plaintiffs must allege (1) Plaintiffs’ ownership or control of the property; (2) Defendants’ wrongful, intentional, reckless, or negligent act of trespass on the property; (3) Plaintiffs did not give permission for the entry or scope of permission was exceeded; (4) damage to Plaintiffs caused by the trespass; and (5) Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.) A trespass claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (b).)

The Court finds that the seventh cause of action for trespass is insufficiently alleged. (Compl., ¶ 137-145.) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Plaintiffs did not give permission for the entry or that the scope of permission was exceeded. Also, the basis for the trespass claim is that Defendants “intentionally, recklessly, or negligently allowed water to enter Unit 6 through the dilapidated kitchen sink and kitchen sink plumbing.” (Compl., ¶ 139.) The purported water intrusion began in 2016 and remained unrepaired. (Compl., ¶ 15.) The Court does not find that the seventh cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations on its face as Defendants contend. The complaint alleges that such defect remained until Plaintiffs Jim and Elda vacated on May 21, 2022. (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 19.) Moreover, the complaint alleges that the trespass is continuing. (Compl., ¶ 143.)

However, given that Plaintiffs have failed to state the required elements under Ralphs, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the seventh cause of action for trespass.

The Court finds that there does is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Plaintiffs may allege facts which, if proven, would state a cause of action for trespass. Thus, leave to amend will be allowed as to the seventh cause of action.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims, treble damages claims, and request for attorney’s fees from the complaint. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support their prayer for punitive damages, treble damages, and/or attorney’s fees. (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:7-9.)

Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Attorney’s Fees is Proper

“California follows what is commonly referred to as the American rule, which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney fees.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278.) “[E]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counsels at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .” (Id. at p. 278-279.) A prevailing party in FEHA action is entitled to attorneys’ fees. (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 99.) Los Angeles Municipal Code, Section 8.52.170 allows a tenant to recover attorney’s fees for violation of rent stabilization and tenant protection provisions. (Los Angeles Municipal Code § 8.52.170.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees pursuant to the second and fifth causes of action in the complaint. The second cause of action was not challenged by demurrer. The fifth cause of action, as explained above, is not deficient and the Court has overruled the demurrer thereto. The complaint does not explicitly set forth a statutory or contractual basis for attorney’s fees. However, Plaintiffs’ second cause of action and fifth cause of action both allow for the recovery of attorneys’ fees.

The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ request to strike references to attorney’s fees from the complaint.

Plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages Allegations are Insufficient

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.¿(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)¿¿¿

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) California Civil Code, Section 3294 authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Malice is defined as either “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff,” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331.) California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Fraud under California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(3) “means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.)

Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts of showing malice, fraud, or oppression by Defendants. The allegations in support of punitive damages are insufficient and are much too conclusory.

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages allegations with leave to amend.

The Request for Treble Damages is Insufficient

Civil Code § 3345 states the following:

“(a) This section shall apply only in actions brought by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of those individuals specified in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, to redress unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition.

(1) Senior citizens, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 1761.

(2) Disabled persons, as defined in subdivision (g) of Section 1761.

(3) Veterans, as defined in Section 18540.4 of the Government Code.

(b) Whenever a trier of fact is authorized by statute to impose either a fine, or a civil penalty or other penalty, or any other remedy for the purpose or effect of which is to punish or deter, and the amount of the fine, penalty, or other remedy is subject to the trier of fact’s discretion, the trier of fact shall consider the factors set forth in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, in addition to other appropriate factors, in determining the amount of the fine, civil penalty or other penalty, or other remedy to impose. Whenever the trier of fact makes an affirmative finding in regard to one or more of these factors set forth in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, it may impose a fine, civil penalty or other penalty, or other remedy in an amount up to three times greater than authorized by the statute, or, where the statute does not authorize a specific amount, up to three times greater than the amount the trier of fat would impose in the absence of that affirmative finding.”

(Civ. Code § 3345.)

“Disabled person means a person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (g).) A senior citizen is a person who is 65 years of age or older. (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (f).)

Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Jim suffered an allergic reaction, due to damp countertops and cabinets, and that the allergic reaction included difficulty breathing and upper respiratory congestion. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff Jim emailed Defendants about the water leak and informed Defendants that the water leak was triggering his allergy symptoms. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Defendants, however, failed to repair the countertop and cabinets. (Compl., ¶ 15.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ treble damages allegations are insufficient. The complaint does not allege sufficient facts showing that any of the Plaintiffs suffered from a disability which limited one or more major life activities. Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they come within the scope of one of the categories articulated in Civ. Code § 3345.

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ request to strike references to treble damages from the complaint with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART the demurrer of Defendants to the complaint.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the third and fifth causes of action in the complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action in the complaint with 20 days leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.