Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 23STCV23759, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV23759 Hearing Date: February 18, 2025 Dept: 45
robles, et al. v. ajr investment
group, et al.
MOtion to strike
Date of Hearing: 2/18/2025 Trial
Date: 8/4/2025
Department: 45 Case
No.: 23STCV23759
Moving Party: Defendants
AJR Investment Group, LLC and AR Tarzana Properties
Responding Party: Plaintiffs Elizabeth Robles and Demian
Robles
BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2023, Elizabeth Robles
(Elizabeth) and her son Demian Robles (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a
Complaint against entities AJR Investment Group, LLC; AR Tarzana Properties;
and individual Joy Neal-Regula and Mario Cea (collectively Defendants). The
Complaint was followed by a First Amended Complaint (FAC).
On November 8, 2024, the Court
sustained Defendants’ demurrer to portions of the FAC as to the eighth cause of
action and denied Defendants’ motion to strike to the extent it sought punitive
damages in connection with the remaining causes of action.
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed
a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging twelve causes of action against
Defendants as follows:
1. Breach
of Contract
2. Breach
of Implied Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing
3. Breach
of Warranty of Habitability
4. Breach
of Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment
5. Violation
of Civ. Code §§1941.1, et seq.; 1942.4 et seq.
6. Negligence
7. Fraud
– Misrepresentation and Deceit
8. Sexual
Discrimination
9. Sexual
Discrimination
10. Extortion
11. Unfair
Business Practices in Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq
12. Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs, who have resided at the
subject property since 2010, allege that Defendants failed to maintain
habitable living conditions despite numerous complaints. (SAC ¶ 17.) They claim
their unit was unfit for human occupancy due to severe roach infestations,
water leaks, lack of running water for months, mold, defective plumbing, broken
windows, faulty electrical wiring, peeling paint, a defective bathtub, and
unsafe carpeting. (SAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs repeatedly notified Defendants, both
orally and in writing, but their repair requests were ignored. (SAC ¶ 20.) From
November 2022 through April 2023, Plaintiffs had no running water in both
bathrooms, forcing them to shower at gyms or family members’ homes. (SAC ¶ 21.)
When they informed Defendants of their intent to withhold rent until repairs
were made, Defendants allegedly retaliated instead of addressing the issues.
(SAC ¶ 22.)
Plaintiffs further allege fraud,
misrepresentation, extortion, and unfair business practices. Defendant
Neal-Regula allegedly requested Plaintiff Elizabeth Robles to help find new
tenants for the property. (SAC ¶ 23.) In May 2021, Plaintiff introduced a
family that was approved to rent unit 64, but after the lease was finalized,
Neal-Regula demanded that Plaintiff Elizabeth collect their rent, despite
having no managerial authority. (SAC ¶¶ 24-25.) When Plaintiff objected,
Neal-Regula allegedly threatened her with eviction. (SAC ¶¶ 26-27.) Over time,
Defendants allegedly pressured Plaintiff into collecting rent from multiple
units, including 103, 45, 48, 63, and 65, by using threats and coercion. (SAC
¶¶ 28-33.) Defendants also allegedly forced Plaintiff to file unlawful detainer
actions against defaulting tenants, providing her with forged leases and
falsely designating her as the property manager. (SAC ¶¶ 35-37.) Plaintiffs
claim these actions violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as
Defendants served them with illegal rent demands despite knowing that
Plaintiffs neither occupied nor owed rent on certain units. (SAC ¶ 38.)
Additionally, Plaintiff Elizabeth
alleges that Defendant Mario Cea, a maintenance worker employed by Defendants,
made repeated unwanted sexual advances, including requests for explicit photos
and sexual favors in exchange for necessary repairs. (SAC ¶ 41.) Cea allegedly
exploited the fact that Plaintiffs lacked running water for five months,
coercing Plaintiff Elizabeth under the pretense of helping restore services.
(SAC ¶¶ 42-43.) When Plaintiff rejected his advances, Defendants allegedly
retaliated by threatening eviction and fabricating claims of unpaid rent. (SAC
¶¶ 44-45.) Despite repeated complaints to Neal-Regula and the corporate
Defendants, no corrective action was taken to address Cea’s conduct. (SAC ¶¶
46-47.)
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' actions
violated California Civil Code §§ 1941.1 et seq., which require landlords to
maintain habitable conditions. Specifically, Defendants allegedly failed to
provide adequate weatherproofing (SAC ¶ 52), safe plumbing and gas facilities
(SAC ¶ 53), functional heating and electrical systems (SAC ¶¶ 54-56), and
sanitary conditions free from vermin and debris. (SAC ¶ 57.) Plaintiffs also
allege violations of California Civil Code § 1942.4, which imposes liability on
landlords who fail to correct cited housing violations within 35 days. (SAC ¶
58.) As a result, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive
relief, and attorneys’ fees under the California Unfair Business Practices Act
(Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204). (SAC ¶¶ 59-60.)
The motion now before the Court is the
Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint By Defendants
AJR Investment Group, LLC And AR Tarzana Properties (the Motion). Plaintiffs
oppose the Motion, AJR Investment Group, LLC and AR Tarzana Properties (Entity
Defendants) file a reply.
[Tentative] Ruling
The Court denies Defendants’ motion to
strike.
LEGAL
STANDARD
California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter
from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper.
(Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436, subd. (a).) Motions may also target pleadings or
parts of pleadings that are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable
laws, rules, or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)
However, motions to strike in limited jurisdiction courts
may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought
are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 92,
subd. (d).) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its
own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking
matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (Code
Civ. Proc. § 436.)
Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5 requires that
“[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party
shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the
pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining
whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised
in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)
ANALYSIS
Request
for Judicial Notice
The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice in
full pursuant to Evidence Code section 452.
Eighth
and Ninth Causes of Action
Defendants argue that the SAC
improperly reintroduces claims that were previously dismissed by the Court.
They contend that under CCP sections 436 and 437(a), a motion to strike is
appropriate when a complaint contains irrelevant, false, or improper matters or
fails to comply with court orders. Specifically, they assert that Plaintiffs
failed to timely amend their complaint following the Court’s ruling on
Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC which had previously removed certain claims.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action in the SAC should be stricken because they
exceed the permissible scope of amendment allowed by the Court and were filed
without leave. Under CCP section 472, a plaintiff may amend a complaint once
without leave of court before a defendant files a responsive pleading. However,
after that, any further amendments require court approval. Defendants contend
that when the Court sustained their demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action on
November 8, 2024, with leave to amend, Plaintiffs were required to file an
amended complaint within 10 days, by November 18, 2024. Plaintiffs failed to
meet this deadline, and Defendants filed and served an Answer on November 21,
2024, expressly stating that the Eighth Cause of Action was removed due to
Plaintiffs’ failure to amend.
Despite this, Plaintiffs
improperly filed the SAC on November 27, 2024, reintroducing the Eighth Cause
of Action by recharacterizing it as Sexual Discrimination instead of Sexual
Harassment, and adding an entirely new Ninth Cause of Action for Sexual Discrimination,
without seeking court approval. Defendants argue that this is procedurally
improper under People
v. Clausen (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 770, which
held that a plaintiff may only amend the causes of action explicitly permitted
by the court following a demurrer ruling. Similarly, in Harris v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, the court ruled
that a plaintiff cannot add new claims without permission. Defendants cite
additional cases, including Leader
v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 603, where the court held that failure to file an amended complaint
within the prescribed time renders any subsequent filing subject to a motion to
strike.
Defendants further argue that
allowing Plaintiffs to assert new legal theories so late in the case, over a
year after the action was filed and months after discovery was initiated, would
be prejudicial. They also assert that the Eighth Cause of Action was already
ruled insufficient by the court in its prior demurrer ruling, and Plaintiffs’
attempt to recast it as a new claim for Sexual Discrimination is merely an
effort to avoid a subsequent demurrer, which is impermissible under Womack v. Lovell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772, 787. Defendants
contend that the SAC was filed improperly, without court approval, and is
therefore subject to a motion to strike. Moreover, they argue that any motion
for leave to amend would be futile because the new claims are legally deficient
and would not survive demurrer under Yee
v. Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 1409, 1429. Thus, Defendants request that the court strike the
improperly filed Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action from the SAC.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue
that the motion to strike should be denied because the delay in filing the SAC
was due to their counsel’s medical leave and an inadvertent calendaring error
by office staff. The Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the Eighth Cause
of Action on November 8, 2024, with leave to amend but did not specify a
deadline. Plaintiffs’ counsel mistakenly believed they had 20 days to amend,
leading to the SAC being filed seven days late, on November 27, 2024.
Plaintiffs assert that this brief delay was inadvertent and does not justify
striking the amended complaint. They further argue that the court has
discretion to accept the late filing, as CCP section 438(h)(4)(A) states that a
court may strike an untimely amended complaint but is not required to do so.
Under Leader v. Health
Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 603, a motion to strike is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and
Plaintiffs contend that striking the SAC for a minor delay would be an
excessive sanction.
Regarding the addition of the
Ninth Cause of Action for sexual discrimination, Plaintiffs argue that the
court’s prior ruling on the demurrer suggested that a claim for sexual
discrimination under FEHA would be more appropriate than the originally pleaded
claim for sexual harassment. Plaintiffs maintain that they are entitled to
plead in the alternative, particularly when the new claim arises from the same
set of facts as the original claim. They cite Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015, which allows for amendments that
directly respond to a trial court’s ruling. Since the Eighth and Ninth Causes
of Action stem from the same facts as those previously alleged, Plaintiffs
argue that including both claims in the SAC is permissible. They contend that
denying the amendment would be unfair and contrary to established case law
allowing plaintiffs to adjust their legal theories in response to court
rulings.
In reply, Defendants argue that SAC
was untimely and filed without leave of court, making it subject to a motion to
strike.. Under Rule of Court 3.1320, Plaintiffs had ten days from November 8,
2024 to file an amended complaint, making the deadline November 18, 2024.
Plaintiffs failed to amend within this period, and Defendants filed and served
an Answer on November 21, 2024, which explicitly stated that the Eighth Cause
of Action was removed due to Plaintiffs’ failure to timely amend. Plaintiffs
did not dispute receiving Defendants’ Answer but still proceeded to file the
SAC on November 27, 2024, nearly a week later and without court approval.
Defendants cite Leader v. Health Industries of America,
Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, where
the court ruled that failing to file an amended complaint within the
court-ordered time frame subjects it to a motion to strike. In that case,
plaintiffs who missed the deadline did not seek an extension or court approval
before filing an amended complaint, leading to its rejection. Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs in this case similarly failed to notify the court or opposing
counsel about their delay or request an extension before filing the SAC.
Defendants further contend that
Plaintiffs’ actions have caused unnecessary delays, as the case was filed on
October 2, 2023, and Defendants' demurrer, filed on February 1, 2024, could not
be heard until November 8, 2024. In the meantime, discovery had already been
conducted, and trial is scheduled for August 4, 2025. By introducing new legal
theories and claims for damages at this late stage, Plaintiffs have disrupted
the case timeline, prejudicing Defendants. Given these factors, Defendants
request that the court strike the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety.
Defendants also argue that SAC
exceeds the scope of permissible amendment by improperly adding a new cause of
action and altering the legal basis of the existing claim. In the FAC,
Plaintiffs alleged a cause of action for sexual harassment under Civil Code
section 1708.5, which pertains to sexual battery, and under California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). However, the court sustained Defendants’
demurrer, finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to establish sexual
battery and that FEHA does not recognize a separate cause of action for sexual
harassment. Instead of simply amending the Eighth Cause of Action as permitted,
Plaintiffs in the SAC recharacterized the claim as sexual discrimination and
introduced a Ninth Cause of Action based on Civil Code section 51.9, which was
not previously pleaded.
Defendants argue that this change
raises new legal theories and claims for damages that were not asserted in
prior pleadings. Under case law, including People v. Clausen (1967) 248
Cal.App.2d 770 and Harris
v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, a plaintiff may only amend a complaint within the scope
allowed by the court and cannot add new causes of action without obtaining
permission. Furthermore, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have included
additional factual allegations not previously raised, which contradict or alter
the claims made in earlier pleadings. Under Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 and Womack v. Lovell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772, 787, courts may strike
amended complaints that attempt to introduce new or inconsistent factual
allegations without explanation.
Since the Court’s leave to amend
was limited to revising the Eighth Cause of Action and did not authorize the
addition of a new claim based on a statute not previously pleaded, Defendants
contend that the SAC was improperly filed. They request that the Court strike
the SAC in its entirety for exceeding the permitted scope of amendment.
While Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs exceeded the scope of permissible amendment by recharacterizing the
Eighth Cause of Action as Sexual Discrimination and adding a new Ninth Cause of
Action, the Court exercises its discretion to allow the amendments to stand.
Given that the newly asserted claims arise from the same underlying facts as
those previously pleaded, the amendments do not fundamentally alter the nature
of the dispute but instead refine the legal basis for relief.
Furthermore, while the SAC was
filed beyond the 10-day period prescribed under Rule of Court 3.1320,
Plaintiffs have provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing
counsel’s medical leave and a calendaring error by office staff. The Court
acknowledges that this delay was not intentional and finds that it does not
warrant the harsh remedy of striking the amended causes of action. Under CCP
section 438, the Court has discretion in determining whether to strike an
untimely pleading, and here, the brief delay does not significantly prejudice
Defendants or disrupt the litigation timeline.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to strike and allows the Second Amended Complaint to stand.