Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 23STCV04730, Date: 2025-02-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV04730 Hearing Date: February 14, 2025 Dept: 45
HOLLYWOOD INVESTMENTS, LLC V. J M DELL LLC
DEMURRER &
MOTION TO STRIKE
Date of Hearing: February
14, 2025 Trial
Date: None
Department: 45 Case
No.: 23STCV04730
Complaint Filed: March 3, 2023
Moving Party: Defendant
J M Dell, LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiff Hollywood Investments, LLC
Notice: Proper
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Hollywood Investments, LLC (“Plaintiff”) sued defendant J M
Dell, LLC (“Defendant”) on March 3, 2023 and filed its operative first amended
complaint (“FAC”) on July 24, 2024. The FAC asserts claims for (1) quiet title
and (2) declaratory relief.
As alleged in the FAC and accepted as true upon demurrer:
Plaintiff owns the property located at 2239 Alcyona Drive, Los Angeles
90068 (“Hollywood Property”). Plaintiff acquired the Hollywood Property from
Plaintiff’s principal, Kim Oanh Pham (“Pham”).
Defendant owns the property located at 6339 Ivarene Avenue Drive, Los
Angeles 90068 (“the Dell Property”). Defendant acquired the Dell Property from
Defendant’s principal, Laura Siegel Larson (“Larson”).
The Hollywood and Dell Properties share a border.
When Pham acquired the Property, she retained a surveyor to perform a
slope density survey in preparation for renovations. Upon receipt of the
survey, Pham “learned for the first time of several possible encroachments onto
other properties, including the ... Dell Property”. (FAC, ¶ 22.) The FAC does
not allege Pham took any action regarding the encroachments at that time. She
did, however, retain contractors to perform repair work on portions of the possible
encroachments. Larson’s children emerged from the Dell Property and demanded
that Plaintiff’s contractors stop their work. Defendant has now proposed to
build a chain link fence (“Proposed Fence”) that will physically block
Plaintiff’s access to various portions of the Hollywood Property.
This is at least the third litigation involving the Hollywood and Dell
Properties. In 2011, the properties’ respective prior owners, Jackson Underwood
and Nicole Duckett, settled a lawsuit with an agreement under which Underwood released
all easement rights over the Dell Property. In May 2023, Plaintiff sued
Underwood, claiming among other things that he failed to disclose that he had
quitclaimed the easements before he sold Pham the Hollywood Property.
Plaintiff has sued to quiet title over an equitable easement in favor
of the Hollywood and over the Dell Property, and for a judicial determination
of the parties’ rights regarding the same.
On July 5, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend. The Court took notice
of the Quitclaim Deed wherein Jackson Underwood released easement rights over
the Property to Nicole Duckett. The Court also took notice of Plaintiff’s
allegations against Underwood in her lawsuit arising from his failure to
disclose material facts when Pham purchased the Hollywood Property.
In relevant part, the Court found as follows:
“[B]ased
on (1) Plaintiff’s allegations on [sic] the Underwood Lawsuit, (2) the fact
that the Quitclaim Deed states that the contracting parties entered into the
Quitclaim Deed ‘for the sole purpose of releasing and extinguishing any claims
... [Dr. Underwood’s] affiliates might have had based on claims of easement
...,’ (3) Plaintiff does not dispute that Pham and Plaintiff were Dr.
Underwood’s ‘affiliates’ within the meaning of the Quitclaim Deed, and (4) an
‘equitable easement’ is a claim that Plaintiff ‘might have had’ within the
meaning of the deed ..., Plaintiff is not entitled to an equitable easement.”
(07-05-2024 Order, p. 11.)
The Court proceeded to find no present
controversy over the easement, and also granted the motion as to Plaintiff’s
claim for declaratory relief.
On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed its FAC. The
FAC includes new allegations and a sworn declaration from Underwood regarding his
and Duckett’s intent when executing the 2011 Quitclaim Deed. (FAC, ¶¶ 17-20 and
Exh. E [Underwood Decl.].) Underwood attests he and Duckett’s dispute did not
involve any of the easements at issue here, nor did he intend to release any
claims to such easements. (Ibid.) As to Plaintiff’s 2023 lawsuit against
Underwood, Plaintiff alleges that when Pham claimed Underwood had released all
easements, she “was not making any kind of factual admission”, but “opining on
the potential legal effect of the Quitclaim Deed”, despite the fact that she
“is not a lawyer.” (FAC, ¶¶ 27-28.)
On September 24, 2024, Defendant demurred to
Plaintiff’s FAC. Defendant argues, in brief, that Plaintiff has added nothing
to her initial complaint, and it should fail for the same reasons that the
Court granted Defendant’s prior motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant
concurrently moved to strike portions of the FAC.
On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed its
opposition to Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike.
On February 7, 2025, Defendant filed its
reply.
[TENTATIVE] RULING
Defendant’s demurrer is sustained in its
entirety, without leave to amend.
The motion to strike is denied as moot.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has added nothing to her initial
complaint that materially changes the analysis in the Court’s July 5, 2024
ruling.
Plaintiff relies on new allegations regarding
her intent and Underwood’s to persuade the Court the facts should be construed
differently. But their intent does not change the facts.
“California recognizes the objective theory of
contracts (Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948...), under
which ‘[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract,
rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls
interpretation’ (Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist.
(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 ... ). The parties' undisclosed intent or
understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation. “ (Founding Members
of the Newport Beach Country Club v. New Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.) The objective theory appears clearly in two sections
of the Civil Code:
(1) “The
language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is
clear and explicit.” (Civ. Code, § 1638), and
(2) “When
a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if possible[.]” (Id., § 1639.)
As a result, neither Plaintiff’s nor
Underwood’s construal of the language of Underwood’s settlement or the
Quitclaim Deed can change the Deed’s interpretation. Its language is plain.
Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that
Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the Underwood Lawsuit can be construed as “opinions”
about the Deed’s legal effect.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s recharacterization
of her allegations against Underwood, the final two factors informing the
Court’s prior ruling remain unchanged: (1) the still-undisputed fact that
Plaintiff is Underwood’s “affiliate” for purposes of the Quitclaim Deed; and (2)
the still-undisputed fact that Plaintiff’s claim is one that an affiliate
“might have had” when the Quitclaim Deed was executed.
Plaintiff has not cured her pleading by
amendment. Because she has failed to amend her complaint to state a claim on
any theory, she has also not demonstrated she can cure it by a second
amendment. In fact, in her opposition, Plaintiff contends the Court is not
bound by the “law of the case”, the Court may “reconsider any ruling”, and
Plaintiff “does not have to plead an ‘alternative legal theory’ ” – all of
which amounts to an attack on the Court’s reasoning, rather than a showing that
the complaint can be cured with further facts. Plaintiff has not carried her
burden.
The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer is sustained
without leave to amend. The motion to strike is denied as moot.
Moving party to give notice.