Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 23STCV06439, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV06439 Hearing Date: February 13, 2025 Dept: 45
WOOLEN
V. COLBERT
MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Date of
Hearing: February 13, 2025 Trial
Date: June 16, 2025
Department: 45 Case No.: 23STCV06439
Moving Party:
Defendant David E. Colbert
Responding
Party: Plaintiff
Michael Woolen
BACKGROUND
This
is a dispute over ownership of real property located at 1509 West 97th Street,
Los Angeles CA 90047 (“the Property”). Plaintiff Michael Woolen (“Woolen”)
filed his complaint against defendant David E. Colbert (“Defendant”) on March
23, 2023. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”) on June 15, 2023,
also naming as defendant all persons known and unknown claiming an interest in
the Property. The FAC asserts claims for (1) quiet title, (2) intentional
fraud, (3) cancellation of instrument, and (4) declaratory relief.
Defendant
cross-complained for partition of the Property on January 12, 2024, naming as
defendants Plaintiff and Allied First Bank, sb dba Servbank dba The Money
Source.
As
alleged in the FAC and accepted as true upon Defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings:
Plaintiff
took title to the Property as joint tenant with his wife pursuant to a
quitclaim deed dated June 29, 2013 (“the 2013 Deed”). (FAC, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s
wife passed away in 2022, and Plaintiff took sole title to the Property. (Id.,
¶ 10.)
Defendant,
Plaintiff’s wife’s son, brought a notary public to Plaintiff’s house on
November 3, 2022 and persuaded Plaintiff to sign a grant deed (“the 2022 Deed”)
granting Defendant a 50% interest in the Property. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff is autistic and suffers from physical disabilities, and he did not
understand the documents he signed. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 11.) Defendant did not
immediately record the 2022 Deed.
On
December 7, 2022, Plaintiff appointed non-party Darrel Woolen his Agent In
Fact. (Id., ¶ 14.) Shortly afterward, Plaintiff was hospitalized through
January 1, 2023. (Id., ¶ 15.) He returned home immobile. (Id., ¶
16.)
When
Defendant learned Darrell Woolen had been given power of attorney, Defendant
went to the Property and physically assaulted Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 16.)
Darrell Woolen changed the locks at the Property and arranged for Plaintiff to move
to a new residence in Dallas, Texas. (Id., ¶ 17.) Darrell Woolen also arranged
for Defendant to retrieve his personal belongings from the Property and for the
Property to be sold. (Id., ¶¶ 18-22.)
Defendant
recorded the 2022 Deed the same day he learned that Darrell Woolen planned to
sell the Property, around February 3, 2023. (Id., ¶ 21.) Darrell Woolen
discovered the existence of the 2022 Deed on February 7, 2023. At that time, a
sale was set to close escrow on February 15, 2023. (Id., ¶ 24.)
On
May 2, 2024, Defendant Colbert moved for judgment on Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff
filed his opposition on February 3, 2025.
[Tentative]
Ruling
The
motion is denied. Plaintiff is ordered to verify his complaint within fifteen
(15) days to cure the clerical defect in his first cause of action.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks
only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be
judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is … not proper on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999, citations omitted.)
The
standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially
the same as that applicable to a general demurrer: that under the state of the
pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Schabarum v.
California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) The court “must
accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not
consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation,
or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson
Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220, citing Shea Homes Limited
Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)
MEET
& CONFER
Code
of Civil Procedure section 439 requires a party to meet and confer with its
adversary before it moves for judgment on the pleadings.
Defendant’s
counsel attests he sent meet and confer “letter[s]” and “correspondence” to
Plaintiff’s counsel. (Reed Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) This does not satisfy the Code,
which requires meeting and a conference in person, by telephone, or via
videoconference.
Given
that the motion fails on its merits, the Court proceeds to hear the motion for
the sake of efficiency, notwithstanding Counsel’s lapse.
ANALYSIS
As to the
first cause of action to quiet title, Defendant asserts he is entitled to
judgment because the FAC is unverified. This is easily corrected via clerical
amendment, which the Court permits. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) In his
opposition, Plaintiff has offered to file a verification forthwith. The Court
orders him to do so within fifteen (15) days.
As to the
second cause of action, Defendant asserts “the Grant Deed is clear and
unambiguous on its face”, so Plaintiff has not stated a claim for fraud. (Mot.,
7:9-10.) Clarity of a written instrument is not relevant to a tort claim. The
motion is denied.
As to the third cause of action, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not
alleged fraud or wrongful conduct justifying cancellation. Not so. Plaintiff
alleges a specific instance of misrepresentation by which Defendant obtained
Plaintiff’s signature on the 2022 Deed. The motion is denied.
As to the fourth cause of action, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not
alleged any “fraud, wrongdoing or controversy” justifying declaratory relief.
Not so. Plaintiff has alleged an ongoing controversy regarding ownership of the
Property or entitlement to sale proceeds. The motion is denied.
Defendant also argues Plaintiff has not shown he was incompetent in the
manner he alleges in the FAC. This is an issue of fact, not for resolution on
the pleadings. The Court accepts the pleadings as true here, and the pleadings
allege Plaintiff’s incompetence to sign the Grant Deed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion is denied in its entirety.
Plaintiff is
ordered to file and serve a sworn verification for his pleading within fifteen
(15) days.
Defendant to
give notice.